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1 Prologue  
This thesis aims to reflect on the financial crisis, lasting from 2007-2009, and the 
impact it had on the shipping market. We are interested in finding out how and 
why the financial crisis affected the shipping market so hard. 
The thesis is founded on a theoretical framework based on different subjects we 
have had in our time as Bachelor and Master Students. Though, we have also 
added relevant facts and information regarding the shipping market and the 
financial crisis to this foundation, in order to get a broader perspective on this 
topic. 
In order to analyze the shipping market, we have chosen five shipping 
companies which operate in different segments. These five companies have been 
thoroughly analyzed and discussed in chapter 8 of this thesis. When analyzing 
the companies; the theory from the previous chapters should be recognized as 
foundation for our discussion and arguments which legitimize our findings. In 
the analysis we have tried to benchmark our chosen companies against 
comparable companies in the same industry and segment. By comparable; we 
imply the companies are operating within the same segment and the majority of 
cargo handled being the equivalent. The routes travelled and ports called upon 
may vary, as may operate speed and types of contracts and financial structure of 
the company. Needless to say; to find a perfectly comparable company is not 
possible, but also this is what makes for a discussion of this kind.  
The conclusion of this thesis has been based upon the findings we have made in 
the analysis and the theoretical foundation. 
While writing this thesis, we have been using EndNote X3, a reference manager 
tool, and we have chosen to use APA 5th as the style of reference. When analyzing 
the five shipping companies, we obviously had to go through numerous annual 
reports and financial statements. In order to keep it simple, we chose to list all 
the URLs to the annual reports 2004-2009 of a company under one single 
reference. The reason behind this is, not only to keep it simple, but also since we 
have analyzed the years 2004-2009 in relation to each other. 
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2 Summary 
The theoretical framework of this thesis includes macro arguments for trade, 
shipping theory and definitions, including Martin Stopford’s comprehensive 
shipping market model, and some theory and definitions on some of the financial 
terms, such as gearing, financial and operating lease, used in this thesis. 
The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is a series of indices based on reports from 
independent and competitive shipbrokers. Its purpose is to provide the shippers 
and the ship-owners with unbiased information on freight rates, and it is thought 
to be one of the most accurate indicators of economic development in the 
shipping market.   
Due to environmental considerations, new IMO regulations state that by the end 
of 2010 all single-hulled tanker vessels should be phased out of the market and 
only double-hulled vessels will be accepted. This will result in more ships being 
scrapped or repurposed.  
The force behind the financial crisis was subprime mortgages sold to a higher 
rating than what they should have been, creating solvency and liquidity 
problems for the banks and the financial sector. It is reasonable to say the crisis 
started in the US, but it spread to other countries as well. The financial crisis led 
to a decline in world consumption, and thus world trade and the demand for 
shipping services decreased. The liquidity problems were faced by the shipping 
industry as well, with reduced attaining of debt due to interbank lending 
problems faced.  
Frontline is one of the world’s biggest tanker companies in the bulk trade. The 
Company has had a high debt to equity ratio during the period of 2004 to 2009 
and the ratio peaked at 7.44 in 2007. The Company’s net income decreased from 
$701M in 2008 to $105M in 2009 due to the decrease in voyage and time 
charters. Revenues were down 46,1% from 2008 to 2009, which amounted to a 
staggering $971M. 
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NAT operates in the tanker market and mainly transports crude oil. It is a fairly 
young company, which was founded in 1995, but has had a strong growth focus 
during its relatively short life. In contradiction to Frontline, NAT has a 
philosophy of low gearing and has financed their growth through issuance of 
common stock. Their debt to equity ratio was 0.2, 0.03 and 0.01 during the years 
of the financial crisis. Though, the net income of the Company plummeted from 
$119M in 2008 to $1M in 2009 due to low revenues and the cost of operating 
expense, including depreciation, amounting to $113M. 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen is the market leading company in RORO shipping. Due to the 
recent financial crisis the Company has had to put 17 vessels into layup entering 
2010. The debt to equity ratio has been relatively low; 1.17 in 2004, 1.90 by the 
end of 2009 and peaking in 2008 at 2.56 due to the issuance of new debt. The 
freight revenues of Wilh. Wilhelmsen were nearly halved from 2008 ($293M) to 
2009 ($153M) due to the sharp decline in average freight rates and the low 
utilization of the fleet.  
Odfjell is a worldwide provider of transportation and storage of bulk liquid 
chemicals, acids, edible oils and other special products. Odfjell’s extensive new-
building program resulted in an increase in the company’s debt to equity ratio, 
which peak in 2008 at 2.59. The net result of the Company went from being 
negative in 2007 to a positive $110.5M in 2009 due to the repeal of the 
Norwegian tonnage tax system. 
Golden Ocean is a dry bulk shipping company focusing on Panamax, Kamsarmax 
and Capesize vessels. The Company has had a high debt to equity ratio during the 
years 2004-2009, 5.52 in 2007 and 4.74 in 2008, but in 2009 it was down to just 
1.06 due to a major increase in equity and a decrease in debt. Further, the 
Company has had a return on capital employed peaking at 28.50% in 2007, 
20.79% in 2008 and 18.73% in 2009. The revenue in 2009 was $350M, which 
was a dismal result compared to $877M the year before. 
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Up until the crisis, the shipping industry saw a high degree of new-building, 
which created to large a supply of vessels during the decline and forced ships 
into layup.  
The various segments have all experienced a decrease in freight rates, but the 
chemical tanker market experienced the least volatile rates, which in turn hurt 
the companies as they have had a large portion of their ships in the spot market. 
Bunker cost increased freight rates and companies with hedges on bunker 
incurred substantial losses when the crude oil price plummeted.  
Chinese demand, especially for oil and iron ore, has been one of the main factors 
driving the increased and decreased demand for vessels, both prior to and 
during the financial crisis.  
All the shipping companies analyzed, but NAT, have experienced prevailing low 
share prices when comparing towards the BDI, BDTI, BCTI, OSEBX and the NYSE. 
The NYSE and OSEBX did not incur as high a decline as the shipping companies, 
making us believe the shipping industry was one of the losers in the midst and 
end of the financial crisis.  
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4 Theoretical framework 
4.1 Trade theory 
The following theory is based on the book ”Næringsstruktur og utenrikshandel: i 
en liten, åpen økonomi” by Victor D. Norman (Norman, 2006, pp. 13-20 & 142-
143). 
In the 1700´s Adam Smith stated, that there is not only the capital gain from 
export, but also the increased access to a variety of goods that makes countries 
prone to international trade.  
Through international trade a country will specialize in a variety of products, 
have a less specialized consumption, obtain a larger marketplace and reach a 
higher indifference curve, as we will describe in the following.   
 
4.1.1 Comparative Advantages 
Looking at the theory regarding comparative advantages presented by David 
Ricardo, a country should focus on producing what it is relatively better at 
producing compared to another country. If Norway is better at producing oil 
than China, and China is better at producing clothing relative to Norway, then 
Norway should produce oil and China clothing. By producing what they have a 
comparative advantage at, the total amount of oil and clothes will supersede 
what would be the case if either country produced both oil and clothing. Norway 
would have to enter into cross trade with China exchanging oil for clothing, or as 
the case is, selling oil internationally, receiving cash, and then purchase clothes 
from China and vise versa.   
Every country may have (n-1) comparative advantages, where n represents the 
total amount of goods and services produced by a country. Hence, a country 
cannot have a comparative advantage in producing all products they are capable 
of. It is these advantages that will determine the composition of trade and what 
will be exported and what will be imported.  
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International trade is thought of as raising the standard of living in a country as 
products are made more efficiently, increasing profit margin, or in a larger 
quantity, increasing the total output and thus the profit if margins sustain. With 
larger revenues from international trade the inhabitants of a country is able to 
purchase more products they desire, be it domestically- or internationally 
produced. Rather than having a specialized consumption, as would often be the 
case of self-sufficient countries, the production and consumption relationship is 
decoupled. 
The relationship between production capabilities and preferences of a country is 
intertwined with other countries production and preferences when trading 
internationally. When allowing for international trade, the utilization of 
respective comparative advantages and the more efficient employment of 
resources and knowledge will be utilized.  
It is very unlikely that a country like Norway would be able to sustain such a high 
level of real wages, diversity of products and services if it weren’t for the 
increased marketplace that free trade represents.  
When considering a country in autarky state, compared to when open for 
international trade we clearly see the difference in production of product x1 and 
x2, and consumption c1 and c2 for the two goods in the following figure. We 
denote the curve TT as production possibilities for a country when only 
inhabited by one consumer, although, we assume it is organized as free 
competition.  
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(Graph cited from Norman, 2006, p. 146) 
In autarky the consumer will adapt in A, where iAiA -the indifference curve of 
highest level that tangent with the production possibility line TT and the budget 
constraint line bAbA. Thus gaining maximum utilization of production and 
consumption, as they are equal and denoted by c1A=x2A and c2A= x2A, with a price 
ratio of: 
p1
p2
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
. Assuming free trade with the constraint of no transportation cost 
and a price ratio of: 
p1
p2
 
 
 
 
 
 
H
, the production adaption will be in point B, but the 
consumption adaption from the budget line bHbH, will be in point C. Thus giving 
the consumers a higher consumption level for both goods compared to autarky. 
The production of good x1 is increased, and the production of good x2 is reduced. 
As consumption of good 1 clearly is less than what is produced, the country will 
export x1H-c1H and import c2H-x2H as consumption succeeds what is produced.  
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By analyzing the effects of this beneficial trade, consumers have reached a higher 
indifference curve (the rotation of the budget line); as consumption is no longer 
bound to domestic production which is know as the decoupling from domestic 
production. With production locked in point A we assume the consumer would 
adapt in point D. Now also allowing for adaptive production we will get a shift in 
the budget line, also known as the utilization of comparative advantages, to 
where production is in B and consumption in C. 
It is safe to assume a country will benefit on international trade as long as the 
international price ratio differs from the autarky price ratio.  
 
4.2 Shipping theory and models 
 
4.2.1 Why Shipping? 
Shipping is a very old industry and the first cargoes were moved by sea more 
than 5,000 years ago (Stopford, 2009, p. 3). Trade extended itself over longer 
distances as time went on and the need for shipping increased. Adam Smith’s 
book “The Wealth of Nations” was published in 1776 and is regarded as the 
centrepiece of economic literature. In the book he stressed the importance of 
shipping and its impact on the economy: 
“As by means of water carriage a more extensive market is opened to every sort 
of industry than what land carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, 
and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally 
begins to subdivide and improve itself, and it is frequently not until a long time 
after that those improvements extend themselves to the inland parts of the 
country” (Smith, 1998, cited in Stopford, 2009, p. 4). 
Also, Adam Smith stated in his book that by the time a wagon drawn by eight 
horses could transport 4 tons weight of goods between London and Edinburgh, a 
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ship travelling between London and Leith, nearby Edinburgh, could carry 200 
tons weight of goods (Smith, 1998, cited in Stopford, 2009, p. 4). 
It is fair to say that shipping of goods made it easier to transport goods over 
distances not necessarily due to the speed of the transport, but rather the 
capacity of the cargo handling and the possibility of reaching markets that was 
more or less impossible by land transport.  
Nowadays, there are various ways of transporting goods. Martin Stopford 
(Stopford, 2009, p. 4) finds the airline industry to be the closest counter part to 
the shipping industry, but also points out that it is has a very short history 
compared to the shipping industry. And even though air transport has made it 
possible to transport goods much faster, the shipping industry still accounts for 
around 90% of the world trade (Shipping Facts, 2010). This is most likely due to 
the economies of scale principle, which is “reduction in long-run average and 
marginal costs, due to increase in size of an operating unit (a factory or a plant, 
for instance)” (BusinessDictionary.com, 2010b). A ship can carry much more 
cargo than an airplane, though moving at a slower speed. Also, the ship is more 
fuel-efficient than the airplane.  
Shipping has become an important factor in the modern economy and without 
the freight of goods by sea, the import and export of goods on the scale necessary 
for the modern world would not be possible (Shipping Facts, 2010). Shipping can 
be seen as a key factor to help countries engage in trade.  As a matter of fact, 43 
out of the 195 countries of the world are landlocked and have no direct access to 
the oceans. The landlocked countries have a disadvantage compared to the other 
countries since they have to rely on the neighbouring countries in order to trade 
by sea (Rosenberg, 2007) & (Rosenberg, 2009). Perhaps even more interesting; 
31 out of the 43 landlocked countries are developing countries and 16 out of 
those 31 countries are among the poorest countries in the world (The World 
Bank, 2008). This statistic further underlines the importance of seaborne trade 
for countries in order to develop and grow economically. 
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4.2.2 The four markets of shipping 
The following theory on the four markets of shipping is based on chapter 5 of 
(Stopford, 2009, pp. 175-214). 
 
We usually divide the shipping industry into four markets: 
- Freight  
- Sale and purchase 
- New-building  
- Demolition  
 
4.2.2.1 The freight market 
The freight market is simply the market for sea transport. Nowadays, trade is 
being done between countries all over the world and the commodities are being 
transported by ships. Even though there is a single international freight market, 
there are separate markets within this sector. Also, these markets have different 
ships. This is due to the different characteristics of the commodities being traded 
(e.g. Oil, chemicals, food and technology).  
 
There are two different types of transactions in this market; freight contract and 
time charter. Freight contract is transport at a fixed price per ton of cargo, 
whereas time charter is when a ship is hired by the day. When entering into a 
freight contract the shipper pay an agreed sum in order to get the cargo 
transported and leaves the management of the transport to the ship-owner. With 
a time charter agreement, on the other, the shippers are often experienced ship 
operators and are handling the transport management themselves.   
 
4.2.2.1.1 Types of Charter 
Bareboat Charter is such that the owner of the ship contracts the ship to a second 
party, usually for a long time, and the charterer then operates the ship as if he 
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owned it, paying for fuel, maintenance and so on, and the owner only paying the 
financial cost of the vessel (Stopford, 2009, p. 185). 
Voyage charter, also known as spot charter, is somewhat different as the owner 
of the ship is also the one running it, with the charterer only paying a fee for the 
transport of the goods per ton, item or alike. The only additional cost may be that 
of cargo handling. Operational and shipping market risk is here transferred to 
the owner of the ship instead of the charterer as is in bareboat charter (Stopford, 
2009, p. 183).  
Contract of Affreightment (COA) allows the owner of the vessels to use the ship of 
his choice, as the only aim is to get the amount of goods from where it is to be 
delivered within the time agreed upon. This may be for multiple trips and a 
minimum of goods every trip.  The risk is also here at the owner of the ship that 
has agreed to carry the goods (Stopford, 2009, pp. 183-184).  
Time charter is an agreement in which grants the charterer operational control 
of the vessel transporting the cargo, but the ownership and management of the 
vessel remains in the hands of the ship-owner. Instead of agreeing upon a fixed 
number of voyages, the two parties agree on a period of time the ship will be 
under operational control of the charterer. The length of such an agreement can 
be everything from the days or weeks it takes to complete one voyage to as long 
as months or years.  During the period of time charter the ship-owner will 
continue to pay all operating costs of the vessel, but the charterer will pay all the 
expenses concerning the voyage and cargo handling (Stopford, 2009, pp. 184-
185). 
 
4.2.2.2 The sale and purchase market 
The sale and purchase market is basically the market for sale and purchase of 
used ships. A ship-owner, who wishes to sell his ship, puts it up for sale. Usually 
the ship will be sold cash, with prompt delivery, free of any charters, mortgages 
or maritime liens. Though, sometimes it may be sold with an ongoing time 
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
16 
charter. In some cases, ships are being sold to raise cash in order for the selling 
company to survive. These sales are often referred to as “distress sales”. The 
purchasers, on the other hand, might be interested in such ships due to its 
specific type or capacity or just sees the deal as an investment. Brokers who 
specialize in one ship-segment usually carry out the sale and purchase of ships 
and facilitates such that buyers and sellers are connected.  
 
4.2.2.3 The new-building market 
The new-building market is closely related to the sale and purchase market, but, 
quite differently; it deals with ships that do not exist yet. Therefore, the process 
of buying and selling a ship in this market is much more complicated. The 
producer and the seller must agree with buyer on specifications of the ship. 
Shipyards usually wants the buyer to pick a yard standard design, which makes 
it easier to calculate the time and cost perspective of the ship building and also 
makes the building process easier due to the fact that they actually have built 
that kind of ship before. Buyers, on the other hand, may have special needs and 
may wish to make modifications to the standard design, though they will be 
charged extra for these changes. The shipyards normally prefer series orders. 
This is obviously due to the complexity of the market. The contractual process is 
time consuming. The future conditions are unpredictable and with the ships not 
being available for 2-3 years it is important for the buyer to have expectations of 
the further sustainability of the market. 
 
4.2.2.4 The demolition market 
The demolition market is the market for recycling old, out-dated ships. When a 
ship is due for demolition, it is not like any other household item which you can 
just throw away. The process of demolishing a ship is costly and time consuming. 
The sellers in this market are ship-owners with out-dated ships that cannot be 
sold for continued trading, and the buyers are scrap yards that dismantle ships. 
Similarly to the second hand market, there are brokers that usually work as 
intermediaries in the process of selling and buying ships that are ready for 
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demolition. The prices of scrapping a ship can be very volatile due to state of the 
local steel markets, where the scrap metal ends up, and the availability of 
scrapping facilities. 
 
4.2.3 Shipping market model 
The shipping market model is a model made by economist Martin Stopford and 
consists of three main components; supply, demand and the freight market. The 
model is meant to simplify an otherwise enormously complex market and 
focuses on the most important drivers in the shipping market. The following 
theory concerning the shipping market model is based on chapter 4 of Martin 
Stopford’s book, Maritime Economics (Stopford, 2009, pp. 135-174). Although 
the model is divided into three parts for simplicity, bear in mind that they are all 
connected and herein lays the difficulty of explaining the explicit reasons for 
change in the model.  
 
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
18 
4.2.3.1 Demand 
 
(Model cited from Stopford, 2009, p. 137) 
The demand in the shipping market is known to be very volatile. There can be 
short-term fluctuations as large as 10-20% in a year, but also long-term changes 
in the demand for shipping where ship demand has increased or decreased 
quickly over a longer period. There are five variables in Stopford’s model that 
explain the demand function of the shipping market which are all numbered in 
the demand module of Stopford’s model; the world economy, the seaborne 
commodity trades,  the average haul, random shocks in the market and transport 
costs. 
Stopford declares the world economy to be the most important influence on ship 
demand. This is due to the fact that the world economy creates most of the 
demand for sea transport through the import of raw materials for manufacturing 
or the trade in manufactured products. In the Shipping Market Model above we 
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can see the world economy being affected by business cycles and regional 
development, and are factors that bring changes to the demand for shipping. 
“The business cycle lays the foundation for freight cycles,” Stopford states. This is 
easily seen when you compare the growth in world GDP and growth in sea trade 
over time. You will see that when the growth in GDP is down the growth of sea 
trade soon follows and likewise when it is up. This is due to certain internal and 
external factors. The external factors are events such as wars, weather changes 
and sudden commodity changes.  
The internal factors, on the other hand, are more related to the dynamic 
structure of the world economy itself. Stopford claims there are four internal 
factors that cause these business cycles: 
• The multiplier and accelerator theory is one of those internal factors. 
When the income (GNP) is spent on investing in for instance new roads, it 
creates new workplaces. The newly hired workers will be spending their 
newly earned wages and it will create even more demand. This is called 
the investment multiplier. The income accelerator is when the new 
demand ensures further economic growth and generates demand for even 
more investment. But eventually labour and capital will become fully 
utilized and the economy will over-heat, and the multiplier and 
accelerator will reverse. 
• Time lags are another internal cause for the cyclical process. During 
upturns in the economy the shipowners order new ships to meet new 
demand, but it takes years until the ships are delivered and the market 
might have gone into recession when they are delivered.  
• Stockbuilding is another internal factor which has a short-term effect on 
the cycles. During recessions manufacturers run down stocks, which 
intensify the downturn in demand for shipping, just to see a sudden 
explosion in demand when the economy recovers. 
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• Mass psychology is the fourth internal factor as people does not act 
independently, but in an imitative manner which is why one person’s 
actions can spread throughout the whole market and affect the whole 
economic system. For instance, optimism or pessimism on the stock 
exchange can easily and quickly spread to all participants and affect their 
behaviour.    
Seaborne commodity trade is the second variable in the demand module. The 
main commodities shipped by sea are; energy trades, metal industry trades, 
agricultural and forestry trades. There are both short and long-term variations in 
the demand for certain commodities. Some commodities are seasonal (e.g. fruit, 
vegetables and grain) and therefore the demand for those commodities can be 
very volatile in a short-term perspective. Trade in seasonal commodities can 
vary enormously during for instance a year and makes it difficult to plan 
shipping of such commodities, and thus, the shippers rely on the spot charter 
market. Long-term changes in world demand are due to more drastic changes in 
demand for a specific commodity. This may be due to technological development 
where one source of power replaces another and the demand for the one 
commodity shifts to the other. Also, it may be a relocation issue, for instance, if 
the source where the commodity is supplied from changes or the processing 
plant is relocated. Or it might just be a change in transport policy on the 
shipper’s behalf. 
Thirdly, the demand is affected by the average haul: 
Avg. haul =  tonnage ×  avg. distance  
The effect of average haul has on ship demand is best illustrated when one of the 
world’s canals closes. For instance, if the Suez Canal was to close today it would 
mean that a ship carrying crude oil from the Arabic Gulf to Europe would have to 
travel nearly twice the distance it usually would. The average distance the cargo 
is shipped goes up, the average haul goes up and the demand for freight 
increases. 
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
21 
Random shocks are events that upset the stability of the economic system. They 
differ from the cycles by being unique and created by a particular event. These 
events can be for instance wars, commodity price changes, technological 
changes, weather changes and economic crisis. Evidently, such events can have 
dramatic impact on the shipping market and the demand for sea transport. If you 
look back at the happenings of the last century it is quite easy to find events such 
as the Wall Street Crash of 1929 that have caused these shocks, and you will also 
find that there normally is decline in trade and less demand for sea transport 
during these periods of turmoil. 
Finally, transport costs influence the demand for sea trade. Meaning; 
commodities such as raw materials will only be shipped over long distances if 
the cost of shipping does not exceed the benefit of the operation. Ergo, the price 
of the commodity being shipped plus the transportation cost is still lower than 
the price of buying the commodity in the domestic market, or the quality of the 
product justifies the extra transportation cost.  
 
4.2.3.2 The freight market 
 
(Model cited from Stopford, 2009, p. 137) 
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The freight market is an essential part to the shipping market model. It works as 
a regulator that adjusts the supply and demand side of the model.  In short; 
supply and demand are being balanced by the ongoing negotiation of freight 
rates between shipowners and shippers. The price of freight is dependent on the 
availability of ships and cargo. For instance, if there are few ships available, the 
freight rates will be higher, but too many ships will force the price of freight 
down.  
The following two subtexts, freight supply and freight demand, are examples of 
how the freight market works and do not constitute real-life prices and effects. 
 
4.2.3.2.1 Freight supply 
 
(Graph cited from Stopford, 2009, p. 161) 
As seen in the graph above, the supply function for a ship is J-shaped. The ship 
breaks out of lay-up when the freight rate hits $150 per million ton miles since 
the price of freight then exceeds the operating costs, but the ship will run at the 
slowest possible speed in order to minimize the cost. At the other end of the 
scale, the ship will run at its full speed at 15 knots per hour and supply nearly 14 
billion ton miles (btm) if the freight rates surpass $220 per million ton miles.  
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(Graph cited from Stopford, 2009, p. 161) 
The aggregate of all the individual supply curves of ships in a fleet provides us 
with the fleet supply curve. The individual supply curves vary depending on the 
individual ships age and efficiency. New ships are more efficient than the older 
ships, and thus have lower operating costs. Differences in operating costs mean 
that the ships also will have different lay-up points, which also means the fleet 
supply function is sloping upwards.  
The ship-owners respond to changes in freight rates by taking ships in and out of 
service. Ship number 10, which is the oldest ship in the fleet, has a lay-up point 
around $157 per million ton miles and this ship will be moved out of lay-up only 
if the freight rates exceed the operating costs. If the freight rates are $156 per 
million ton miles, only 9 out of 10 ships will be moved into service and it will 
continue like this until none of the ships are in service if the freight rates go 
below the $150 mark. On the other side of the scale; when all the ships are in 
service and are running at full steam, the fleet will have maximized its capacity. 
Then the only way to increase the supply of the fleet will be through building 
newer and more efficient ships and scrapping the older ships in a long run 
perspective.  
The slope of the supply curve is affected by the age and size of the ships and the 
relationship between speed and freight rates. Older ships tend to have higher 
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lay-up points due to them having higher operating costs. Older ships are also 
usually smaller than the newer ships and therefore have higher transport costs 
than the newer and bigger ships. Therefore, older ships will make the supply 
curve steeper. Finally, it is the relationship between speed and freight rates. In a 
perfect competitive market a shipowner maximizes his profit by letting his ship 
run at a speed which ensures that marginal cost equals the freight rate. Martin 
Stopford has in his book defined the relationship between speed and freight like 
this: 
s =
R
3 p.k.d( )
 
 
 
 
 
  
S represents the optimal speed in miles per day, R the voyage freight rate, p the 
price of fuel, k is the fuel constant of the ship and is the distance travelled. These 
factors combined in this equation are defining the slope of the supply curve. 
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4.2.3.2.2 Freight demand 
 
(Graph cited from Stopford, 2009, p. 165) 
The demand function shows the shippers price elasticity. In shipping theory we 
normally reckon that the demand function is quite steep. Meaning; the shippers 
will buy the same amount of transport regardless of what the price is, this is due 
to the fact that there is no real alternative mode of transport in this price range. 
This is most likely due to the lack of competition, the time restraint and the need 
to get the cargo shipped regardless of the cost and very often the freight cost 
only amount to a small proportion of the total cost for the shipper.   
The time frame is important in determining freight rates, as they consist of the 
present and belief of the future market, and will thus change as time goes by. We 
divide into the momentary, the short term and the long-term market.  
The momentary market is the spot market and the shippers as well as the ship 
owners need to take into consideration the local demand and supply of ships in 
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their region and the price of freight to other regions, as it varies. The whole 
process is like an auction and a little change in the supply of ships or good to be 
freighted may adversely affect the rates obtained, in a positive or negative 
manner, depending on which side of the table on is at.  
In the short-term market the owners of the ships may move vessels in and out of 
layup, and be able to respond to price changes. The figure above shows the 
supply offered in terms of thousands of billion ton miles per annum and the 
freight rate in dollars per thousand ton miles of cargo transported  
We have a movement from point A, where we are slow-steaming at 11knots, 
with low freight rates and only the most efficient fleet at sea. Moving to B there 
we expect a 50% increase in demand and the freight rate increase only slightly. 
The further increase in demand to point C will yield a dramatic effect of 270% 
increase in freight rates in relation to the 15% demand increase. In point D there 
will be full utilization of the fleet, with no more vessels to take out of layup and 
the vessels going at full speed. The reason for the small increase in freight rates 
from A to B is due to the less diversity of efficiency between the ships utilized 
while the efficiency of the ships and thus the cost of operating varies more 
significantly between the ships from B to C and similar form C to D.  
The trouble with the freight rates reaching the level of C and D is that this 
auctioneer state is not stable, the rates will fall again, as the shippers are looking 
for alternate mode of transport and investments made by shippers and owners is 
frenzy like.  
Finally, it is the long-term market. As the freight rates fall during a recession, so 
do the profitability and the second hand value of the vessels. Ships are scrapped, 
reducing the surplus supply. Or ships are converted from single hulled tankers to 
offshore vessels or grain carriers or utilized as storage facilities. The profitability 
that has prevailed in the market will seize when the delivery of new ships 
commence as the order-book will be larger than the actual demand in the 
market.  
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There are multiple ways the supply and demand can be affected in the long run 
with scrapping, higher demand for storage, time lags affecting the market 
balance with to much new-building and so forth. When describing this 
mechanism there are no clear-cut definition of how it will be, just simplifications 
of how it is intertwined.  
 
4.2.3.3 Supply 
 
(Model cited from Stopford, 2009, p. 137) 
Whereas the demand in the shipping market is known to be very volatile, the 
supply works quite differently. It can take up to 2-3 years to get a new ship 
delivered and the ships have a lifespan from 15-30 years. This can make it very 
hard to respond to the volatile increase and decrease in demand. Stopford’s 
shipping market model describes the supply side of the market having five 
variables that affects and determines the supply of shipping services to the 
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market. These variables are; the size of the world merchant fleet, the fleet’s 
productivity, new-building, scrapping of ships and freight revenues. 
The world merchant fleet is a collective term for all the ships available for sea 
transport and is an expression of the aggregate supply. The growth of the fleet is 
determined by the run of scrapping and deliveries of ships, but the delivery time 
for a new ship obviously makes it harder to dictate the run of new ships.  
The productivity of the world fleet is variable. There can be variations due to 
how efficient the ships are being used. In downturns in the economy ships are 
often very cheap and carrying less cargo per deadweight ton. Also in such times, 
the ships spend longer time on non-trading activities than they normally would 
in better times where the ships would have more loaded days at sea. 
Additionally, the productivity is influenced by the speed of the ship, but also the 
time the ship spends docked in port and its deadweight utilization. 
At last, the supply of sea transport is influenced by the freight rates. The freight 
rate mechanism works as a regulator between the supply and demand and 
motivates the suppliers to adjust the capacity in the short-term and to find ways 
of cutting their costs and improving their services in the long term. 
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4.3 Financing 
The shipping industry is a capital-intensive industry and the need for financing 
to purchase a ship is crucial. The balance between obtaining capital as a 
mortgage, through issue of new shares or through leasing is a decision that will 
yield different outcomes when facing a financial crisis of the magnitude we have 
seen the recent years. 
  
4.3.1 Gearing 
Gearing is the financial measure of the ratio of debt to total assets. This means 
that the greater the amount of debt over assets; the larger the gearing. There are 
multiple reasons for a firm to acquire debt, the most common one being the need 
for cash to pay for an asset.  
For a company paying dividend, the interest paid on a loan can be written off 
against the firm’s revenues allowing it to generate more earnings without the 
corresponding increase in the equity capital requiring increased dividend 
payments, which cannot be written off against earning. 
In general a higher debt to equity ratio represents a riskier company, but the 
industry standard should also be taken into account.   
The benefits of having a debt in an economic upswing may be the downfall for a 
company when the tide is turning, as some companies are simply not making the 
revenues needed to cover their interest payments or liabilities. On the other 
hand, there might be those companies that were, and are, able to make the 
payments, but are unable to obtain a loan as the banks are limiting their 
exposure and are struggling with their own financial situation (Investorpedia, 
2010b); (Investorpedia, 2010a) & (BusinessDictionary.com, 2010c). 
Gearing is often referred to as the debt to equity ratio and represents the 
liabilities of a company compared to the assets. A high level of gearing is often 
considered very speculative and banks that lend out money i.e. to buy a ship 
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often restrict the level of gearing allowed for that ship or company as a whole. 
One of the reasons for this is the fact that commercial banks usually lend out 
money at a rate of 1-2 percent points over the rate they borrow money at. Thus 
there is little margin of error and a bank must be certain that the company is able 
to make the payments. Seeing as shipping is such a volatile market and 
borrowers may face times when trading income does not cover the interest 
payments, clauses like the following may be embedded in the contract: 
- Assignment of earnings and insurance   
- The lender takes first mortgage on the ship, giving the first claim of 
proceeds when the ship is sold of  
- Income from a long charter is assigned to the lender and provides 
assurance that the loan will be serviced 
- A guarantee may be given from a third party, like the owner himself, 
government agency or Shipbuilding Company  
As capital cost of a ship may account for as much as 80% of total cost for a 
company, the decisions of financial strategy are amongst the most crucial a 
shipping company make. But due to the international mobility of ships, the 
choice of legal jurisdiction, adoption of less formal corporate structures, largely 
volatile revenue flows and asset values, a lot of shipping companies does not 
meet the criteria’s set by bankers and investors, thus creating a hard time for the 
companies to obtain long and short term financing (Stopford, 2009, pp. 40-42). 
 
4.3.2 Financial parameters 
When analyzing the shipping companies, we need to use some ratios for the sake 
of comparison as well as empirical evidence of the state of their financial 
performance. The companies are vast in the sense of magnitude of their 
liabilities as well as revenues, but also in the amount of financial derivatives and 
vehicles they use. We will use three main ratios as described below. These will 
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measure the profitability, solidity and liquidity of the companies. In the 
appendices we have calculated an array of ratios, used to various extend when 
comparing the companies. Some companies state these ratios in their financial 
statement, but we have chosen to calculate for each and every company so as to 
use the same figures to judge the performance.  
 
- Return on total capital= EBIT + Financial Income
Avg. Total Capital
 
o We have incorporated financial income in this ratio as these 
figures may have a large effect on the companies result.  
 
- Debt to equity ratio = Total Debt
Total Equity
 
o This ratio measure the amount of debt held against the total equity 
of the company. A ratio higher than 1.0 indicates debt to be the 
main source of financing.  
 
- Quick ratio = Current Assets -  Inventories( )
Current liabilities
 
o The reason for choosing the quick ratio rather than the current 
ratio is the withdrawal of inventories. As a company in distress 
may have problems selling their inventories, or at a substantially 
reduced price, it is highly speculative to include inventory when 
accounting for the liquidity of company.   
(Ratios cited from 1881.no, 2010) 
 
Simple-moving-average (Weissmann & Rosenfield) is “A simple, or arithmetic, 
moving average that is calculated by adding the closing price of the security for a 
number of time periods and then dividing this total by the number of time 
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periods. Short-term averages respond quickly to changes in the price of the 
underlying, while long-term averages are slow to react”. 
We have used a 50 day moving average when analyzing our companies in order 
to determine the long-term pattern in a stock price. By using a 50 day average 
we have eliminated some of the volatility we would have (Investorpedia, 2010d).  
 
4.3.3 Financial lease 
“Financial lease is the lease of an asset is similar to a purchase of an item, 
although the ownership of the item stays with the lessor for the lease period. The 
lessor is responsible for the purchase of the asset, while the lessee pays all the 
other costs like insurance, maintenance and taxes. The lessee acquires all 
economic benefits and risk such as depreciation and the potential loss of the 
leased asset” (BusinessDictionary.com, 2010a).  
This type of leasing is very common in the shipping industry. In many cases the 
firm establishes a wholly owned subsidiary, performing a buy-lease-back 
transaction. A company sells the vessels they feel are not performing as well as 
they would like in their books. Reasons may be they are fully depreciated, getting 
old, thus not being in line with company policy of a young fleet, or tying up to 
much cash. With a sale to the financing company (often a subsidiary) they may 
enter into a financial lease with the benefits as described above while the control 
of the vessels are still within the group and cash is untied in the process (bdp1 
Consulting Ltd., 2005).  
 
4.3.4 Operating lease 
Operating lease is different from financial lease in the way that the lessee is not 
able to take advantage of, especially, depreciation of the asset. The lessee is to 
use the item, in this case the ship for a period that is substantially shorter than 
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the ships useful life. Operating lease is not capitalized, but rather accounted for 
as a rental expense (Investorpedia, 2010c) & (InvestorWords, 2010).  
 
5 Baltic Dry Index 
The Baltic Exchange history reaches back more than 250 years with a humble 
start in the Virginia and Maryland coffee house in London where merchants and 
sea captains gathered to socialize and discuss business.  In order to establish 
some regulations in the market, the coffee house regulars formed a committee in 
1823. The rules applied by the committee made the Baltic Exchange an exclusive 
club with restricted access, and the members needed to have permission to join. 
From there on, the local coffee house developed into a major business centre for 
shipping which obviously outgrew the coffee house with respect to size, but also 
in the need for a more secluded location.  In 1903, the Baltic Exchange moved 
into their first purpose built establishment. 
 In 1985 the so-called Baltic Freight Index, a series of freight indices, was 
launched. Since then more indices have been developed to meet the demand 
from an increasingly more complex and larger business venue (Baltic Exchange, 
2010a). 
Today there are 53 dry bulk and tanker routes. The indices are based on reports 
provided by independent competitive shipbrokers; know as Panelists. They 
calculate the cost on routes with a specified ship standard, loading and cargo 
conditions. These standard measures makes it is easier to calculate for cargo, 
time and route deviations for the actors in the shipping market.  
The purpose of the Baltic Indices is to provide an independent party to deliver 
freight rates so as both parties of a contract may easily agree upon a fair freight 
rate, without the fear of the rate being manipulated.  
The weight of the routes included in an index may change when it no longer 
depicts reality as the ship standard may change and the cargo specifications may 
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be altered over time. Furthermore, there are routes being added and removed in 
accordance with the developments in the shipping market (Stopford, 2009, pp. 
195-197). 
As the successor to the Baltic Freight Index (BFI), the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) was 
launched 1st of November 1999. The multiplier of the equation first came into 
play when the BDI replaced the BFI and has been modified throughout the years 
as the contributing indices have changed and the methods of calculations have 
been modified. Today the index is calculated based on the following formula:  
Capesize TC avg. +  Panamax TC Avg. +  Supramax TC  avg. +  Handysize TC avg. 
4
 
 
 
 
 
 ∗ 0.113473601
TC avg. = Time charter average 
BDI is thought of as being a good indicator for economic growth or decline as it is 
a measure for the supply and demand of the shipping market, which in turn is a 
representation of the state of world demand. For instance, a shipper does not 
book a freighter unless he has cargo to move and a manufacturer would not 
order more raw material if the company has large quantities in stock that they 
are not able to sell (Gross, 2003).  
Beside the BDI, which is the most common index, the Baltic Exchange Dirty 
Tanker Index (BDTI) and the Baltic Exchange Clean Tanker Index (BCTI) are also 
established indicators. These indices are calculated using a basket of routes for 
their representative segment (Baltic Exchange, 2010b) & (Baltic Exchange, 
2010d) & (Baltic Exchange, 2010c).  
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(Graph cited from Baltic Exchange, 2010a) 
 
(Graph cited from Baltic Exchange, 2010d) 
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(Graph cited from Baltic Exchange, 2010c) 
The volatility in the indices has been less than equal studying the following 
graphs. The BDI, which is the main indicator peaked at 11,793 points in May of 
2008 and reached its trough in December of the same year, with a 94.4% decline.  
The BDTI only declined 80.7% from peak to trough in July 2008 and April 2009 
and the BCTI peak in April of 2008, with corresponding trough in April 2009, 
taking longer to reach the bottom. Both the BDTI and the BCTI are more volatile 
than the BDI, with seasonal peaks and trough, while the BDI has experienced 
more of a steady build up before 2005 and especially the crisis of 2008. This is 
believed to be due to the seasonality of the Oil trade and the freight rates as we 
will discuss later in the paper.  
The BCTI have experienced the least peak to end of 2009 fall, with 48.7% and 
corresponding numbers for BDI and BDTI were 74.5% and 65.3%.  
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6 Single to double hull 
The following information is collected from the official pages of the European 
Union (Europa.eu) and concerns the legislation regarding ship hulls (Europa.eu, 
2007).   
Until recent years most tanker ships carrying hazardous materials has been of a 
single-hull design. With such a design the cargo and the seawater are only 
separated by one piece of plating which makes it vulnerable should there be a 
collision or a stranding, and in such a situation there would be great risk of the 
cargo spilling into the sea and causing serious pollution to the nearby waters. A 
ship with a double-hull has less risk of spilling its cargo should it strand or 
collide since it is protected by a second layer of plating inside the outer layer and 
with sufficient distance between the two layers.  
Following the Exxon Valdez accident in 1989, the United States imposed new 
requirements to ship standards for vessels operating in US waters. These new 
requirements would concern both new and old tankers and the goal was to 
phase out the existing single hull ship design and have the new ships designed 
with double hulls in order to prevent future ecological disasters. The deadlines 
set for the phasing out of the single hulled tankers were 2010 and 2015 
dependent on the respective ships age.  
In response to the American measure to reduce pollution, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) established new double hull standards in 1992 in 
the MARPOL Convention which stated that tankers with a deadweight tonnage 
(DWT) of 600 tonnes or more was to be constructed with a double hull and this 
rule would come into effect from July 1996. Also, single hulled tankers with a 
DWT of 20 000 tonnes or more and delivery date before July 1996 had to comply 
with the new standards no later than by the time they were 25 or 30 years, 
depending on whether they had segregated ballast tanks. Segregated ballast are 
tanks located on specific impact areas of the ships hull with the purpose of 
protecting the ship from collision or stranding and preventing possible emission 
of dangerous cargo. 
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It is almost impossible, and not very economically efficient; to transform single 
hulled tankers into double hulled tankers in order to fulfil the new standards 
given. Meaning; that when a ship reaches the age limits set, its commercial life 
ends. The problem though has been the differences between the American and 
the international regulations, which lead to single hulled tankers being banned 
from US waters earlier than they were being banned from international waters. 
This meant that older and more accident prone, single hulled vessels would be 
sent to operate in other parts of the world, including the EU. Therefore, the 
process of phasing out the single-hulled ships was sped up by the EU 
Commission in regulation (EC) No 417/2002 from 2002. According to the new 
regulations single hulled tankers should be phased out no later than 2010. These 
rules would apply to all tankers of 5000 DWT or more. 
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7 Financial crisis 2007-2010 
The financial crisis we have been in the midst of the last three years unfolded in 
the latter part of 2007 and intensified throughout 2008, leading to the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers and the near collapse of other financial mammoths.  
 
7.1 Subprime 
The US subprime mortgage market was the first to succumb to the crisis, as it 
should, being the cradle of bad financing. Mortgages were packed in so-called 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and sold to investors, much like bonds. 
Initially an investor owned a small part of the entire portfolio of mortgages, 
rated anywhere from AAA to D as a whole. In the Standard & Poor’s rating 
system AAA is the best possible 
rating and D, on the other end of the 
scale, the worst rating given to 
mortgage (Standard & Poor's, 2010). 
Then, “clever” bankers started 
chopping up and restructure these packages of mortgages into new CDOs with a 
new credit rating. These CDOs were sold with the promise of yield and risk in 
accordance with their new credit rating, although they had been restructured 
from the mezzanine rating. The CDOs with the highest ratings were usually sold 
to pension funds, which are risk adverse. The mezzanine ones being sold to 
banks and re-structured, again. Lastly the poorest rated, being purchased by 
hedge funds and junk bond funds. The financial institutions selling these CDOs 
made billions of dollars in fees, which is safe to assume, motivated them to 
continue this sharade. When buying the CDOs to restructure, one used borrowed 
money, as well did the buyers of the restuctured products. This made for a highly 
leveraged product looking very attractive, on the paper. The fact we now know, 
is that even AAA rated investments stood to lose their value, which at the time 
was a total contradition of common belief.  But non the less, the wave of 
subprime mortgage defaults sweapt the US like a domino, followed by the 
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demise of artificially high housing prices causing the CDOs to lose value. Since 
the CDOs had been purchased with debt and the value plummeted, institutions 
owning these instruments did not have assets corresponding to the level of debt.    
When selling CDOs through national banks in countries like for instance Norway, 
Germany and in the UK, the countries mentioned became exposed to the 
downfall and thus creating a worlwide calamity (Carey & de Michelis, 2008) & 
(Pearlstein, 2007). 
The credit crisis was not only caused, but also triggered, by the US. Though, the 
ramification of the crisis was further amplified by the loose lending policies of 
the banks and the subsequent real estate booms in the UK, Spain, Iceland and 
many Eastern European countries as well.  
As an economy thrive the banks lending policy turn looser and subprime, as well 
as other borrowers, is allowed higher debt than they would be able to handle 
relative to a higher interest rate. Also, loans denominated in foreign currencies 
(Euro, Swiss Francs, and Yen) were commonplace in Eastern Europe, usually 
with lower interest rate than the domestic rate. Alas, with substantially higher 
risk for default as the ability to serve the loans depended on the continued 
exchange rate stability (Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, & Luc 
Laeven, 2010).  
 
7.1.1 Liquidity problems 
During the second phase, some banks relied on loans from other banks to keep 
up their liquidity rather than deposits of funds. As the crisis was upon them, 
interbank and liquidity problems surfaced, making it harder to receive loans 
from one another. The interbank credit spreads increased from 150 basis points 
to close to 500 basis points for the American dollar and from 100 to 350 for the 
euro. The problems surfaced with a bank run on Northern Rock in the fall of 
2007 (International Monetary Fund, 2010, p. 5) & (Stijn Claessens, Giovanni 
Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, & Luc Laeven, 2010).  
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Credit agencies were criticized for their inability to accurately determine the risk 
of complex mortgage-related securities and to closely align with the issuer. In 
addition the outlook for an even deeper housing downturn and default on 
mortgages led to the downgrade of securities by major rating firms. Due to the 
downgrade, spreads increased, creating an even bigger liquidity problem in the 
interbank and commercial paper markets (Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, 
Deniz Igan, & Luc Laeven, 2010, p. 13). 
What is believed to be the second phase of spillover was transmitted through the 
asset market, with ill liquidity, credit freeze, stocks plummeting and foreign 
exchange fluctuations, especially in the U.K. Sterling, Euro and the Swiss Franc.  
Central banks responded by making liquidity available to local banks. With the 
response varying in size and time of effect the end result seemed to work, but 
short lived as creditors and investors quickly lost confidence. Confidence was 
also lost in the credit default swaps market as it was highly unregulated and the 
question as to the security of the ultimate insurer raised unnerving answers.  
Even though the central banks made efforts to limit the damages in the financial 
sector, it proved too difficult to contain the spillover to the real economy (Stijn 
Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, & Luc Laeven, 2010).  
 
7.1.2 Solvency 
Solvency is considered the third phase of the crisis. Banks as well as financial 
institutions shifted their attentions to address this internal problem. Distress 
sales and growing need of recapitalization for major firms did not strengthen the 
confidence in the industry. When Lehman Brothers, with their international 
connections and exposures, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the fall of 2008, 
the market confidence was shocked on a global scale.   
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The major cause for the solvency problems was the massive build up of debt in 
the financial sector. As the value of financial vehicles dwindled the banks and 
corporations did not have assets corresponding to their liabilities.  
While the governments tried to intervene with guarantees and rate cuts, the 
scope, coordination and speed did not suffice and was less then organized. Thus, 
the problems intensified through international channels and connections (Stijn 
Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, & Luc Laeven, 2010). 
 
7.2 The Governments role 
Looking merely at the subprime trigger and the subsequent financial crisis can 
not be done without looking at what, or who, created a regulatory framework 
allowing for such, in retrospective, exploitation of the system.  
With the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999, financial and commercial banks 
were now able to merge, making it easy to invest money from savings and 
checking accounts into mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps. 
In accordance with Financial Accounting Standard the same banks are allowed to 
hold, so called, special purpose vehicles (SPV) or special purpose entities 
(Fadnes & Bjerke), for the off-balance sheet holding of securitized mortgages. 
What this in fact means is that liabilities, which should force the banks to hold 
capital reserves in risk of default, do not report these liabilities in the company’s 
financial statement. Alas, hiding liabilities and allowing for the capital reserves to 
be invested in, for instance, unsecured financial derivatives. The financial 
derivative market is unregulated, unlike derivatives of commodities that are 
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Thus, 
allowing for the creation of the many obscure financial instruments that even 
CEOs of Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley did not comprehend. 
Although trading in securities was to be seized if the banks reached a debt-to-net 
capital ratio of 12 to 1, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) decided in 
2004 to allow for the banks to develop their own net-capital requirements in 
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accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This ultimately 
led to the banks being free to operate as they saw fit, and some banks reached a 
staggering ratio of 40 to 1 at some point.  
It is a timely question to ask how this could happen, as the banking regulators 
have the power to act on predatory lending abuse. Only three formal actions 
against subprime lenders from 2002-2007 and a staff of 1,800, one can only ask 
what they were spending their time on. In 2003 Elliot Spitzer announced the FED 
used their time stopping the new laws prohibiting predatory lending. Also, due 
to the law prohibiting buyers of restructured subprime loans to sue anyone but 
the original lender, financial institutions and banks were free to sell and 
restructure anyhow they wanted without facing litigation.  
Lastly, what also contributed to the crisis was the fact that banks, in light of 
mergers and acquisitions in the run up to 2007, had become megabanks. They 
had become front-runners in their field and alike to national institutions in terms 
of influence, which made some believe they should have been regulated thereof. 
The sheer thought of these banks succumbing to the burden of debt would create 
such a shock in the market that the US had to initiate a rescue package to save at 
least some of them, as for instance in the case of AIG. The rating agencies built a 
foundation for the banks, as they gave favorable credit ratings to companies they 
had good business with. In retrospective; it is to believe rating agencies should 
have done a better research to fully comprehend what they were rating 
(Weissmann & Rosenfield, 2009).  
 
7.3 Crisis and shipping industry 
Looking back at the financial crisis and the effect it’s had on the shipping market; 
there are dramatic changes that have taken place and the forces behind this can 
represented by the decline in GDP and world trade.  
Different markets and regions of the world have been affected in a v variety of 
ways and with less than equal impact. The IMF measured an increase in world 
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GDP of 3% in 2008 and a decline of 0.6% in 2009. With the main driver being the 
emerging economies, yielding a 6.1% and 2.4% increase in the respective years. 
The decline of 2009 can be contributed to the advanced economies, who had a 
decline of -3.2% in 2009 and an increase of 0.5% in 2008.  
World trade has declined with as much as 10.7% from 2008 to 2009 and grew by 
2.8% in 2008. When breaking down 
these numbers to import and export 
from the advanced and emerging 
economies, the decline is mainly due to 
the advanced economies with import 
decline of 12% and export decline of 
8.2% in 2009. Emerging economies 
incurred an import decline of 8.4% and 
8.2% in export (Graph and numbers 
cited from International Monetary Fund, 
2010, pp. 2-3).  
 
The industrial production, which is the basis for much of the products carried by 
sea, saw a major decline in the midst of the 
financial crisis. Production has made a leap 
and is now back on a positive trend, which 
makes for a positive outlook for the world 
as a whole. Emerging markets were not as 
affected by the crisis when it came to output 
and experienced a less drastic decline than 
the advanced economies in industrial 
production as well. Output is now back to 
pre crisis levels and should further increase 
the trade amongst countries in the years to come (Graph and numbers cited from 
International Monetary Fund, 2010, pp. 2-3).  
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The interbank problems as described earlier are now less than during the crisis, 
as the represented by interbank spreads lower than before the crisis. Faith is 
also restored in the American bond yield as they are now closing in to the pre-
crisis levels around 4%, with the euro crisis not under control the bonds are not 
yielding the returns as before the crisis, rater at the same level as in the midst of 
the turmoil.  
Overall ton miles per deadweight ton of the world fleet has been falling in 2006-
2009, where the expected numbers for 2009 are 27.4M, while 2008 figures were 
29.2M. The surplus tonnage increased 26.6% from 2008 to 2009, calculating for 
numbers in April 2009, with the surplus tonnage representing 2.9% of the world 
fleet (International Monetary Fund, 2010, pp. 1-27).  
Also, ports throughput has been drastically altered as we can see below from five 
of the busiest ports in the world. They enjoyed a steady increase with major 
plans of expansion in the years before the financial crisis hit, but comparing 
2009 data to 2008 data the decline is in the range of 13,7%-21,7% as we can see 
from the table below. 
 
(Table cited from Floerl & Coutts, 2009) 
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Due to the absence of business, ships are forced to sit idle and wait for new 
contracts despite the decline in the global shipping rates of 74%, early 2009. The 
container traffic fell a staggering 20% and carrying capacity fell 15% from 
August 2008 to February 2009, along with the sharp fall in container rates. 
24,3% of the reefer fleet was in February 2009 reported to be in lay up for more 
than a month. In the hope of a contract being imminent, 10% and 8,8% of the 
bulk and container vessels were laid up. Most ships were in layup in the waters 
outside Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, due to the low anchor fees 
(Floerl & Coutts, 2009).  
There is only one company that has seized operations as of the start of 2009, 
namely Senator Lines, while others, for instance Maersk, are not going forth with 
previously planned expansions or rerouting and are cutting back on existing 
operations. Maersk are rearranging their AE-5 and AE-8 lines as to reduce the 
toll fees being paid to enter multiple ports on one tour. They are also rerouting 
their eastbound traffic from Europe to Asia around the Cape of Good Hope as to 
avoid the fees that amount to $800,000 for passing the Suez Canal with a super 
post-panamax vessel (Slack, 2009).  
The high freight rates, easy access to credit and increasing second hand prices 
for vessels have made for large 
investments in new ships. Thus the 
order-books for the segments have 
increased and are now larger than 
what is sustainable for the current 
market (RS Platou Group, 2010a, p. 
12).  
 
            
(Graph cited from RS Platou Group, 2010a, p. 12) 
 
 
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
47 
7.3.1 Lack of funding 
Lack of funding has been a problem for many shipping companies. In regard to 
new-building, which is usually very high when reaching the peak of a boom, the 
inevitable downturn has created interbank funding problems, which in turn 
makes for less lending to customers to limit the banks exposure.  
Due to the decline in freight rates and the over supply of vessels, the revenues 
have decreased substantially making it hard for some companies to pay their 
existing debt commitments, and thus making it hard to obtain new loans. In June 
2008 the order book for new ships represented 53% of the existing fleet 
capacity. To absorb this; it is assumed that the total trade needs to grow at an 
annual rate of 15%, not the actual 10.2% it has decreased. This has forced many 
shipping companies to utilize their ships as storage facilities, in order to make at 
least some revenue to pay for their current liabilities (Slack, 2009) & (Floerl & 
Coutts, 2009).  
As the shipping industry has experienced a lack of credit from their banks many 
ship-owners have tried to negotiate their way out of contracted ships under 
construction. Even though this may lead to financial trouble for the shipyards, it 
may save the industry as a whole from a long-term downturn as there are 
already to high supply of ships to meet the downfall in demand we have seen the 
last few years (de Lange, 2009).  
The lack of credit from the purchasers of shipped goods, especially dry bulk, and 
have delayed many shipments, thus creating a decline in revenues for shipping 
companies. On the basis of limited revenues for shipping companies, banks are in 
turn skeptical to lend out money as forfeit has increased.  
During the fiscal year of 2009 the big shipping banks in Germany has been 
remarkably reluctant at lending money leaving the stage to Mitsubishi UFJ 
Financial Group ($ 5.176B), DnB NOR($ 2.691B) and Nordea ($ 2.171B) as the 
top lenders. DnB NOR provided 60% of their lending to Norwegian companies 
although they only represent for a third of DnB NORs portfolio. This is due to the 
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importance of their proximity and the fact that a lot of Norwegian customers are 
building at Norwegian wharfs, thus being included in the state guarantee from 
Eksportfinans og Garantiinstituttet for eksportkreditt (GIEK) (de Lange, 2010).  
During the Nor-Shipping week in Oslo, DVB Bank economist Sjur Agdestein 
stated that ship-owners wanting to invest in new ships would have to think 
otherwise since the banks would not lend them any money.  Out of the previous 
fifty, there are only seven shipping companies doing active business as of 
11.06.2009, and these banks will only lend money to a secluded group of their 
core customers (Becker, 2009a).  
Although the situation has improved somewhat and the first initial public 
offering (IPO) in shipping is underway thanks to Nordea, there is still a long way 
to go for the shipping industry in means of restoring the accessibility of credit. 
The Norwegian Bank’s leader, Svein Gjedrem, still urges to prudency when it 
comes to lending to the shipping industry as he believes they are not financially 
ready for an aftershock of the financial crisis (Becker, 2009b). 
 
7.3.2 Crude oil and bunker price  
Due to high demand for oil in 2004, the market experienced an increase in the 
demand for freight, led by China and the US as the major destinations for 
delivery. Bunker cost followed the oil prices quite closely.  
2005 had lower demand for oil compared to 2004, but still China and the US 
represented the largest part of consumption with 55% of demand. The relative 
high oil prices of $70 a barrel was partly due to the hurricane season in the US 
and geopolitical instability in the Middle East and Nigeria. With abnormal prices 
the demand softened reaching years end.  
2006 was a volatile year with bunker reaching a high of $76, only to fall to $56 in 
mid-October. This was mainly due to the high amount of storage before the 
hurricane season in the US.  
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
49 
In 2007 the oil price increased steadily throughout the years making a small 
seasonal dip in the late summer and closing at $85 at year’s end.  
Although 2008 had a good start for the industry, with oil peaking at a record high 
$143, world demand decreased in the second half of 2008 and oil prices 
plummeted to $38, at end of December, even though OPEC were trying to put 
less pressure on the prices and consecutively reducing oil production.  
Oil demand increased 1.8% in 2009 and oil price as well as bunker has increased 
throughout the year. This is much caused by optimism, especially by the 
increased GDP in China and their need for oil (RS Platou Group, 2010c) & (OPEC, 
2007).  
 
7.3.2.1 Crude oil prices 
Looking back at the shipping market model we note that the cost of transport 
and the increased demand for goods are two of the drivers for shift in the freight 
market. With the increased demand for oil we have seen in the years leading up 
to, and including, 2008 the oil prices have had a significant abnormal increase. 
Oil demand surpassed the supply for 2006 and 2007 creating an upward 
pressure on the oil price leading to an artificially high spot price before the vast 
downfall in summer of 2008.   
China is the third largest net importer of oil and the as the consumption has 
increased substantially from 2004 through 2008 the domestic production has 
had a relative standstill. As end of 2008 the import represented about half of 
domestic consumption of oil 
at 7.85mb/d with world 
consumption being 85.7 
Mb/d. The US has also 
increased their consumption 
of oil, but not nearly in the 
range that China has. With 
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China still increasing their consumption as of 2009 and expected to do so in 2010 
the US has reduced their demand of crude oil, thus creating somewhat of a shift 
where oil is transported (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010); 
(International Energy Agency, 2010) & (Graph cited from Oil-price.net, 2010). 
 
7.3.2.2 Bunker  
Crude oil prices are the key influence in bunker cost. The Bunkerworld Index 
(BWI) is comprised of 20 bunkering ports, weighted daily. Thus being a 
representative index for settling bunker contracts and futures in addition to 
being an indicator for price movements.  
The bunker cost reached a high of 1799 points at 15.07.2008 and a record low at 
year’s end of 589 
points in 2008, falling 
67% in just a few 
months. For those on 
spot purchase of 
bunker this was most 
welcome while those 
holding future 
contracts with higher 
strike price this discrepancy of cost created tremendous losses. 
(Bunkerworld.com, 2010).  
 
7.3.3 Coal and steel  
Ore and coal makes up for about half the demand for dry bulk cargo and is thus 
the main driver for these freight rates. 
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China is the world’s largest consumer of coal, for use in their steel mills as well as 
for the production of energy. With an approximate 2B ton consumption in 2005 
and a yearly average growth of 200M ton, the total import of coal is in the range 
of 150-200M ton per year, as of 2009 (Aden, Fridley, & Zheng, 2009).  
With the increase in dry bulk 
import to China the last decade 
one can easily understand how 
the Chinese demand is a big 
driver for the world consumption 
of these products and how this 
affects the freight rates (RS 
Platou Group, 2010a, p. 20).  
                 
(Graph cited from RS Platou Group, 2010a, p. 20) 
7.3.4 Stock exchanges 
We will be looking at an array of stocks in this discussion and the majority of the 
stocks are listed either on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSEBX) or the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). The benchmarking towards these indices will give us an 
impression of the magnitude of crisis and the actual decline that took place, both 
with respect to the indices as well as the individual stocks. It will also exemplify 
the recovery, or lack thereof, that has taken place.  
The OSEBX is the main index and is supposed to be a representative array of the 
stocks listed on the exchange. It is revised every six months, and adjustments to 
the composition are made when necessary.  
The main index had a peak in the summer of 2007, followed by a decline towards 
January 2008. From late January to 16th of May the stock soared with an increase 
of 31%, followed by a 64.1% in the subsequent six months (Oslo Stock Exchange, 
2010) & (e24.no, 2010f). 
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The NYSE composite index, in contrary to the OSEBX, measures the aggregate 
performance of all their listed stocks. Through various methods and calculations 
this is believed to be a good representation of the development.  
With a steady increase in the years prior to, and including most of 2007 the NYSE 
composite index experienced a sharp decline in August of 2007. The index rose 
to an absolute peak of 10,312 points on the 31st of October following a, thought 
to be, major decrease through the first week in March 2008.  Regaining some of 
its strength during the month of April and beginning of May the stock fell to its 
lowest level since 1997 at the 9th of March 2009 with a value of 4225.3 points. 
From this point the index has regained some of its previous value, but is still 
down 29.6% since its peak (NYSE, 2010) & (Yahoo! Finance, 2010d).  
 
7.3.5 Segments 
There has been a varied development within the different shipping segments as 
the commodities carried are of different value, demand and supply. In the 
following we have limited out research to the segments in which our companies 
trade within. 
 
7.3.5.1 VLCC and Suezmax crude oil carriers  
With the development of the prices in these markets the time charter equivalents 
(TCE) rate development of 2005 were between $24,000 and $130,000, and for 
Suezmax $23,000 and $107,000. The year started with high rates both for VLCC 
and Suezmax tankers at the rates of $81,000 and $70,000 respectively, but with 
the seasonal fall having its impact in April. In August the TCE reached $89,000 
and $ 75,000 led by increase oil demand toward the hurricane season in the US 
and the high future prices on oil, which caused massive use of tankers for 
storage. Due to the large oil reserves the oil prices dropped causing the TCE to 
end at $63,000 and $50,000 for VLCC and Suezmax.  
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2007 started good for the Suezmax tankers as there were major delivery 
problems in France creating an upward surge in the prices to $70,700. VLCCs, on 
the other hand, experienced a smaller upswing to $47,000 and were now 
creating substantially lower revenues than usual, compared to the Suezmax fleet. 
Both segments declined throughout the year, until November when VLCCs 
experienced an increase in demand. 
The price of oil continued rising in 2007, hurting the tanker owners and 
operators such that a joint decision was made to reduce the average speed from 
15 knot to 12 and thus saving $20,000 a day in bunker cost and reducing total 
capacity by 10%. Capacity was also reduced as an estimated 10-15 VLCCs were 
marked for conversion, thus resulting in an increase in TCE.  
In the beginning of 2008, the VLCC market reached its high of a daily TCE of 
$195,000, only to experience a decline throughout the year and the daily average 
ended on $95,000. There are various reasons for the high prices, but it was 
mainly due to the Iranians tying up 12-14 vessels for storage, the Chinese 
increased demand for oil in relation with the Olympic Games, various port 
strikes and increase in ton-mileage for US, China, Japan and Korea. 
In the fourth quarter of 2008 the demand for vessels increased as contango, 
which is higher future price than the current spot price, prevailed in the future’s 
market and 40 vessels were chartered under storage or voyage ending in 
storage. The financial crisis and thus the lower GDP growth slowed the demand 
for consumer products as well as for oil. Less export were undertaken as the oil 
prices were down and the belief of a fair price of oil being $75 a barrel, creating 
less profit for exporters with rates around $40. 
Reaching 2009 contango was still in effect and there were respectable rates at 
$83,000 for a VLCC, although prices fell significantly reaching March and 
continued on a downward spiral through the third quarter. Though in spite of 
this development, at the end of the year, prices were up to $39,500, much due to 
a large number of vessels utilized as storage and less new deliveries. The 
delivery of new ships was 40% less than expected due to cancellation and 
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slippage. Rates fell on account of 
negative outlook for future 
demand, but to some extent 
China with their increase in 
import of oil, managed to put an 
upward pressure on the price.  
The current fleet as of March 
2009 was comprised of 18% 
single hull vessels even though 
they are discriminated when it comes to freight rates. The single-hulled vessels 
were still available and trading to some extent, which meant a larger pressure on 
the supply side of the industry. Though, these tankers are to be phased out 
within 2010 due to the IMO regulations. This may have a positive effect on the 
market since it will relieve some of the pressure put on the supply side 
(Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010) & (Graph cited from RS Platou Group, 2010d).  
 
7.3.5.2 Pure Car Carrier (PCC), Pure Car & Truck Carrier (PCTC) and Roll-On-Roll-
Off (RORO) 
In 2004 the main drivers for the demand was the increase in vehicles worldwide 
with 3.8%. The export from Japan and Korea rose by 12.5% and 30% 
respectively. The depreciating American Dollar contributed to increased exports 
from and decreased import to the US. Heavy and agricultural machinery had a 
formidable increase especially to South and North America and Oceania. The 
world fleet had an increase of 25 PCC/PCTC for the year, increasing the total to 
453 and expecting 33 vessels on delivery for 2005. The main driver behind the 
development in the segment was the increased demand from Asia (Annual 
report 2004 cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010).  
The demand for cars increased through the year of 2005 as well, with an overall 
increase of 3.2%. Korea increased their export of cars by 9% and in China there 
was an increased demand for heavy machinery, which meant a positive outlook 
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for the segment. High activity in the mining industry in South America further 
strengthened the demand for machinery. The world fleet is at this time around 
470 vessels, which represents a net addition to the fleet of roughly 17 ships 
(Annual report 2005 cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010).  
Further delivery of heavy machinery to Australia and increased demand from 
Asia to America and Europe strengthened the segment in 2006. 
The largest influence in the market this year was the big strike in Korea, which 
lead to utilization and dead-time for the companies transporting. The additional 
cost to secure the shipments of cargo in the time after the strike further 
increased costs and weakened margins for those involved (Annual report 2006 
cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010).  
2007 saw record high bunker prices and the increase in demand for sea 
transport for cars, machinery and non-containerized equipment. The bunker 
prices increased due to the record high oil price, thus squeezing the margins for 
carriers. Freight rates also increased making it profitable to expand business 
(Annual report 2007 cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010).  
Higher freight for the majority of the first two quarters of 2008 strengthened 
revenues for the segment. The utilization though was less than perfect due to the 
undersupply of tonnage throughout the last few years, and increasing demand 
for transport. The need to perform ballast legs has also put a constraint on the 
revenues. The main drivers were the increase in transport of high and heavy and 
non-containerized cargo, but there was a setback in the transport of cars (Annual 
report 2008 cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010).  
The downward trend seen in late 2008 continued into 2009 and there was a 
decrease in worldwide demand for cars by 20%, which lead to a decline in the 
demand for RORO transport by 50%. According to RS Plateau this may be due to 
limited sea voyages and better logistic opportunities as the cars, to a larger 
extent, can be sold where they are made and the massive shipment of cars prior 
to the crisis, which are now sitting idle in ports of their destination country.  
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Both Korean and Japanese manufacturers have increased their market share in 
North America as of May 2009 (Annual report 2009 cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
ASA, 2005-2010).  
Japanese export significantly dropped during late 2008 and first half of 2009. As 
they are the largest exporting country of cars, their setback has seriously 
affected the segment. 14% of the RORO fleet was scrapped during 2008. Reduced 
vessel speed as well as longer journeys combined with the lay up of vessels had 
decreased the supply side of the market.  
During the second half of 2009 export from Japan and Korea increased, much 
due to stronger signs in the economy and incentive packages around the world. 
Export is, as of February 2010, up 50% from mid 2009, but still 30% below peak 
in 2008.  
The total order-book for PCC was 33% as of late 2009 and 14% for RORO cargo 
carriers. Thus being respectively in what Clarkson research denotes as high and 
low risk zones. The utilization of the PCTC fleet went from 93% to 60% from 
2008 to 2009.  
“Plateau mentions the fact that the deep sea automobile trade was hit much 
harder than global automobile sales, mainly because the trade had a lager 
exposure to regions where automobiles sales fell more than the global average, 
combined with manufacturers seeking to sharply reduce inventories” (RS Platou 
Group, 2010b, p. 1)  
Regional development in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Eastern 
Europe, where one has experienced a major increase in import leading up to the 
crisis, has now experienced drastic reductions in import, although these 
countries have not been as severely hurt by decline in GDP.  It is expected that 
these countries will be back to higher import relative soon, as to further 
strengthen the demand for transport.  
Japanese car manufacturers have had some plans as to expand their production 
in the US as to utilize the plants that have been experiencing less production due 
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to the Chapter 11 filing of GM. This may seriously affect the future for car 
carriers as cars may be distributed throughout the US by rail rather than shipped 
from Japan (RS Platou Group, 2010b); (RS Platou Group, 2010a) & (RS Platou 
Group, 2009). 
 
7.3.5.3 Chemical tanker market 
2004 was a good year for the shipping industry as a whole, although chemical 
tankers are a more isolated segment they have felt the ever-present interplay 
between the segments. The competition of the Handysize vessels is getting 
fiercer and the prices for building chemical tankers are rising due to the decrease 
in yards accepting to build them (Annual report 2004 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-
2010).  
In 2005, rising freight rates had a positive effect on the chemical tanker market, 
but the rising oil price, as for all shipping segment, had a dampening effect on the 
result for the companies. Geopolitical problems and hurricane season also had a 
negative effect on the segment (Annual report 2005 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-
2010).  
2006 had increasing bunker prices compared to 2005, the parcel tanker freight 
rates was somewhat weaker in Q2 and Q3 and a sluggish growth at the end of the 
year. The tanker storage business saw also an improvement during 2006. The 
parcel tanker segment experienced higher operating cost much due to bunker 
and the increase in maintenance and upgrades of the ship to the standard 
required. The chemical tanker market prospered, much due to the increasing 
demand of vegetable oil and input crops, also the cancellation and delay of new-
buildings. Long-term charters were in demand as the charterers worried about 
the increase in freight rates (Annual report 2006 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).  
The IMO MARPOL Annex II revision, which took effect as of 1st of January 2007, 
states the need for double hulled vessels for the carriage of certain chemicals. 
Thus creating the need to re-build or carry other types of products not classified 
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under the Annex II revision. The fleet growth of deep-sea chemical tankers grew 
of about 6-7% during the year, although less than previous years and the order-
book include around 280 ships.  
During 2007 the segment prospered on the rising freight rates, the increased 
demand in the Far East and a depreciating dollar enhancing competitiveness. 
The major downside is the downturn in demand for bio-fuel products as multiple 
products have been scrapped or delayed. The spot rates in the segment 
increased by 10-15%, much due to the increase in operating cost caused by 
increased oil prices. The COAs and time charter demand also increased.  
The increase in the fleet is about 8% for 2007, with the total order-book 
increasing to 410 ships as high freight rates have seemed to boost the need for 
new ships.  Demolition was 8 ships for the current year and 7 in 2006 for the 
deep sea chemical tankers, thus not nearly enough to balance the order-book of 
new vessels with main delivery in 2010-2011 (Annual report 2007 cited in 
Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).  
2008 started of well for the chemical tankers, with rising rates towards the 
summer. With the financial crisis affecting the entire world economy, the oil 
prices plummeted and thus the further debate on biodiesel was put on hold. This 
created a massive drop in demand for such product carried by chemical tankers.  
Although the financial crisis spilled over to the shipping industry in the summer 
of 2008, the chemical tanker segment did feel the serious effects until late 2008. 
Due to the high number vessels supplied, too little cargo to meet supply and a 
general high build up of inventory, which materialized in less demand for sea 
freight. The revenues for the shipping companies were high in 2008, although 
with fewer products to be carried, the decrease in bunker cost had a positive 
effect on the result. 
The piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden made for some shipping companies to sail 
around the Cape of Good Hope, which in turn increased average haul.   
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The chemical tanker fleet grew by 12% in 2008; with nearly no additions to the 
order-book, thus the outstanding order-book for the deep sea market is down to 
represent 37% of the current fleet (Annual report 2008 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-
2010). 
2009 proved to be a tough year for the chemical tanker business, with the 
aftermath of the financial crisis the demand was still low. China increased their 
consumption considerably making for more demand into the Far East, but the 
return leg proved difficult, as the demand for product from China to Europe and 
the US were limited. The chemical tanker fleet grew by 9.2%, and even though 
demolition doubled from 2008 the increase in world fleet was more than the 
market could absorb, with limited demand.  
The world fleet order-book fell to 26% for the deep-sea chemical tanker 
segment, thus a sharp fall from the previous high ratios in 2007 and 2008. This is 
generally seen as a good sign, even though the number of cancellations was 
lower than expected as many ships are reaching their completion and 
cancellation was hard to perform (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-
2010).  
  
7.3.5.4 Panamax and Capesize segment 
The segment has experienced a increase in value of fairly new ships, 5 years of 
age, with a 7% increase in 2006 the prices for a Panamax is $46 million and $81 
million with newbuilding contracts respectively $38 million and $68 million, 
with delivery in 2010 (Annual report 2006 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 
2005-2010).  
During 2007, the market increased substantially throughout the year mainly due 
to increased demand of iron ore to China. The daily rates for the year averaged 
$176,000 and $82,500 for Capesize and Panamax respectively, and there were a 
further surge in second hand prices reaching $135million for Capesize and 
$85million for Panamax at years end.  The high utilization of the dry bulk fleet of 
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98.5% created a shortage of supply in some areas, putting further pressure on 
the freight price (Annual report 2007 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-
2010).  
In 2008 the Baltic index plummeted and the average rates were down between 
30-50% in the first quarter. The second quarter was substantially better, 
averaging in the range of Q407, and the Baltic Cape index reaching an all time 
high in June. This was much due to the 9% export of iron ore from Australia, and 
further export increase in Brazil and Canada. Slippage also increased, leading to 
less supply of vessels.  
3Q08 was rather grim for the dry bulk segment. The rates ended at $41,159 and 
$19,294 for Capesize and Panamax, but in Q4, rates were at one point down to 
$2,316 for Capesize. Though, prices increased throughout the month ending at 
average earnings of $11,250 and $7,740 for Capesize and Panamax. Part of the 
decrease in freight rates were due to the halt in import of iron ore to China, 
caused by the prevailing spot prices that were lower than contractual prices, as 
well as the high inventory of iron ore in China. Steel also saw a general decrease 
in demand throughout the year. With lower trade volume, the port congestion 
and sailing distance were shorter, creating higher utilization of the vessels, 
which pushed the supply side of the fleet further up.  
At years end of 2008 the prices of five-year-old ships were now, $30M for 
Panamax and $48M for Capesize, representing a drop of 60% the last quarter 
(Annual report 2008 cited in 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-
2010).  
In light of the crisis in 2008, 2009 
started well, with earnings 
ranging for a Capesize between 
$9,000 and $39,500 a day. The 
forces for this increase were the 
higher demand for iron ore 
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import to China, the higher availability of letters of credit and higher congestion 
in ports. In 2Q09 the market was still managing to keep an utilization of over 
90%, much due to the port congestion problems in for example China and 
Australia tying up 5% of the Capesize fleet. 
At years end 2009 the fleet was earning an amounted average of $27,600 for 
Panamax and $55,350 for Capesize vessels, thus a substantial increase compared 
to 4Q08.  
The high order-book for the segments are a worry for the ship-owners, although 
the shipyards are experiencing slippage, the tonnage on order may be able to 
offset the supply and demand relationship and force prices back down (Graph 
cited from RS Platou Group, 2010c) & (Annual report 2009 cited in Golden Ocean 
Group Ltd., 2005-2010). 
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8 Five shipping companies  
 
8.1 Frontline  
Established in 1985 and listed on the Swedish stock exchange in 1989. After 
Hemen Holding Ltd., owned by John Fredriksen, became the largest shareholder 
in 1996; the decision was made in May 1997 to change Frontlines domicile from 
Sweden to Bermuda and to list its shares on the Oslo Stock Exchange. The stock 
is also listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock exchange 
(Frontline Ltd., 2010d). 
“The company’s vision is to provide the customers with flexible and reliable 
transportation service, and use this flexibility to develop unique industrial 
relations that will give material benefits to the customers as well as to the 
Company, Shareholders and employees” (Frontline Ltd., 2010f). 
From the Frontline web page; it is also stated that Frontline’s vessels mainly 
trade in the spot market, which usually turn a higher charter rate than time 
charter. This affects the continual employment and Frontline needs to efficiently 
charter its OBO carriers and tankers. Since Frontline seeks to maximize earnings 
in employing vessels they focus on operational safety and quality of 
maintenance, to comply with environmental regulations and the outsourcing of 
technical operations and crewing. To further strengthen their financial situation 
they minimize operational cost, focus on high utilization of their vessels and a 
good relationship to their main charterers as well as negotiating competitive 
financial agreements (Frontline Ltd., 2010f).  
 
8.1.1 Operations 
The Company, including its subsidiaries, is employing 51 persons as of 
31.12.2009, in their offices in Bermuda, Oslo, London, Singapore and India. 
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Frontline Management AS is responsible for the commercial management of 
Frontlines ship owning subsidiaries, including chartering and insurance. The 
Management Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Frontline Ltd. with 
domicile in Norway.  
With an extensive outsourcing strategy independent ship management 
companies are taking care of Frontlines need for crewing, ship management and 
accounting services. Frontline benchmarks operational performance and cost 
level amongst the Company’s ship managers and crews are usually from Russia, 
India or the Philippines (Frontline Ltd., 2010e). 
   
8.1.2 Who controls the Company and what is their strategy 
John Fredriksen controls the Company through Hemen Holding Ltd.  and the aim 
is to have competitive returns to its shareholders, with quarterly dividend 
payments. To the furthest extent the Company is adjusting its fleet to be owned, 
leased or sold-and-leased-back through fully owned subsidiaries or partially 
owned companies.  
Fredriksen’s daughter Katrine Fredriksen is employed as a director in the 
Company and one is to believe she is learning the business, so as to one day take 
over the Company with her sister. This along with the great returns Mr. 
Fredriksen has received through the ownership of the Company; it is believed he 
is to be a long time owner (Annual report 2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-
2010, pp. 74-75). 
 
8.1.3 Segments 
Frontline is a major company in the tanker business, with their main freight in 
oil. Their Oil/Bulk/Ore (OBO) tankers make the Company more flexible in the 
way they transport cargo; they may carry oil one way and ore or dirty bulk the 
other way. This allows Frontline to take advantage of the fluctuations in freight 
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rates for the various commodities the carriers are able to transport. Although it 
is expensive to clean the tankers between the shipments, they are binding less 
capital than by obtaining two different ships (Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010).  
Frontline has 29 Suezmax tankers, 47 VLCCs and 8 OBOs, making it a total of 84 
vessels. This includes vessels on commercial management and owned by 
Independent Tanker Corporation Ltd. (ITCL), which is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Frontline Ltd.  
Frontline takes pride in having one of the most modern fleets in the world, with 
nearly all of their ships being in accordance with the new IMO regulations. New 
ships allows for more efficient and reliable operations as well as being compliant 
with new maritime regulations as of 2010 and less of a hazard for marine life in 
the case of an accident (Frontline Ltd., 2010c).  
The trade of Frontline is conducted worldwide, but in the last few years the trade 
in Asia has substantially increased, due to the higher demand for oil and ore to 
China (Annual report 2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010). 
 
8.1.4 Fleet 
Looking at the financial statements of Frontline, the acquisition of vessels and 
contracts to buy vessels are performed frequently. With the sale and purchase of 
options it seems like Frontline is using their skills of negotiation and foresight to 
create the best return whether that is to purchase a ship for their own usage or 
to make a profit on the option. 
In 2006 Frontline entered into an agreement for the delivery of four VLCCs and 
an option for an additional two. As Frontline were able to sell two of the 
contracts with a gain of $9.8 million they entered into a new agreement for the 
delivery of additional two VLCCs. The options were exercised and the ships were 
sold to a third party.  
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The Company also entered into an agreement for the delivery of four Suezmax 
tankers with an option of further four vessels. Two of the contracted vessels 
were sold to Ship Finance Ltd (Annual report 2006 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-
2010, pp. 16-17).  
In 2007 the options for four Suezmax vessels were exercised and the delivery 
date of the now four VLCCs and eight Suezmax vessels were between 2008 and 
2010. With 80% of the liabilities of $880 million being financed with new credit 
facilities (Annual report 2007 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, pp. 18-19).  
Frontline entered into further agreements of new-building with the delivery of 
four VLCC new-buildings and a fixed price option for further two, which were 
exercised in May of 2008. At the year’s end, the contract for delivery consisted of 
ten VLCC and eight Suezmax vessels as the yard were not able to deliver the 
contracted three VLCCs for 2008 (Annual report 2008 cited in Frontline Ltd., 
2005-2010, p. 19).  
By 2009 the falling oil prices and the financial crisis had crept upon the shipping 
industry with falling rates and few obtainable credit facilities. The delivery of 
two VLCCs was completed, but due to the crisis Frontline negotiated the 
cancellation of two VLCC and four Suezmax new-buildings, with the already paid 
installments of $56 million to be set off against future payments on new-building. 
In March 2010 the delivery of two Suezmax vessels were undertaken, reducing 
the new-building in process to two Suezmax and six VLCCs (Annual report 2009 
cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, pp. 30-31).  
The general development of the Frontline fleet has been new acquisitions every 
year and a significant boost in chartered vessels during all the years up until and 
including 2008. The timing must at that time seemed perfect as the majority of 
dispositions were performed in 2007, leaving room for further commitments 
when freight rates boomed in 2008.  
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8.1.4.1 Disposition of vessels 
Due to the IMO regulations, Frontline has long had a standing policy of disposing 
their single-hulled vessels. Furthermore, there has been a larger discrimination 
towards double-hulled vessels, thus creating two-tiers for freight rates. This 
discrimination against the single-hulled vessels has hurt the Frontline earnings 
in the years up to 2009 since more countries has started supporting the 
legislation of double-hulled vessels and limited the number of markets such a 
tanker can operate in.  
Although Frontline has stated that they want to modernize their fleet, the 
acquisition of five single-hulled vessels was performed in 2004, but with the 
subsequent sale or termination of charter of eight single-hulled vessels in the 
years of 2006-2008. The majority of dispositions, nine altogether, was completed 
in 2007 (Frontline Ltd., 2010b). 
 
8.1.5 Finance 
Frontline had a debt to equity ratio of 3.37 in 2004 which increased steadily to 
7.44 in 2007, but was down to 4.0 at the end of 2009. Total liabilities have not 
changed much during these years. They only made an increase of 10% from 
2004 to 2005, and kept fairly steady until making a 10% decrease in 2009 
(Calculations from Appendix 1  based on Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010). 
   
8.1.5.1 Equity 
Reviewing Frontline’s balance sheets, the dividend payments are very much in 
correlation with net earnings for the Company. The payments of 2008 were to 
some extent lower with retained earnings of $45M compared to 2007 when no 
earnings were retained. This is believed to be due to the financial crisis and the 
outlook for a decrease in further revenue. In 2008 the Company issued new 
shares to obtain fresh capital in the amount of $211.1M, thus increasing their 
equity substantially.  
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2009 was a rather bleak year with net income in the amount of $105M, 
compared to 2008 when the net income was $701M, but nonetheless the 
Company paid cash dividend in the amount of $70M. This meant an increase in 
equity to $740M from $702M previous year (Balance sheets cited from Frontline 
Ltd., 2005-2010).  
 
8.1.5.2 Debt  
In 2003 Ship Finance Ltd. was formed as a fully owned subsidiary to take over 
the larger portion of Frontlines fleet and lease it back. During a four-year long 
share spin-off, dividend was paid through Ship Finance Ltd. as well as ordinary 
cash dividend. Through these transactions Frontline was no longer reporting the 
Ship Finance Ltd. ownership in their annual reports. The previously owned ships 
were now reported as financial lease in their books. This way Frontline have 
reduced their net vessels holdings at the end of 2007 and increased their holding 
of vessels under capital lease (Annual report 2007 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-
2010, p. 20 & 61).  
The long-term interest bearing debt of Frontline was $377M, $614M and $761M 
in 2007-2009, with the increase due to the new-building program (Annual report 
2008-2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010). 
Frontline managed to obtain credit facilities in 2008 with a pre-delivery secured 
term loan facility at the amount of $129.6M with due date in June 2009, for the 
purpose of financing a VLCC under construction. Further, the Company secured a 
$420M pre- and post-delivery secure loan facility, due in 2017, which they had 
drawn $137.8M on by the end of 2008. The third facilitation was a five-year 
$180M mortgage to support their new-building program (Annual report 2009 
cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, p. 142). 
With the spin-off of Ship Finance the liabilities due to capital lease of Frontlines 
54 vessels was $2,325M at year’s end 2007. Current liabilities ratio increase 
from 9.7% in 2006 to 15.7% and 17.7% in 2007 and 2008. The increase was 
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partly due to a 2-year debt of $80M entered into in 2006 to secure the financing 
of a new VLCC, due in mid 2008. This facility was renegotiated in 2008 with the 
result being extension of the payments until 2009 and a covenant of positive 
working capital and a set amount of free cash. Reaching 2009 the Company was 
still not as liquid as they had hoped for, and the payments with exception of 
$24M were set to be due in 2013 decreasing the current ratio to 16.3% 
(Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010). 
Frontline have a strategy by obtaining new debt when the maturity dates are 
closing in, and it seems to have worked in the crisis as well, with facilities 
stretching from one year to nine years in 2008 (Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010).  
The future liquidity of Frontline may be strained due to lessor’s put options for 
five ships chartered in by the Company due in 2015 (Annual report 2009 cited in 
Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, p. 64). 
  
8.1.6 Revenue and results 
Frontlines EBIT surged in 2008 from $519million in 2007 to $850million, 
followed by a drop in 2009 to $240million with the factors of lower freight rates 
and lower demand influencing the segments operation.  
Return on total capital employed has had a volatile run since 2004, with 28% in 
2004, decreasing steadily in the subsequent years to 16.85% in 2007. 2008 
yielded substantial revenues for the shipping industry and Frontline’s return on 
capital employed was 23%, followed by 6.9% in 2009. The strong returns in 
2008 and 2007 were to some extend due to the sale of assets of $118M and 
$142M, positively affecting the result, compared to 2009 with sale of assets in 
the amount of $3M (Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Frontline Ltd., 2005-
2010). 
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8.1.6.1 Operating income 
Vessel’s revenue is either from the spot market, pooling, time-charter or vessels 
on bareboat charter.        
There has been a shift in the organization of the fleet distribution. With 66% and 
69% in the spot and pool market in 2004 and 2005 the Company has held a 
relative stable composure from 2006 through 2009 with around 45% in the spot 
and pool market, roughly 35% on time charter and the remaining 20% on 
bareboat. The strategy for Frontline is to have at least 30% on medium to long 
charters with the rest in spot to utilize on the fluctuations in freight rates, as well 
as to serve core customers with variable need of transport (Frontline Ltd., 2005-
2010).  
While Frontlines revenues were halved from 2008 to 2009 the TCE has actually 
increased to 79% as seen in the table below: 
TCE in $ a day 2009 2008 2007 2006 
VLCC 38,300 74,500 45,700 56,800 
Suezmax 25,300 55,200 33,000 37,800 
Suezmax OBO 43,000 43,500 39,700 31,700 
TCE% 79% 76.6% 77% 74% 
(Annual report 2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, p. 57) 
Frontlines calculation of their TCE as noted above, gives us an impression of the 
magnitude of the decreasing rates. The corresponding TCE break-even rates 
were as of 2009 $32,100 and $25,200 for VLCCs and Suezmax vessels. These 
rates do not include capital expenses or balloon payments on loans, which 
historically have been refinancing of new loans (Annual report 2009 cited in 
Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010). 
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8.1.6.2 Voyage charter 
Voyage charters, being the major income source for operations, has increased 
their revenues by 78% from 2007 to 2008, mainly due to the increase in freight 
rates represented through the spot market and an additional seven vessels 
trading. Though, the revenues decreased significantly in 2009 reflecting the 
major decline in freight rates which were significantly lower than the first half of 
2008 (Annual report 2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, p. 105).  
The increase in voyage charter from $801M in 2007 to $1,426M in 2008 can be 
broken down into a few components, such as the major increase in trading days 
for VLCCs with the charter in of 11 new vessels in 2008 realizing a revenue 
stream of $213M higher than 2007. The TCE rates for these double-hulled 
vessels rose from $48,000 in 2007 to $90,000 in 2008, on average.  
In 2009 the average TCE for vessels on voyage charter decreased to $38,000 and 
$23,200 for VLCCs and Suezmax. 
Demurrage was a highly profitable business in 2008, but saw a decrease of 
$82.2M, from 2008 to 2009. This may be explained by the overall higher degree 
of layup in the market and lower utilization of ships, creating less congestion in 
ports.  
Frontline experienced less trading days for vessels in 2009 with the redelivery of 
a vessel only chartered in for 2008. If trade had been like in 2008, revenues 
would have been $52.6M higher, not taking into account the falling spot prices. 
The transfer of three VLCCs and a Suezmax from voyage to time charter created 
another $166.5M reduction in revenues.  
The Gemini pool, in which Frontline is a substantial contributor, incurred a 
serious revenue decrease compared to 2008. Delivery of eighteen double-hulled 
Suezmax vessels to the pool resulted in a reduced income for Frontline of 
$277.3M compared to 2008 earnings for the same vessels, as they were also 
trading in the spot market in 2008.  
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As the distribution of the fleet trading in the voyage charter market was roughly 
the same in 2008 and 2009, the percentage of total revenues represented 68% in 
2008 and 50% in 2009, thus being adversely affected by the spot market trading 
(Annual report 2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, pp. 55-57).  
 
8.1.6.3 Time Charter revenues 
The OBOs trading for Frontline had fixed rates during 2008. Only one of the 
vessels was dry-docked that year, compared to six in 2009, which estimated a 
decrease in revenues of $7.9M. 
As the time charter contract for four of their vessels was up, the transfer to 
voyage and bareboat charter altered revenue streams with an estimate impact of 
negative $43.8M. Another two vessels fixed to the BDI, which fell during the 
beginning of 2009, realized earnings of $37.5M less than 2008.  
Another six VLCCs were chartered out on floating time charter and these vessels 
created a reduced income of $121.4M compared to 2008.  
A positive allocation of vessels to time charter from spot market increased 
revenues by $36.6M and increase in trading days for three Suezmax vessels 
creating an increase in revenues by $21.2M (Annual report 2009 cited in 
Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, pp. 55-65). 
  
8.1.7 Result 
Frontline, albeit having an army of subsidiaries, does not report any substantial 
earnings or losses concerning their subsidiaries, nor from associates. 
2008 was a good year for Frontline; taking into account the purchase of vessels 
representing an outflow of cash for new-building in the amount of $657M and 
the dividend paid of $642M. The Company had an increase in net cash holding at 
the year’s end, mainly provided by the operating margin and proceeds from long 
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term debt with additional proceeds from issuance of shares, amounting to 
$208million. 
For 2009 the cancellation of vessels, 75% reduction of payments for new-
building progress and the obtaining of new debt did not prove sufficient to offset 
the decrease of net income from $701M in 2008 to $105M in 2009. Obligations 
for the repayment of debt in the amount of $267M and capital lease payments of 
$241M were twice as big as those incurred in 2008, straining on the cash holding 
of Frontline, which were reduced from $191M in 2008 to $83M in 2009. 
Restricted cash, used for the payment of various debt, lease installments and 
other non-foreseeable obligations increased from $370M to $430M in 2009. This 
is a holding meant for their medium to long-term liabilities, otherwise taken out 
of the cash balance. Frontline is showing signs that they are increasingly worried 
about the future earnings and their obligations by increasing the restricted cash.  
The main driver behind the poor result of Frontline in 2009 was the decrease in 
voyage charter, which was down 60.3% from 2008, and a 19.3% decrease in time 
charter revenues. Revenues fell in the amount of $971M which represents 46,1% 
decrease from 2008 (Annual report 2009 cited in Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010, pp. 
107-109). 
 
8.1.8 Benchmarking 
Tsakos Energy Navigation Ltd. (TEN) operates mainly in the carriage of crude oil. 
The Company has delivered a return on capital of 12.18%, 11.57% and 2.95% in 
the years of 2007-2009, showing a weaker return than Frontline has been able to 
produce. Tsakos is not as highly leveraged as Frontline with their corresponding 
figures of 1.79, 2.17 and 1.76 in 2007-2009 and the quick ratio shows that the 
Company has had a minimum ratio of 1.66 the last three years. Thus, maintaining 
a fair financial situation. Albeit showing some better signs of solvency and 
liquidity than Frontline the stock only up 16% from bottom and still down 80% 
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from top, not close to the recovery of Frontline (Calculations from Appendix 2 & 
3 based on Frontline Ltd., 2005-2010).  
Frontline has as we can see later in the paper obtained better return on capital 
employed than NAT, even with a higher gearing. NAT has in return a 
substantially higher quick ratio, which is a sign of strength in liquidity.  
    
8.1.9 Share price 
Looking at the development of Frontline and its share from 2007, the stock 
initiated at NOK196 following a quite volatile year, ending at a price of NOK 261, 
peaking at NOK 
304 in mid July. 
This movement 
is very much 
alike that of the 
BDTI, which 
also peaked in 
the summer of 
2007(e24.no, 
2010a).  
(Graph cited from e24.no, 2010a) 
The SMA (50) for the last half-year of 2007 reveals a small downward trend in 
the stock price, but seemingly more volatile than actual decline in this period. 
This may be due to the mixed market signal with respect to freight rate decrease, 
the bleak revenue outlook as stated by Frontline and the sale of assets in 
Dockwise Ltd. as well as in IMAREX ASA. The stock experienced a sustainable, 
higher level of trading from the middle of 2007, which lasted until the end of 
2008 (Yahoo! Finance, 2010a). 
Frontline’s share reached a peak in late June 2008, experiencing a significant up-
swing from the beginning of the year. Freight rates reached a new high; John 
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Fredriksen and Frontline increased their holding in Overseas Shipping Group 
Ltd., which was a sign of their further belief in the crude oil carriage. Increased 
demand for oil by China and strong GDP were signs alongside the increase in oil 
price that the Company’s underlying assets could generate increased revenues in 
the following months. However, the demand for oil decreased in 2Q08 and 
supply was higher than demand by 1.2(Tb/d), a new scenario for the industry 
considering the undersupply that had sustained the last few years (OPEC, 2008).  
The bubble burst in the summer of 2008, with freight rates plummeting, fear of 
debt forfeit, the dollar reaching a new low against other major currencies and 
world stock markets being extremely bearish. Frontlines stock fell drastically, 
and perhaps more than what could be expected relative to the earnings potential 
of the underlying assets, with a larger percentage of their fleet on medium to 
long term charters. One of the major factors was the decline in prices for second 
hand vessels and steel prices, which in turn weakened the value of their vessels 
that debt was held against. As some of the earnings of the ships were also 
assigned to mortgage holders, the outlook seemed grim if the Company should 
not be able to obtain freight. The freight rates continued falling in August and 
throughout the fall, with earnings of the Company substantially lower than 
previous year much due to the lower freight rates and the $200M loss on the 
forward contract of Overseas Shipping Company. The new-building 
commitments proved to be a worry for the market as the price of the vessels 
were higher than the second hand prices one could obtain for similar vessels and 
the week before the quarterly report for Q3 the Frontline share fell 12.1%.  
Dividend payments from Frontline have yielded sustainable results during the 
last few years and were expected to be in the amount of $1,50-$1,70 a share, but 
as expectations was not met on the 28.11.2008 the Frontline share fell 
significantly (Furuset, Wålen, Thyri, & Takla, 2008); (Takla & Lium, 2008); 
(Becker, 2008a) & (Becker & Eidem, 2008). 
During the first months of 2009, liquidity problems due to their new-building 
commitments and decreased earnings became a thorn in the side for the 
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Company, and it is believed to have a dampening effect on the stock price. The 
ships were still believed to be too expensive at the price of $140M per VLCC 
while the prevailing market price was $115M. In the presentation for the first 
quarter the Company states they have only limited problems obtaining credit 
facilities for their program, as well as the new-buildings may be 5-9 months 
delayed, giving Frontline some more time to obtain this financing. At the same 
time the Company reported a high level of contractual coverage for their ships in 
2009 at 39% (TDN Finans, 2009) & (Becker, 2009c). 
Reaching the summer of 2009, Frontline’s stock reacted strongly to the market 
signals. Due to the expectation of higher oil inventory in the US of 0.1M barrels, 
the news of a decrease of 4.4M barrels caused the Frontline stock to surge by 
11.41% (Becker, 2009d).  
Dividend was paid in second and third quarter of 2009, and the Company struck 
back against analysts who did not believe the Company could manage to pay 
dividend with the large liabilities and the weak cash flow that was expected. 
Despite dividend payments, which show the Company is making a profit, the 
share price had a sluggish and small growth during the last part of 2009. This 
was much due to the low freight rates of VLCC and the fact that shippers were 
reluctant undertake shipments (DN.no, 2009d).  
Although freight rates for VLCCs and Suezmax vessels is back at the same level as 
beginning of 2007, the Frontline stock price is not, and thus this is only a partial 
explanation for the major fall in the stock price. The gloomy outlook for the 
future of the business, as well as the falling steel price, which Frontline need to 
take into consideration when four of their single-hulled vessels need to be 
scrapped or refitted is probably a factor in the price of the stock. As well are the 
new-building commitment and the order-book of the segments in general, as 
supply of vessels may supersede the demand for ships in the years to come.  
The Frontline stock had a significant peak in late 2004 at roughly the same price 
of the 2008 peak, and as we compare to the results and debt degree they were 
much in line with the year of 2008. Keeping in mind that the Baltic Index also 
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reached a peak at this time, it should be an indicator of the correlation the stock 
price of Frontline has had to the freight index. When the index started its decline 
in the spring of 2008, so did the Frontline stock.  
Since 2Q09 the stock has continued on a positive trend as the SMA (50) gives a 
good indication of. The stock has incurred some volatility, but the trend is 
positive, with increase in the freight rates, fewer new deliveries in the segment 
than expected and a more positive market outlook than what the latter part of 
2008 consisted of (Yahoo! Finance, 2010a).  
 
8.2 Nordic American Tanker Shipping  
Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd. (NAT) was incorporated in Bermuda on 
June 12, 1995 under Bermudan laws for the purpose of acquiring and chartering 
three double-hull Suezmax tankers that were built in 1997. The shares are today 
trading at the New York Stock Exchange. The Company operates in the tanker 
market and transports crude oil (Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2010a). 
 
8.2.1 Strategy 
“The Board has announced that it plans to grow NAT into a larger company in 
the tanker market business, and that it at all times will evaluate market 
opportunities and employment options to enhance the value of NAT and its 
dividend capability” (Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2010a). 
NAT has a self-declared unique business model providing the investors with high 
dividend at a low risk. The Company has now paid dividend for 50 consecutive 
quarters (Report Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, 
p. 1). Furthermore, growth has been an important component in their business 
model. From the start, the Company has had focus on growth and the fleet grew 
from 3 to 18 Suezmax crude oil tankers in less than five years (Nordic American 
Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2010c). 
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“The Company has a sustainable strategy when the spot market is strong and 
also in a weaker market environment. Thus, the Company essentially has the 
following strategic position going forward: If the market is firm, very good 
results and dividend can be expected” (Report Q4 cited in Nordic American 
Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, p. 1).  
  
“In a weaker market, the dividend will be lower which is a minus. However, if 
rates are down for a while, the Company is in a position to buy ships 
inexpensively and accretively which is a plus. This plus can be expected to be 
larger than the minus. Several of our listed competitors have significant net debt 
which could make it difficult for them to buy vessels in a weak market. In this 
way, the Company has covered both scenarios.” Financially the Company runs a 
strategy of low gearing. Their debt to equity ratio has been kept to a minimum 
with exception of a period in the middle of the last decade where they increased 
the debt in order to let their fleet grow, but this has since return to its normal 
state and according to the fourth quarterly report of 2009 the Company has no 
net debt (Report Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, 
p. 4). 
 
Their charter policy is to operate their vessels in either the spot market, on time 
charters or on bareboat charters. Though, the Company’s vessels are normally 
employed in the spot market with only one vessel engaged on a long term fixed 
bareboat charter. NAT states in their annual reports that it is their “goal to take 
advantage of potentially higher market rates with spot market related time 
charters although we may consider charters at fixed rates depending on market 
conditions” (Annual report 2008 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 
2005-2009, p. 2). 
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8.2.2 Fleet 
As of today, NAT’s fleet consists of 16 operational Suezmax crude oil tankers, but 
further 2 Suezmax tankers are scheduled to be delivered in September and 
December of 2010 respectively which makes their fleet total 18 Suezmax tankers 
by the end of the year. Furthermore, on April 12th this year it was announced 
that there had been struck an agreement with Samsung Heavy Industries Ltd. for 
the acquisition of 2 new Suezmax vessels (Nordic American Tanker Shipping 
Ltd., 2010d). This increase will take their tally of ships up to 20 by the end of 
2011 and underlines the Company’s continuing focus on growth. The Suezmax 
tankers are capable of carrying between 147.000 to nearly 165.000 DWT (Nordic 
American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2010b).  
NAT being quite a young company (founded in 1995) combined with their 
massive focus on growth; means that their fleet consists of only newer, modern 
tankers which are more efficient and more reliable compared to the competing 
fleets. The oldest vessel in NAT’s fleet was built in 1997 and half of today’s fleet 
of 18 vessels is built since the turn of the millennia. This also means that the 
whole fleet is built in accordance with the new regulations regarding tanker hulls 
and all of the 18 Suezmax tankers are constructed with double hulls (Nordic 
American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2010b). 
In recent years, all but one of the vessels in NAT’s fleet has been employed in the 
spot market. The one vessel has been on a fixed charter and will be until the end 
of 2010 (Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009). NAT states in their 
annual report from 2008 states that tankers operating in the spot market are 
more likely to “generate increased profit margins during improvements in 
tanker rates, while tankers on fixed-rate time charters generally provide more 
predictable cash flows” (Annual report 2008 cited in Nordic American Tanker 
Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009, p. 3). 
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
79 
 
8.2.2.1 Disposition of vessels 
In regard to disposition of vessel, it is unlikely to be any scrapping or 
reconstruction of ships due to the age and standard of the current fleet (Nordic 
American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2010b). As of 4Q09 there was only one dry-
docking scheduled, but this was only due to maintenance being performed on the 
ship. It is not unusual that vessels are sent to dry-docking in order to get repairs 
and upgrades during market recessions and NAT has planned for another ship to 
be dry-docked for maintenance during the first quarter of 2010 (Report Q4 cited 
in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, p. 3). 
 
8.2.3 Finance 
NAT has had a relative volatile return the last five years, with their best year in 
2008 at 15.10% return on total capital employed. In 2009 this was down to a 
mere 0.29% as their EBIT plummeted to $2.4M versus $121M in 2008.  
Debt to equity ratio of NAT has, compared to other companies in the industry a 
low value, with 0.36 and 0.31 in 2005 and 2006. In 2007-2009 it decreased to 
0.2, 0.03 and 0.01.  
The Company has an average break even rate of their vessels of $10,000 a day 
and is expected to pay dividend whenever this limit is not breached (Calculations 
from Appendix 1 based on Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009).  
 
8.2.3.1 Equity 
Due to the strategy of limited debt, the Company has issued common stocks 
every year since 2005 rather than obtaining more mortgages in order to finance 
their ships. The net income increased from $44M in 2007 to $119M in 2008, 
increasing their equity even though the Company paid a dividend of $166M. In 
2009 the Company paid a dividend of $95M and sold common shares to the 
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amount of $237M, increasing their equity and investing $167M in new vessels 
(Annual report 2008 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009, 
pp. 11-13) & (Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, p. 
6).  
It seems the Company is not facing hard times obtaining new equity and 
financing in the private market, rather than relying on the banks to be facilitators 
in the need for financing. With the issuance of common stock that has taken place 
since 2005, the number of total shares outstanding has increased from 13M to 
42.2M. The dilution and thus the possible subsequent fall of share price may to 
some extend explain the rockiness of the stock. Although NAT has been widely 
applauded for their cheap, so-called, “over the night offerings” which are swift 
and stingy on the Company’s pockets (Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 
2009-2010) & (Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009).  
 
8.2.3.2 Debt 
In 2005 the restructuring of the business into an operational company changed 
the need for long-term financing, as they wanted to purchase new vessels. The 
Company entered into a revolving credit facility in 2005 with due date in 2010 at 
an amount of $300M, which was increased in 2006 to $500M. This is for the 
purpose of obtaining new vessels and will be drawn on when needed. The lender 
of this facility does not have the power to cancel the agreement as long as the 
Company is within their covenants. For the lender the facility is secured through 
first priority mortgages on the vessel, assignment of earnings and insurance. 
Dividend is allowed paid in accordance with their dividend policy as long as it is 
not in default under the Credit Facility.  
Through 2005 and 2006 the increase in long term debt and thus the gearing 
ration is the use of the credit facility for the purpose of paying for ships in the 
making.  
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As the Company found the situation to be somewhat bleaker, income and result 
wise in 2007, an agreement was reached for the postponing of the maturity of 
the credit facility. With a cost of $2.1 million the default of debt was extended to 
the year 2013, not 2010 as previously agreed upon. Following this new time limit 
and the fact that the Company had repaid most of its facility in 2008 the 
Company was in good shape before the crisis reached the shipping industry and 
in line with its strategy they could obtain vessels when the price was falling 
(Annual report 2008 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009, 
pp. 4-5).  
The Company is to take delivery of two ships in 2010 and two in 2011, which will 
increase their liability for a short period as the aim is to finance these 
acquisitions through further issuance of shares and intermediate use of credit 
facility.  
The Company has of end 2009 no net debt and find themselves in a good position 
as to take advantage of acquisition of vessels as well as the upswing in the spot 
market, which they expect is imminent (Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker 
Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, pp. 2-3).  
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8.2.3.3 Operating income and results 
NAT’s operating income has been steadily growing since 2004, but following the 
record year of 2008 the Company suffered a significant set-back in 2009. The net 
income during these two years went 
from staggering $119M to a lowly 
$1M. One of the major reasons 
behind this was the decline in 
voyage revenues, which was nearly 
halved during that year. As 
mentioned earlier, the Company is 
mainly operating in the spot market 
and therefore has felt the effects of the downturn in freight revenues harder than 
those who have employed their vessels on long-term charters. The graph above 
further illustrates the Suezmax average spot rates and shows reason behind the 
sudden drop in voyage revenues. The Suezmax spot market is very volatile. From 
reaching the highest average freight rates of the decade in 2008, the average 
freight rates more than halved in 2009. Though, it is likely that this graph is 
somewhat incorrect due to time lags. The downturn in the economy had already 
started in 2008, but it takes time for the effects to show since the voyages are 
usually lengthy and the ships operating in the market are not immediately out of 
service (Graph cited in report Q4 from Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 
2009-2010); (Report Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-
2010) & (Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009). 
Evaluating the Company and its result, the net voyage revenues were almost 
halved from 2008 to 2009, but the expenses increased as a main result of the 
new-delivery of vessels, which did not get a full trading year in a weak market. 
Voyage expenses decreased substantially in 2008 and 2009 from the year of 
2007, without the reports showing any indication why. The decrease in oil prices 
and the fact that NAT does not undertake any derivative hedges or likewise may 
be an explaining factor as the expenses comprise of bunker, canal tolls, 
brokerage commission and port fees (Annual report 2008 Nordic American 
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Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-2009, p. 5) & (Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker 
Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, p. 6).  
Net income was $1M in 2009 compared to $119M in 2008 due to the low 
revenues and the relative fixed cost of operating expense, including depreciation, 
which amounted to $113M.  
Cash flow from operating activity was $45M in 2009 compared to $128M the 
previous year, and the cash balance stayed fairly unchanged although the 
repayment of debt, purchase of new vessels and dividend payment were a zero 
sum game towards the issuance of new shares and use of the credit facility (Q4 
cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, pp. 6-7).  
The trading days for the fleet in 2007 represented a 100% utilization of the 
bareboat charter and a 94.75% utilization of the spot market fleet of 11 boats. 
Trading days in 2008 were a 100% for the one ship employed on bareboat 
charter and 90% for the ships on the spot market, which is in correspondence 
with the segment standard for the current year. Following the 2009 reports of 
NAT, their employment was 100% for the ship on bareboat charter and 97.6% 
for the vessels operating in the spot market, thus substantially better than 2008, 
and a lot better than the market average. This should be affected by the relative 
young fleet employed by NAT with respect to for instance maintenance and the 
fact that they do not have to worry about the segregation in the market with 
single versus double-hulled vessels. In fact this has been an advantage as the 
market has priced the double-hulled vessels higher with regards to freight rates 
(Annual reports 2007-08 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2005-
2009, p. 5). 
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8.2.4 Benchmarking 
Looking at Tsakos Energy Navigation Ltd. (Tenold) and Frontline compared to 
NAT as somewhat done in the Frontline chapter, NAT when reaching October of 
2008 did not continue the fall as the two other companies did. It flattened out. 
This we believe is much due to the rising spot prices that prevailed in the market 
and the fact that NAT managed to obtain freight. Frontline showed poor results 
and were in a liquidity squeeze. NAT, on the other hand, had an equivalent of 
zero debt and cash in hand if times should get tougher. The market was 
experiencing an increase in Suezmax tanker rates in the end of 2008 and the 
Company paid dividend, which further strengthened the belief in the NAT stock 
(DN.no, 2008k).  
 
8.2.5 Share price 
NAT nearly quadrupled the stock price through 2004, but the peak did not last 
for long and the share 
price has been going 
trough some turmoil 
during the last few 
years. The “financial 
crisis peak” was at 
$40.69 on 20.05.2008 
following a rocky 
decline until it ended 
at $22.86 the 
03.03.2009, climbing to $30.07 as end of 2009. This represent a 43.8% fall from 
the top to bottom and, only, in retrospect to other shipping companies, a fall 
from top to end of 2009 of 26% (e24.no, 2010c) & (Graph cited from e24.no, 
2010c).  
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By analyzing the stock price with an overlay of a simple moving average (50), we 
can see a trend from 2005 through 2009 with the stock bottoming out in April 
and rising to a top in July/August each year. This trend is not as significant for 
the years prior to 2005, but as we believe this can to a large extend be 
corresponding to the rising spot rates that usually prevail in the start of a year, 
that will materialize in revenue increase and thus share price increase the 
following quarter.  
It seems like the stock has a tendency of falling the day after dividend payment, 
as described in basic financial theory. After the stock fell to $26.40 in the second 
week of March 2008, dividend payment and announcement should be a small 
key explaining variable along with rising spot prices in the following quarter, as 
well as dividend outlook were substantially better than 4Q07. The stock surged 
and volume traded of the stock was quadrupling. The increased trading activity 
is believed to put a significant upwards pressure on the stock in this period. 
Analyst coverage changed from neutral to “hold” and “overweight” in the six 
months of January through June 2008, which indicates a stronger belief in the 
stock as the freight rates were strengthening and the NAT fleet were mainly 
trading in the spot market (Yahoo! Finance, 2010c).  
Following the turmoil in September and October 2008 the stock fell 
tremendously as spot prices followed the BDTI and market outlook were gloomy. 
With an order-book that would indicate a daunting increase in supply of vessels, 
not nearly corresponding to the current market, nor the future market where the 
“multiplier and accelerator” effect was believed to kick into reverse and decrease 
demand. The stock was traded at a higher volume than previous year’s average, 
and was highly volatile and seemingly more fragile to market changes. In mid 
2009 the SMA (50) has flattened out and the stock seems to have adjusted to a 
level around $30.  NAT has a break-even cost of their ships of $10.000, and with 
the spot rates that has prevailed, the Company has managed to make money and 
subsequently pay dividend, which further strengthens the belief in the Company. 
“While there is no financial risk in the Company, there is high operational risk, 
states CEO Herbjørn Hansson” (Takla, 2010).  
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NAT explains their lack of exposure to the credit squeeze as a variable positively 
affecting their Company’s performance. Without any debt to default the main 
worry is to obtain voyages at a positive rate, in which they have succeeded. The 
Company has cash holding in the amount of $30M, which is backed up by credit 
facility that is possible to use if the Company should face troubles obtaining 
contracts in the future. As the Company has limited outlays to administrative, 
interest and operating expenses relative to the income the past years we believe 
that when the world economy recovers, the demand will increase. NAT is in a 
unique position with no ships that are single-hulled and need not worry about 
the sale of such vessels, in respect to decreasing steel prices and falling second 
hand value. As we have seen less delivery of new vessels than feared, due to 
delays, cancellation and an artificially high order-book with respect to engines 
sold. Platou has a notion in their report that the actual vessels in order-book may 
be less due to resale of contracts that are double-booked in the companies’ 
statements. The “proof” of this is; the sale of engines has not been as high as the 
number of new-buildings reported. Thus, the recovery might be swifter than 
expected (Q4 cited in Nordic American Tanker Shipping Ltd., 2009-2010, pp. 1-
5).    
We believe NAT will be able to gain momentum out of the crisis and serve their 
shareholders and customers in a positive manner, both with respect to share 
price, dividend payments and delivery of crude oil.  
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8.3 Odfjell Group  
Odfjell was set up in 1916, and pioneered the development of the parcel tanker 
trades in the middle and late 1950s as well as the tank storage business in the 
late 1960s. Currently they are a global provider of transportation and storage of 
bulk liquid chemicals, acids, edible oils and other special products. The latest 
breaking news for Odfjell was the Norwegian Supreme Court decision in favor of 
the shipping companies with respect to the retroactive tax imposed in 2007 for 
the years 1996-2006. For Odfjell this means an increase in equity of about $110 
million and the reduction of the interest cost on the tax debt for 2010 by about 
$5 million (Odfjell SE, 2010c) & (Odfjell SE, 2010a). 
 
8.3.1 Strategy  
Their strategy is “(..) to continue developing our position as leading logistics 
service provider for customers worldwide”. Through the efficient and safe 
operation of deep-sea and regional parcel tankers and tank terminals Odfjell 
aims at maintaining this position. Odfjell realizes the fact that scale is needed to 
offer an efficient trading pattern in a global transportation context, thus gaining 
maximum fleet utilization. With their current size Odfjell states they obtain 
significant purchasing benefits (Odfjell SE, 2010a). 
 
8.3.2 Operations 
“Our operations are fully integrated, with in-house functions for chartering, 
operations and ship management” (Odfjell SE, 2010d).  
Due to the fact that intelligence and market knowledge became important 
competitive elements Odfjell started their internalization of operations in 1963 
by establishing Minde Chartering, a brokering firm. Also, terminals were bought 
to enhance the competitiveness in the market for chemical transport (Tenold, 
2006, p. 194).  
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With their fleet currently consisting of 96 specialized ships at a total capacity of 
2.6 million dwt, they generated a turnover of $1,247M in 2008, excluding tank 
terminals.  
Odfjell’s tank terminal business consists of fully owned, partially owned and 
associated companies which generated a turnover of $232M in 2008. Odfjell 
states their “(..) terminal operations yield synergies with transportation 
activities and enhance quality and efficiency control throughout the 
transportation chain” (Odfjell SE, 2010d). 
 
8.3.3 Company structure 
Odfjell SE is listed on the Oslo stock exchange. As is the case of many other 
shipping companies, the structure of subsidiaries and ownership structure is less 
than straight forward. Odfjell has 21 subsidiaries and when Odfjell states that 
their operations are in-house, the terminology is also including their 
subsidiaries. In this paper we will focus on the Odfjell Group as a whole. Odfjell 
SE is the ultimate company, which is traded on the Oslo stock exchange and is 
reported in the consolidated financial statements. In 2008 Odfjell SE became 
purely a holding company, with Odfjell Chemical Tankers as the largest 
subsidiary and the operator and owner of the majority of the group’s vessels 
(Annual reports 2008-2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010). 
 
8.3.4 Who controls the Company and what is their strategy 
The extended Odfjell family still has control over the Company although it is 
publically traded.  
In the 2009 March edition of the Quarterly, the in-house magazine of Odfjell, Mr. 
Bernt Daniel Odfjell, at that time the CEO of Odfjell, is baffled by the sheer 
magnitude of the financial crisis and its effect on the shipping market. Although, 
he believes the Company is well equipped to weather the storm. With all-round 
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skilled personnel they will continue to expand both in ships and terminals. The 
financial situation he believes is good, although with a slightly low equity ratio. 
The Norwegian Supreme Court decision on the retroactive tax imposed should 
further strengthen their financing abilities.    
With the retrospective view of 2009, the new CEO Mr. Jan A. Hammer seems to 
have a somewhat different view of the future than the previous CEO, Mr. B. D. 
Odfjell. Almost a year has passed and the financial situation is bleaker, the 
organization needs to be trimmed and ships that are out of date needs to be 
decommissioned, as they are no longer profitable.  
The Odfjell family has been a long time investor and the major shareholder of the 
Company since its founding. It is to believe the family is to maintain control and 
steer the Company out of the storm with a good foundation and expansion so as 
to be able to gain significant market shares when the shipping business is 
gaining momentum again (Odfjell SE, 2009b); (Odfjell SE, 2009a) & (Proff.no, 
2010). 
 
8.3.5 Segments 
Odfjell’s fleet consists of 96 ships with a capacity from 4,000 to 50.000 DWT, 
currently 54 of the ships are owned by Odfjell and 42 are on time-charter.  
Odfjell has been listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange since 1986.  
Odfjell is operating in two segments, parcel tankers and tank terminals. By 
combining the two it is to believe they are realizing bigger potential and 
operating more efficiently (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, 
pp. 7-12) & (Odfjell SE, 2010b).  
The effect of this combination may be twofold, as a downturn in the parcel 
tanker segment may result in less transport activity, thus reducing the need for 
storage in the storage and processing facilities, creating a double dip or a double 
upside if times are good.  
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Transportation services are offered in all major trade lanes throughout the world 
supplemented with regional transport in Europe, Asia and South America. For 
storage needs this is provided through their terminals located in Europe, North 
America, the Middle East as well as Asia. Through arrangements with members 
of the Odfjell family, Odfjell SE has also easy access to terminals in South 
America. The strategy is to further develop the scope of tank storage facilities 
throughout the major shipping lanes of the world  (Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, pp. 9-
11).   
With trading routes all around the world Odfjell’s ships are affected by regional 
as well as world changes, business cycles and local supply and demand for 
products. Odfjell have the past few years obtained the largest revenue from the 
geographical segment of Middle East and Asia, USA, Netherlands, Brazil and 
Africa. The largest part of Odfjell fleet in the under COAs which make for easy 
planning and scheduling both for the customer as well as Odfjell. With 500 
different generic products carried each year, with parcel size ranging from 100 
ton to 40,000 ton the scheduling is crucial to obtain positive results. A 
substantial part of the ships are on the spot where trading companies take 
advantage of the arbitrage opportunities in the commodity market (Odfjell SE, 
2005-2010).  
 
8.3.6 Fleet 
Odfjell has been in the process of renewing their fleet; replacing their older 
vessels with newer models. This is to a large extent to be in compliance with the 
customer demand, as some of the older ships are less sought after. The first 
delivery of Parcel tankers to Odfjell commenced in 1975 and the fleet has served 
Odfjell well since then, but by 2005 the Company stated that it was time to renew 
their fleet  (Annual report 2005 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 10).  
In 2005 Odfjell had a new-building program comprised of 27 vessels including 
two options, at what was then referred to as favorable prices, with delivery 
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through 2011. The Company has since then not increased the fleet they operate 
by more than two ships, from 93 in 2005 to 95 in 2009. The composition of the 
fleet have although shifted towards newer vessels. With the serious commitment 
of renewing their fleet, four ships were to be on variable time charter, ten ships 
on long-term time charter and the last thirteen including two options to be 
purchased by Odfjell (Annual report 2005 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 91) & 
(Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 3).    
The ships on order have mainly been delivered on time, at the cost agreed upon 
and employed at favorable rates which has secured the income of the Company. 
In 2005 Odfjell entered into an agreement to enter six ships into a pool with 
delivery through 2007, so as to take advantage of hopefully increasing spot rates.  
The Company has sold older vessels in 2006-2008 with the bareboat-charter-
back in order to free cash. This has been done to renew their fleet by taking 
advantage of the increasing second hand prices corresponding to the increased 
cost of the new-buildings of this segment (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 
2005-2010, p. 4).  
In 2008 Odfjell purchased Flumar, a Brazilian based company owning four 
vessels 50/50 with Odfjell. The need to operate under local flag along the coast 
of Brazil, combined with the Odfjell management expertise was believed to 
further strengthen the synergy effects along with Odfjell terminals in the area 
(Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, pp. 5-8).  
The new-building program of Odfjell lost some of its momentum due to the 
slippage from the Russhian wharf Sevmash, following the cancellation of the 
entire contract by Odfjell. A contracted eight vessels with option of up to twelve 
was signed in 2004, with delivery staring in 2007 through 2011. The vessels, 
45.000 dwt IMO type II boats  with an estimated cost of $500M, were cancelled 
due to the time overrun, cost overrun and cooperation problems faced. The 
installments paid including interest were repaid in full in 2008. Followed by a 
compensation of $43M after a trial in Sweden. Odfjell was not pleased about the 
compensation, nor the failure of delivery, as they were a long-term investor in 
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the industry. Although this failure of delivery may seem timely as in the midst of 
a financial crisis, Odfjell, did in 2008, place an order at a Chinese wharf for a 
series of six 9,000 dwt stainless steel chemical tankers and one 8,200 dwt coated 
chemical tanker with delivery from 2010 through 2012 (Annual report 2009 
cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 4).  
During 2009 Odfjell entered into a 50/50 joint venture with National Chemical 
Carriers Ltd. (NCC) in Dubai to pool althogether fifteen vessels with common 
operation of their IMO II and III tankers. This agreement was reached following 
the charter of three IMO III tankers from NCC (Annual report 2009 cited in 
Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 17).  
Odfjell has continued to sell older ships. Seven ships in the time period of 2005-
2009 were sold for demolition of to third party. Another seven ships were sold to 
third party with the time or bareboat-charter-back to Odfjell.  
In  2009 Odfjell reached agreements to sell a grand total of four outdated ships 
for recycling in India. Odfjell has stated that they are willing and able to further 
invest in new-buildings as well as charters in the midst of the crisis and at end of 
2009 the Company had six vessels on order through 2012, with the first new-
building being delivered in 2011 (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-
2010, p. 4). 
 
8.3.7 Finance 
The Odfjell Groups main debt driver was the investment in new vessels and 
terminals. Odfjell’s debt does not put any restrictions on the dividend or 
financing policy of the firm, other than; book debt ratio should at all times be less 
than 75% (excl. deferred taxes from debt) and liquidity must be the highest of 
$50 million or 6% of interest bearing debt. All of which has been in compliance 
the last five years. 
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The long-term debt had as of 2005 an average time to maturity of 4.9 years with 
all debt and revenues denominated in USD, except for their tank terminals, which 
receive income in other currencies. By 2007 the average maturity of long-term 
debt had increased to 6.5 years and was down to 5.6 by 2009, thus a fairly steady 
performance. Bonds issued in NOK or SGD are swapped to USD so as to secure 
their exposure towards exchange rate fluctuations. The portion of long-term 
debt on floating USD LIBOR has remained fairly consistent around 80% the past 
few years (Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).  
The debt to equity ratio has increased somewhat from 2005 onward. From 1.89 
in 2005, the top was reached in 2008 with 2.59 and down to 1.98 in 2009 
(Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).   
 
8.3.7.1 Equity 
As cash flow hedges are reported in the equity statement for current years, the 
positive net result for 2008 of $163M was offset to a large extent by the major 
write-down of the value of the hedges by negative $87M as well as dividend 
payments of $33M. The hedges was mainly due to the less than one-year 
maturity of bunker which had a negative fair value of $60M as the Rotterdam 
bunker plummet to $200-a-ton reaching the year’s end. As well as negative $16M 
of interest rate swaps and negative $11M on currency swaps.  
Taking into account the increasing bunker cost in 2009 and the appreciation of 
the dollar, the equity increased to $906M from the $721M level of 2008. The 
increased fair value of hedges increased by $85M, currently driven by the $61M 
increase of bunker value and $22M in currency hedge value.  
The ruling against the Norwegian tax on tonnage system increased the 
comprehensive income on fair value of other reserves from a negative $92M in 
2008 to a positive $113M at end of 2009, thus further increasing the equity of 
Odfjell.  The Company provided a positive net result as to be written against 
comprehensive income in the equity statement, of $121M. The negative input on 
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the equity was the major repurchase of own shares, in accordance with the 
cancellation of the three different total return swap (TRS) agreements with DnB 
NOR. In addition to the dividend paid amounting to $36.4M and $12.3M for 2008 
and 2009 respectively (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, pp. 
22-27).  
 
8.3.7.2 Debt 
The long-term debt over assets ratio has fluctuated between 0.52 and 0.57 from 
2004-2009, thus sustaining at a level that Odfjell is comfortable with. Short-term 
debt has decrease somewhat from the 14% level it had in 2007, both due to the 
decrease in current liabilities and the increase in assets held by the group 
(Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).  
In 2007 the Company performed their third bond issue, acquiring NOK 201M of 
NOK 300M offered through the issue. In addition to this the firm entered into a 
financial lease of three vessels amounting to $320M on a long-term financial 
agreement. $150M of the proceeds was used to finance the financial lease of 
three vessels as well as the purchase of a vessel, and to repay revolving credit 
facilities. The long-term debt increased by $140M in 2007 with overall debt 
increase of $325M. The year saw a strain on the liquidity, but the obtaining of 
new undrawn credit facilities in the amount of $49M made up for this (Annual 
report 2007 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 17 & 29).  
Further increase of debt was mainly due to the long-term debt obtained through 
two different long-term secured bank facilities with the value of $40M and 
$135M in 2008. This was in accordance with the previous mentioned new-
building program in China, sat in effect after the cancellation of the Sevmash 
contract. In addition the Odfjell Terminal obtained new loan facilities of €60M so 
as to repay intercompany debt and to finance the expansion that was to be 
undertaken at the facility. Repayment of debt amounted to $120M, as well as the 
repurchase of $11.7M bond liability due in 2011 at a rate yielding a positive 
result of $1.2M. Additional draw facilities were non-existent at end of 2008 as 
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they were fully constrained (Annual report 2008 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, 
p. 9). 
In 2009 Odfjell entered no less than five long-term secured bank facilities, which 
amounted to $135M, despite being a year where credit facilities were hard to 
come by. $83M was drawn from these facilities at year’s end, where the aim of 
the facility was for general corporate purposes, as stated in the annual report. 
Also one of Odfjell’s subsidiaries in Singapore pursued a loan of SGD 200M for 
general purposes as well as the expansion at Jurong Island.  
Following the restructuring of debt in the bond market which Odfjell successfully 
has performed in the past, the Company successfully performed $88M issuance 
of unsecured bonds with maturity in 2013. The issuance was accompanied with 
the repurchase of earlier bonds with the current outstanding $18M in 2010 and 
$9M due in 2011 (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010, p. 18).  
Through the facilitation of debt, the Company has managed to increase their long 
and short-term credit through a time where credit has been hard to come by. 
Although this debt to some extent has been used to cover their increase in assets, 
the ratio measuring how the Company has financed their vessels and tank 
terminals through either long term debt or equity has decreased from 2007 
when the ratio was 1.0. In 2009 the ratio was 0.91 which isolated indicates that 
more of the long-term debt is used for operational purposes, which was 
explained earlier. Odfjell’s operation cash flow ratio took a dive in 2009 
measuring 0.37 contrary to the previous five years, were the ratio has been 1.10, 
0.54, 1.07, 1.02, and 0.83 for 2008-2004. While the cash held by the Company has 
not substantially changed the proceeds from operation does not cover current 
liabilities to the same extend. Thus the Company may find it increasingly difficult 
to cover these liabilities if the banks or the bond market were to dry up.   
The quick ratio for Odfjell has been somewhat volatile. It has been changing from 
1.02 in 2004 and peaking at 1.39 in 2006 with the increase in cash holding. The 
ratio made a dip in 2007 as the current portion of long-term debt was due, but in 
2008 and 2009 the ratio has leveled out at 1.11 and 1.04, leaving us with the 
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impression that Odfjell has the ability to cover their current liabilities for 2010 as 
the debt maturing is reported to be $163M (Calculations from Appendix 1 based 
on Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).  
 
8.3.8 Revenue and results 
The return on total capital employed in Odfjell has been fairly steady in 2004-
2008 from 7.61% to 9.11%, followed by the gloomy year of 2009 where they on 
a positive note managed to obtain a positive return of 2.88%.  
EBIT has increased from $114M in 2004 to $198M in 2008, making a drop in 
2009 to $61M. With operating expenses in terms of operating revenue for 2007-
2009 of 65%, 73% and 77%, the margins have been closed-in substantially 
(Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Odfjell SE, 2005-2010). 
8.3.8.1 Terminal segment 
The terminal segment has obtained a larger share of the total operating income 
for the group, in the four year period from 2006. This is believed to have a 
correlation with the relative higher investments in terminals during the last four 
years. Carrying amount of tanker terminals at end of 2009 has more than 
doubled from 2006 in line with Odfjell strategy of being able to deliver more 
storage and processing facilities along their shipping routes worldwide.  
Terminal Segment 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Operating Revenue $244.5M $232.2M $179.9M $151.6M 
Carry Amount $691.2M $633.8M $480.5M $340.1M 
Net cash flow op. act. $114M $52.9M $222M $43.4 
Operating Revenue in 
% of group total 
19.3% 15.5% 14.2% 13.9% 
(Table made from Annual reports cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010) 
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The terminal segment has increased its capacity 45.7% since 2007 with EBIT 
result over operating cost decreasing the last years, but still sustaining at relative 
steady and profitable level compared to the shipping segment of Odfjell. The 
ratio would have been 4 percentage points higher if it were not for impairment 
charges for 2009, thus EBIT would have been close to 2006 level where capital 
gain increased the ratio by 7.8 percentage points. Operating expenses are 
relative steady for the segment as it to a large extend incorporates manpower 
and maintenance after the structure is set up.  
Odfjell has had an increased demand for storage through the crisis as demand for 
end products of consumers experienced a downfall. Products already in transit 
or en-route to storage did not have an end destination, thus storage was the only 
viable solution. Hence the terminal segment sustained its position through the 
financial crisis and seriously supporting the operational result for the group with 
net cash flow more than doubled from 2008 (Calculations from Appendix 1 
based on Odfjell SE, 2005-2010). 
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8.3.8.2 Shipping segment 
Odfjell has major trading lanes in deep-sea transport worldwide, with smaller 
vessels operating out of their terminal facilities.  The geographical segments 
generating the largest revenues have not changes, with Middle East and Asia still 
representing the largest portion of revenue. This is also the segment that 
represented half the decline in operation revenues from 2008-2009, followed by 
Brazil and the Netherlands.  
Shipping Segment 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Operating Revenue $1020.6M $1247.4M $1063.2M $928.6M 
Carry Amount $1349.7M $1392.7M $1438.5M $1373.5M 
Net cash flow op. act. $76.4M $190.7M $77.7M $165.1M 
Operating Revenue in 
% of group total 
80.7% 84.5% 85.8% 86.1% 
EBIT in % of Gross 
Revenue 
-0.006% 10.35% 14.09% 11.24% 
(Table made from Annual reports cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010) 
The shipping segment of Odfjell has reduced its earnings without the 
corresponding reduction in expenses, much due to the time charter revenues 
being down 19% from 2008 and the cost of bunkers being relative high. Odfjell 
reports a bunker cost of $100-a-ton reduction will induce an increase in net 
result before taxes of $60M whereas an increase in freight rates of 4% will 
increase the net result before tax by roughly $25M. The following being 
extremely simplified; Odfjell reported a reduction of bunker cost by $40-a-ton 
from $460 to $420 and the decrease in time charter revenues with 19% year-to-
year end 2008-2009, this should represent a decrease in bunker cost by of $24M 
and a decrease in time charter revenues by $118.75M, yielding a negative net 
result before tax of $94.5M from end 2008-2009. Thus with the large portion of 
their fleet on the spot market and the COAs only partially protecting the 
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Company against fluctuations in the bunker cost, this explains a large portion of 
the higher operating expenses relative to operating revenue. 
Odfjell reported a negative EBIT of $6million for the year in its shipping segment, 
including the $43M compensation from Sevmash, due to the failure of delivery. 
The corresponding operating result for 2008 and 2007 were $129M and $150M, 
with larger number of ports called and fewer ships used.  
Net result of $82.5M for 2009 were a result of the recording of taxes in the 
positive amount $108.6M. 
The volume shipped in 2009 decreased from 2008 and 2007 with less parcels 
shipped as well as fewer ports called with an increase of ships and total 
deadweight, much due to the decline in demand for the older vessels operated 
and the high exposure to the spot market for clean petroleum products which is 
represented by the decrease in revenue from the Middle East (Calculations from 
Appendix 1 based on Odfjell SE, 2005-2010).  
 
8.3.9 Revenue and result cont´d  
The net result for 2007 were in fact negative due to the Norwegian tax on 
tonnage imposed. This resulted in a discounted tax liability for Odfjell of $140M. 
In 2008 the tonnage tax system changed the rules for investments in 
environmental friendly solutions, which companies could undertake as to write 
off 33% of the tax payable. As the rules were changed from 15 years maturity to 
infinite, the Company booked a result of positive $32.8M in taxes for 2008. For 
the year of 2009 a gain of $110.5M was reported as payable due to the 
Norwegian Supreme Court decision that the tonnage tax system was 
unconstitutional.  
The net holding of cash did only change marginally from end of 2007($98M) 
through 2009 ($103M). This has been a result of: 
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- Obtaining new debt has been larger than the repayment of old debt with a 
net result in 2008 with $143M and 2009 with $73M. 
- The $192M income from sale of assets in 2008. 
- Decline in payment on vessels and new-building contracts from $405M to 
$174M in 2008 and 2009 respectively. 
- The exchange rate fluctuations Odfjell is exposed to made for a $5M 
positive result in 2009 compared to negative $10M in 2008. 
The chemical tanker market is less exposed to fluctuations as can be exemplified 
by the freight rate in stainless steel grade chemicals from Houston to Rotterdam 
which have had a top to bottom fall of around 35% compared to the major 
decline in the BCTI index which amounted to 72.2% from top to bottom (Odfjell 
SE, 2005-2010).  
We believe the lower utilization of the fleet in combination with lower freight 
rates and relative high bunker cost are the main drivers behind the poor result of 
the group. Although, it seems the tank terminal segment has not moved in 
correlation with the shipping segment and has to some extent offset the poor the 
result from shipping segment.  
 
8.3.10 Benchmarking 
Eitzen Chemical is a fairly young company and has been listed on the stock 
exchange since 2006, but in spite of their age they managed to turn a profit in the 
first full year of trading in 2007 with a total return on capital employed of 3.53%, 
following two rather gloomy years with -18.99% and -3.71%.  The Company has 
increased its gearing from 1.50 in 2006 and 2007 to 3.81 and 3.48 in subsequent 
years. For the year of 2008, the Company did not have liquidity in the range they 
needed and the quick ratio at years end was 0.15, although up to 2.04 in 2009.  
Eitzen’s share saw a slower decrease than Odfjell’s prior to April 2009. At that 
point, the share experienced a mammoth price decline, mainly due to the 
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revenue decrease and high degree of gearing in regard to commitments to their 
new-building program. With 66% of their fleet in the spot market, the Company 
has not managed to obtain enough freight or as good rates needed to pay their 
liabilities. The stock continued its fall throughout 2009 and is down 90% since 
the start of 2008 (DN.no, 2009c) & (Calculations from Appendix 2 & 3 based on 
Eitzen Chemical ASA, 2010).  
Stolt-Nielsen has managed to keep their return on the positive side in the 
amount of 7.94%, 7.71% and 4.31% with a gearing of 0.83, 1.34 and 1.12 for the 
years 2007-2009. The return in 2009 was better than Odfjell’s, but with twice the 
gearing. The Company had a relative high quick ratio showing signs of poor 
liquidity, in the range of 0.40 for each year. Stolt-Nielsen saw a major decline in 
stock prices reaching March 2008 and did not manage to recoup this towards 
Odfjell. They have underperformed during 2008 and 2009, the only exception 
being the start of 2009. At the year’s end of 2009 the Company has not managed 
to tangent Odfjell’s performance although not lagging to far behind with a top-to-
end-2009 fall of 62,15% towards Odfjell’s 56.3% and Eitzen’s 59.8% (Yahoo! 
Finance, 2010e) & (Calculations from Appendix 2 & 3 based on Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 
2010).  
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8.3.11 Share price 
Odfjell has not had the same increase in share price in the run up to the summer 
of 2008 as many of the other companies we have been analyzing in this paper. 
The Company had somewhat of a peak in the beginning of the summer 2007, and 
a falling trend, when analyzing the SMA (50), from late July and bottoming out in 
April 2009.  The share price peaked at NOK 119.00 in June 2007, but the stock 
closed at NOK 52.00 at the end of 2009. This represents a 56.3% fall in the share 
price, although the Company has regained 49.9% from the bottom in April 2009 
(Yahoo! Finance, 2010e).  
In 2007 Odfjell was adversely affected by the dollar price as they had to pay 
salary in NOK, as well as the increased bunker price affected their bottom line. 
On account of the future outlook in the world economy, Odfjell did not want to 
pay dividend for 2007, which signals a prudent company with lower than 
expected earnings (Becker & Bjørndal, 2007).  
The dollar price continued falling in the first half of 2008 and the net result was 
weaker than for 1Q07 although the revenues were higher, which contributed to 
the further decline of the share price (DN.no, 2008i).  
Reaching the end of 2008 the Company decided to re-route their ships around 
the Cape of Good Hope in order to avoid the pirates in the Gulf of Aden. This was 
a decision that increased the ton-mile for the Company as well as the operating 
cost and delays the cargo delivery. Thus another sign of weakness for the 
Company and its share price when looking at it in an isolated manner. The 
Company’s share fell by 4.80% without any news in late 2008, and has been 
taken off the OSEBX, main index in Oslo, due to low trading in the stock (DN.no, 
2008e); (Bjørndal, 2008b) & (DN.no, 2008a). 
Odfjell had to sell their ship “Bow Sky” in order to finance their payment of the 
Norwegian tonnage tax. This financing has been a problem for the Company in 
the recent years and has most definitely put some restrain on the positives 
around the stock (DN.no, 2008j).  
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One of the big drivers putting pressure on the Company is the large world order-
book for chemical tankers which as of 1st of March 2009 were 42% of the current 
fleet. If there is sustained market over-capacity the freight rates will be lower 
yielding lower profit margins. With the increasing oil prices we have seen the 
last year the bunker cost has seriously affect the earnings for the companies as 
seen for Odfjell where a time chartered vessel in 2007 had 20% of their earnings 
allocated to bunker cost. In 2009 they saw an increase to 26%, of an average 
Odfjell tanker. 
The market for demolition and scrapping has not been as expected and only 2% 
of the fleet has been scrapped during 2009. Odfjell expects more scrapping in 
2010, but it remains to be seen, with the low prices of steel and less new-delivery 
than expected.  
In 2009 Odfjell saw an increase in the A-stock of 21.8% adjusted for dividend, 
which was paid in the amount of NOK1 per share. As Odfjell benchmarks itself 
against the Oslo Børs Benchmark Index, the marine index and the transportation 
index that increased 64.8%, 25.5% and 30.1% respectively for the current year, 
Odfjell has not managed to turn the Company around to reflect these figures.  
In February 2008 the Company ended their contract with Sevmash, a deal which 
would have secured extra tonnage for the Company. Odfjell was not pleased with 
the compensation received from the Swedish court, as the price of the ships that 
should have been delivered had well exceeded the contractual price from 2004. 
Although these ships would have made revenues for Odfjell, we believe there to 
be some uncertainty if the Company would have performed better if the vessels 
being were to be delivered. The Company recuperated the installments paid and 
as the Company had liquidity problems reaching the end of 2008, we believe the 
Company was actually better off, as the price for a second hand ship plummeted 
in late 2008 along with the freight rates. Though, it is a highly speculative notion; 
alas the Company did not enter into the purchase of similar ships when the 
contract reached an end. This, in fact, tells us that the Company actually might be 
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pleased to focus on the short sea segment rather than deep sea in the current 
turmoil (Bjørndal, 2008c) & (Annual report 2009 cited in Odfjell SE, 2005-2010). 
 
 
(Graph cited from e24.no, 2010d) 
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8.4 Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
 
The Wilh. Wilhelmsen Group (WW) is a leading group within the maritime 
industry. The Company is based in Norway and is listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. As of today, they have approximately 330 offices in about 72 countries 
all over the globe, but the head office is located in Oslo. Their main activities are 
shipping, logistics and maritime services (Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010d). 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen is conducting advanced industrial shipping activities and is the 
market leader for RORO shipping. They have about 145 RORO carriers operating 
in the market and their customers are the leading manufacturers of cars, 
constructional and agricultural machinery. The group owns and charters ships 
that transport approximately 5 million cars by sea every year. The transporting 
activity is handled by the group’s three subsidiaries; Wallenius Wilhelmsen 
Logistics (WWL), EUKOR Car Carriers and American Roll-on Roll-off Carrier 
(ARC). The cargo being shipped is divided into three classifications; cars, high 
and heavy cargo (e.g. Buses, trucks, trailers, harvesters etc.) and non-
containerized cargo (e.g. Machine parts, generators, turbines etc) (Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010a). 
The Wilhelmsen group not only provides shipping by sea, but also an overall-
transport solution for their customers in order to serve each customer’s specific 
needs. Therefore, the logistic services also include supply chain management for 
vehicles, terminal services, technical services and inland distribution (Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010c). 
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8.4.1 Strategy 
“We are shaping the maritime industry: Our revised corporate vision reflects 
clearly how we see our role in the industry. Shaping means being a pioneer. It 
means willingness to lead. It means maximising every opportunity to innovate 
and meet the ever-changing needs and expectations from our stakeholders. It 
involves risk to go where others have not been. It means accessing and freeing 
up the creative potential in each of our thousands of employees. People, who are 
willing to step up, contribute and take responsibility – people who want to be 
shapers.” (Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010e) 
8.4.2 Operations 
According to WW’s articles of association; the Company’s object is to engage in 
shipping, maritime services, aviation, industry, commerce, finance business, 
brokerage, agencies and forwarding, to own or manage real estate, and to run 
business related thereto or associated therewith.  
Within this object, the business concept is to be a leading international supplier 
of maritime services, based on expertise and a focus on customer requirements 
(Annual report 2009 cited in Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010, p. 44). 
 
8.4.3 Fleet 
The Company has an extensive new-building strategy. The Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
Group had an extensive new-building program as of the end of 2005 comprised 
of 43 car carriers, in which 11 are on the account of Wilh. Wilhelmsen. The 
delivery dates were set from 2006 through 2009. Six new-buildings were 
delivered in 2006 and the order-book was as of end of 2006 comprised of 8 new-
buildings for WW and 44 for the operation group as a whole.  
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In 2007, 9 vessels were delivered to Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics (WWL) and 
EUKOR, with an additional 45 due within 2008-2012 were 12 is on the account 
for WW.  
During 2008 16 vessels were delivered to the Company and its joint ventures. In 
the following years until 2012 another 9 car carriers will be delivered to WW 
with a total of 32 new deliveries for the Wilhelmsen group. Leaving the calendar 
year of 2008 the group had secured the financing for the vessels being delivered 
in 2009 and most of its vessels being delivered through 2011.  
WW had 3 new deliveries in 2009 with additional 6 for delivery through 2012. 
Out of the 6 outstanding deliveries, only three vessels had secured financing, but 
we are to believe that believe that financing is to be secured within the year of 
2010. The extended group took delivery of 9 new vessels, but still had 22 
outstanding.  
The operation group had control over 166 vessels in 2008 and at the end of 2009 
they only had 136, with 80 owned and 56 chartered in. This was mainly due to 
the delivery of vessels back to third party owner by EUKOR. Also, the group as a 
whole disposed a total of 15 vessels in 2009 following the substantial over-
capacity of tonnage. WW and the other companies try to balance the tonnage 
amongst them and, as a result of this, the scrapping and redelivery of tonnage is 
performed when suitable.  
The Company experienced extensive layup sin 2009 with 17 vessels entering 
into 2010, thus not utilizing the fleet to the maximum potential (Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010b). 
   
8.4.4 Finance 
Return on capital employed for the Wilh. Wilhelmsen group showed a decrease 
from 2005 through 2009, with a marginal upswing in 2008. The Company has 
more than doubled the capital employed from $1,517million in 2004 to $3,684 in 
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2009 with financial income fluctuating between $19million for 2004 and 
$83milion in 2008. EBIT also increased in 2008 resulting in 10,7% return, but 
fell to 7,9% in 2009. The peak was in 2005 when the ratio was at 14,4% 
(Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010). 
 
8.4.4.1 Equity and debt 
The Wilh. Wilhelmsen group had, compared to many other companies, a fairly 
low debt to equity ratio at 1.17 in 2004. For the year of 2005 the ratio increased 
to 1.71 due to the delivery of new ships with corresponding financing. 
In 2007 the total debt increased, although the Company reduced interest-bearing 
debt by $100M. This was due to the increase in deferred tax of $170M on account 
of the Norwegian tonnage tax, which was previously believed to be not payable.  
In 2008 the Company increased their long-term liabilities with the issuance and 
attainment of new debt. This meant a marginal decrease in equity, and the 
gearing ratio increased to 2.56.  
When reaching 2009 the ratio fell to 1.90, although with further issuance and 
attainment of long-term debt. As the outlook for the industry was bleak, the 
Company paid less dividend and increased the holding of retained capital.  
The ratio of current liabilities had a positive development from 2006 to 2009 for 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen, and it is now down to 0.13 in contrast to the 0.31 high, three 
years ago. Long-term financing is the main driver behind this development, as 
the equity ratio has had a setback to 0.34 in 2009 from 0.46 in 2004 reaching a 
low of 0.28 in 2008.  
The Company states that attainment of financing for their vessels prove difficult 
before 2008. But for the year of 2009, only 50% of the ordered vessels had the 
proper financing in place.  
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The long-term interest bearing debt amounted to $941M, $1249M and $1602M 
for the years 2007-2009. The current liabilities of the mortgages were, as end of 
the previous year, $198M due in 2008 and $204M in 2009 following $191M and 
$287M for 2010 and 2011. Although current liabilities have increased 
substantially and more than doubled compared to 2004, they do not seem to 
have had any immediate troubles repaying their financial commitments although 
their quick ratio has been below 1.0 in the years prior to 2009.  
What seemed to be more troubling, were the hedges undertaken in order to 
secure the stable payments of interest bearing debt in 2008. The group’s strategy 
is to have a minimum of 30% and a maximum of 67% of the debt portfolio to 
have fixed rates. They managed to do this through various hedging techniques, 
and with current levels of 50% in both 2008 and 2009. At the year’s end of 2008, 
the exposure was negative $163M, but due to the improving conditions in the 
financial market in 2009, the on-paper loss was now down to just $79M. The 
maturity for these hedges is mainly due from 2011 and onward, thus leaving 
some time for the economy to strengthen and limiting their exposure.  
Due to the main currency of trade being USD and liabilities in NOK, the 
transaction exposure is reduced hedging the cash flow. As the NOK appreciated 
against the USD the Company incurred a gain of $18.8M in 2008 and $19M in 
2009. This might change as the dollar may gain some momentum in the years to 
come.  
Through 2004-2009 Wilh. Wilhelmsen’s quick ratio has substantially increased 
due to their holding of cash and cash equivalents over the relative increase in 
current liabilities. The ratio of 1.45 in 2009 is substantially higher than the 0.44 
in 2006 and nearly doubled from 2008, where it measured 0.77. This is a good 
sign since one might account for less operating income in the following years. 
Wilh. Wilhelmsen has a considerable cash balance and they have another $150M 
available under their credit facilities, if they find themselves in a liquidity 
squeeze (Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010b). 
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8.4.4.2 Operating income and results 
In comparison to the year of 2008 where operating revenue was $1,296M, the 
year of 2009 yielded $1,015M due to extensive layup and redelivery of chartered 
vessels to third party owners. Freight revenues plummeted from $293M in 2008 
to $153M in 2009 as a result of the sharp decline in average freight rates and the 
low utilization of the fleet. This was contributed by the financial crisis and the 
effect it has had on the world economy and thus aggregate demand. The main 
driver for operating income is the ship services and it yielded revenues of $560M 
for 2009, which was only a mere $34M decline from the previous year. This 
represented a negative 6% decrease in comparison to the decrease in total 
operating income which was 22%.  
Total capital employed has increased disproportionate to the EBIT. The main 
driver behind the increase in total capital was the purchase of vessels. While the 
EBIT has sustained the same level, mainly due to the increasing oil price creating 
a surge in the bunker cost and the result of slow steaming making the vessels 
entering fewer ports with less volume and number of parcels than in previous 
years. The positive effect on the profit margin in 2009 can be contributed to the 
sale of assets during the year. WW sold 5% of the ownership of Glovis, a Korea 
based logistic Company, yielding an income of $48M and performed a sale-and-
leaseback agreement for its head office with gain of $46.5M.    
Following years of high demand, the cargo volumes for the extended group had a 
variable year in 2009. WWL experienced a decline of 43%; EUKOR volume fell by 
16% and ARC delivered a 12% increase in their volumes following the focus on 
US preference Cargo. Terminal services experienced a 37% decline in 
throughput due to fewer deliveries from EUKOR and WWL. Though, they had 
higher revenues due to long lead time, as demand for cars decreased, and the 
cars were stored at the terminals.  
Amidst the financial turmoil, the need for ship management services for laid up 
vessels increased. In 2009, 14% of the Wilhelmsen Ship Management (WSM) 
revenues stemmed from this activity. Together, the contribution from associates 
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and joint ventures realized a profit of $132M on the income statement, which is 
up from $82M in 2008 and $80M in 2007. Other income contributed to total 
income of 11% in 2009 from 6% and 9% previous two years.  
Wilh. Wilhelmsen is of the belief that they have been able to significantly reduce 
the downside in the wake of the financial turmoil, much due to their end-to-end 
services with logistics provided (Wilh. Wilhelmsen ASA, 2010b).  
 
8.4.5 Benchmarking 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines is a Japanese company operating in the carriage of cars as well 
as for instance LNG, crude oil and container shipping. The Company has 
performed well with regards to returns in 2007 and 2008, with 21.23% and 
12.91%, following a rater dismal year of 2009 with return of 2.21%. With the 
exception of 2009, the Company performed better than Wilh. Wilhelmsen. 
Mitsui’s gearing ratio during the years 2007-2009 was 1.79, 1.53 and 1.56. Their  
gearing ratio was lower than Wilh. Wilhelmsen’s, which in turn may explain the 
better quick ratio of 0.96, 0.97 and 0.99 for the years of 2007-2009. 
Mitsui has been more a volatile stock than the Wilh. Wilhelmsen stock; probably 
due to the divergence in their operating activities. Wilhelmsen has outperformed 
the Mitsui stock as end of 2009 (Calculations from Appendix 2 based on Wilh. 
Wilhelmsen ASA, 2005-2010) & (Calculations from Appendix 2 & 3 based on 
Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., 2010). 
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8.4.6 Share Price 
The stock peaked at the end of April 2007 at NOK 260. From the peak, a steady 
decline followed, and in spite of some positive trends in 2008, the stock price on 
16th of March 2009 was 75.1% below trading in April 2007. The stock has 
strengthened towards the end of 2009, but is still down 53.1% from the peak in 
2007. 
 
(Graph cited from e24.no, 2010e) 
When analyzing for the SMA (50), we find that the stock has been steadily 
declining since May 2007, only with a small upswing in the summer of 2008.  
The Wilh. Wilhelmsen stock fell by 15.6% from the start of 2008 and had an 
intraday decline of 5.8% the 7th of February 2008, despite any indication or 
breaking news stating that the stock should fall (DN.no, 2008d).  
The Wilhelmsen stock fell from NOK 190 to NOK 162.5 in three short days, 
without any explicit news to explain the sudden reaction from the market as of 
11th of March 2008. This was according to experts not a suitable price as the 
underlying assets and earnings should justify a price of NOK 250 a share, as 
noted by Mr. Jarl Ulcin (DN.no, 2008d) & (Becker, 2008b).  
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In spite of the stock price failings, the Company presented very good results for 
1Q08 and also presented a contract amounting to $12-14B with Hyundai and Kia 
Motors lasting through 2016-2020. This news made the stock spike for about a 
week before eventually starting to decline again (DN.no, 2008h) & (DN.no, 
2008g).  
The stock took a further dip on the 23rd of June 2008 due to Mr. Wilhelmsen 
announcing the moving of the Company abroad in reaction to the Norwegian tax 
tonnage system. However, this means that the Company still has to pay their part 
of $200M in deferred tax, but also that they cannot take advantage of the 
environmental effects that could reduce this bill (DN.no, 2008f). 
Negative earnings before tax amounting to $94.1M in Q408, released in February 
2009, did not help strengthening the stock, but only put further negative 
pressure on the stock (DN.no, 2009g).  
Reaching mid March 2009, the Company had passed the bottom of the share 
downturn and the share had regained some of its former value. The Company is 
putting 15-20% of their vessels into layup, mostly due to the decrease in demand 
for car transport which amounted to 30-40%.  The layups gave the Company a 
higher utilization of their operating fleet and reduced the operating cost. The 
share price is on the rise after this news and has according to the SMA (50) been 
on a positive trend towards 2010, with a small dip reaching years end (DN.no, 
2009h) & (DN.no, 2009a).  
The dividend policy of the Company has not been sustained at the same level as 
in previous years. In 2007 the Company paid NOK 9.00 per share, and the 
subsequent years the paid NOK 7.00 and NOK 2.00 per share. When the 
Company states they have a policy of paying higher dividends each year, it sends 
a signal to the market that they are a company with substantially lower earnings 
and is less solid than in previous years (Annual report 2009Wilh. Wilhelmsen 
ASA, 2005-2010, p. 47).  
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8.5 Golden Ocean 
Golden Ocean Ltd. is a dry bulk shipping company based in Bermuda, which 
demerged from Frontline in the end of 2004 based on Frontline’s decision to 
become purely a tanker company (Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2010c).  
  
8.5.1 Strategy 
The Golden Ocean Ltd. strategy is to become one of the leading suppliers of dry 
bulk and serve their customers and investors in the best way possible, by 
allowing for efficient deliveries and high returns on investments.  
With the goal of becoming one of the leading suppliers, they need to grow, both 
through acquisitions of new vessels as well as chartering of ships on both short 
and long-term contracts (Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2010a).  
 
8.5.2 Operations 
The Company will focus on the Panamax and Capesize market and have a fully 
integrated commercial management responsibility for vessels and contracts.  
Golden Ocean is organized much in the same way as Frontline Ltd. since the 
same group of people set it up. The Golden Ocean Management Ltd., a wholly 
owned subsidiary, runs the management of the Company, while Frontline 
Management Ltd. performs the technical support. This has been done in order to 
stay competitive and target low overhead and daily ship operating costs. 
Mr. John Fredriksen is the major shareholder in Golden Ocean with around 40% 
of the shares. In order to be able to deliver on the promises of high return on 
investment and continued growth, all available instruments in the dry bulk 
market is used. Additionally, the restructuring of the fleet and the establishment 
of subsidiaries is undertaken when necessary (Annual report 2009 cited in 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010). 
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8.5.3 Segments 
The Company has control over 60 vessels; they currently own 31, charter 19, 
with three on bareboat and sixteen on a minimum of three-month charter, and 
an additional 10 under commercial management. Golden Ocean is operating in 
four segments with 22 Capesize, 8 OBO´s, 15 Panamax and 15 Kamsarmax 
(Annual report 2009 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010) & (Golden 
Ocean Group Ltd., 2010b).  
 
8.5.4 Fleet 
As of the beginning of 2005 the Company only owned two vessels, but further 
purchases and a leasing agreement made with Louis Dreyfus Corporation for ten 
Panamax vessels further ensured their fleet growth. Six leases were delivered 
and four new-buildings were outstanding with delivery due in 2007 (Annual 
report 2005 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
Golden Ocean further expanded its operations and investments in 2006. A new-
building contract for six ice-class Panamax vessels was entered into, with 
delivery in 2008 and at a contractual amount of $34.5M per vessel. The Company 
also sold two fully owned subsidiaries each owning a new-building contract, 
creating a revenue stream of $3.8M.  
Four new-building contracts for Capesize vessels were entered into in 2006, with 
delivery between mid 2008 and early 2009, each contract amounting to 
$72.25M. Two of these contracts were sold to Ship Finance with a back-to-back 
lease agreement (Annual report 2006 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-
2010).  
Golden Ocean sold two of the Panamax vessels ordered in 2006, yielding a 
positive result of $17M. They also entered into new contracts for four Panamax 
vessels, and an option for further two, at a purchase price of $35.5M per vessel.  
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Also, the Company made an order for four Capesize vessels with delivery 
between late 2008 and 2009 for the hefty sum of $296M. 2007 was a year of 
investment for Golden Ocean; they exercised an option for two Capesize vessels 
with delivery in 2010 and at a price of $145M. At the same time they sold two 
options for Capesize vessels earning a profit of $3.2M and agreed to 
commercially manage these ships when delivered (Annual report 2007 cited in 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
Starting 2008 on a positive note Golden Ocean sold a new-building contract 
entered into in 2006 with gross earning of $46.4 million. And only a month later 
they declared the use of their options on two Kamsarmax vessels at a cost of 
$208 million, with delivery in 2011 (Annual report 2008 cited in Golden Ocean 
Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
2009, on the other hand, did not start as well for Golden Ocean with non-
compliance on the sale-and-leaseback with Ship Finance, thus resulting in the 
termination of the agreement. Furthermore, the redelivery of one of their owned 
Panamax vessels created legal actions towards third party, as the contract had 
not reached an end.  
Later in 2009 the delivery of one of their new vessels went on a contract of time 
charter for five years with revenue of $48,000 a day. Another delivery was made 
in April and the ship went on the spot market for what is reported as favorable 
rates.    
The Company had substantially increased their capital commitment account 
balance from $82,6M in 2005 to $482M in 2006, and to $1,119M, $1,003M and 
$730M in the following years. Out of the $730M in 2009, $374.9M of the 
commitment was unfinanced.  
Reaching the end of 2009 the Company had an open capacity in the Panamax 
market of 23% in 2010 following 40% and 47%in the subsequent years. The 
Capesize market has a free capacity of 20% in the fourth quarter of 2010 and 
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33% and 39% for the whole of 2010 and 2011 (Annual report 2009 cited in 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010). 
 
8.5.5 Finance 
Golden Ocean’s return on total capital employed was 22.5%, 13.26%, 28.50%, 
20.79% and 18.73% in the years; 2005 to 2009 respectively. Although with 
increasing total capital and revenue every year except 2009, the Company had 
some troubles keeping their debt covenants in the midst of the financial crisis.  
The debt to equity ratio of the Company increased from 2005-2008 by 3.93, 3.03, 
5.52 and 4.74. In 2009 the ratio was 1.06 due to a major increase in equity and a 
decrease in debt (Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Golden Ocean Group 
Ltd., 2005-2010). 
 
8.5.5.1 Equity 
Golden Ocean has steadily increased their equity, with 2009 being an exceptional 
year as the equity rose from $175M to $527M. The reason for the small increase 
in equity in years prior to 2008 was the dividend policy of the Company, which 
meant dividend almost corresponded to profit of the respective year. In 2009, 
the Company retained all the earnings, issued shares and generated cash in the 
amount of $108M. 
 
8.5.5.2 Debt 
In 2007, the Company pledged vessels under construction in order to obtain 
loans for their new-buildings, amounting to $414M (Annual report 2007 cited in 
Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
As Golden Ocean was not in compliance with their ratio of 30% market adjusted 
equity as of 2008, negotiations were performed, and the new agreement states a 
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minimum of $200M in equity. With the repurchase of convertible bonds, 
reducing debt and generating a profit from the issuance of new shares, the firm 
is now in compliance (Annual report 2008 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 
2005-2010). 
The group also negotiated a contract delaying the delivery of six Kamsarmax 
vessels under construction, deferring the exposure of major liabilities another 
year. 2009 was the best year gearing wise, as Golden Ocean had a debt to equity 
ratio of 1.06.  
Of the total long term debt of $465M, $415M were secured under vessels under 
construction or sailing, but of the $730M of new-building commitments $380M 
were unfinanced as end of 2009. Golden Ocean uses single purpose companies 
for many of their new-buildings, with currently six of the Kamsarmax vessels 
under construction isolate in such companies. This amounts to a liability of 
$236M, which has been given no guarantee by the group, and as such is limiting 
the financial risk of the entire firm (Annual report 2009 cited in Golden Ocean 
Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
The Company’s quick ratio has increased in the years up until 2008. In 2008 the 
ratio declined to 0.21, having been 1.0 in 2007, due to the high level of current 
liabilities and the decrease in cash holdings. Though, in 2009 the ratio was up at 
1.46 which is more in compliance with the industry average, and the Company 
was showing signs of a stronger liquidity (Calculations from Appendix 1 based 
on Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010). 
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8.5.5.3 Financial leasing/ Operational leasing 
Golden Ocean is heavily committed to the operational lease of vessels, rather 
than financial lease. The Company had operational lease payments amounting to 
$50.51M in 2005, $144.15M for 2006, $393.14M in 2007 and $544.17M for 2008 
and $123M for 2009, with the revenues of operating lease amounting to 
$107.90M, $279.92M, $710.88M $883.60M and $366.56M respectively.  
The Company has as end of 2008 a minimum lease payment amounting to 
$143.75M compared to total minimum lease revenues in the range of $1.241M. 
This has been obtained by substantial repayment of lease in 2007 and 2008 
(Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010). 
 
8.5.6 Operating income and result 
Operating income for Golden Ocean made a leap from 2006 to 2007 
corresponding to $267M and $703M. The Company increased its revenue in 
2008 to $877M, followed by a rather dismal 2009 with lowly $350M in revenue. 
Return on capital employed was at it highest in 2007 with 28.5%. During the 
following years, the return on capital employed decreased to 20.7% in 2008 and, 
finally, 18.73% in 2009. The return in 2007 more than doubled from 2006, even 
though Golden Ocean declared vessels under construction in order to obtain 
financing, which increased their asset holdings with about $400M.  
In 2009 the revenues fell drastically, but the operating margin only changed a 
little with operating expenses representing 76% of operating income in 2008 
and 2007. The 2009 result reveals expenses over income of 71.2%. Meaning; it 
was actually a better performance operation wise. Operation expenses consist of 
roughly 50% charter hire expenses. 
Net result before tax during the years 2007 to 2009 shows a peak in 2008 at 
$381M compared to 2007 at $201M and 2009 producing a net result of $218M. If 
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we compare the results, after deducting for the sale of assets, we can see that 
there is not a huge difference between these years: 
2007: $75M  Net result without sale: $126M 
2008: $209M Net result without sale: $172M 
2009: $51M  Net result without sale: $167M 
Although net result was substantially higher in 2008 compared to the other two 
years, the net results without the sale of assets yields a $5M difference from 
2008 to 2009 and there was actually a substantial increase in net result from 
2007 to 2009.  
Net cash provided by operating activities were $143M, $194M and $114M in 
2007-2009. The major increase and decrease being due to the payment of 
dividend, sale of vessels, repayment of debt and the proceeds of debt and cash 
provided by operating activities (Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010) & 
(Calculations from Appendix 1 based on Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
 2009 2008 2007 
Cash provided by 
operating activities 
$143M $194M $114M 
Sale of vessels $231M $451M - 
Net debt change $467M ($51M) $48M 
Purchase of vessels ($413M) $420M ($178M) 
Dividend/other ($171M) ($347) $60M 
Net cash held yrs end $306M $41M $81M 
*These are only the main changes and does not represent real net changes in cash held by years 
end. Positive net debt change constitutes proceeds from debt. 
(Table based on numbers from Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010) 
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Golden Ocean had imminent cash flow problems at years end in 2008, therefore 
decided not to pay dividend, which seemed to be a wise call. The restructuring of 
loan covenants and proceeds from debt issuance, as well as sale of vessels, in 
2008 have managed to keep Golden Ocean liquid. Mr. John Fredriksen and Mr. 
Tor Olav Trøim explain their sale of vessels amounting to $451M in 2008 would 
not have been undertaken if they did not believe the market would collapse in 
the near future, as they saw troubles of financing already in 2007 (Takla, 2008).  
 
8.5.7 Benchmarking 
Diana Shipping and Jinhui Shipping are companies operating in the same 
segment as Golden Ocean and are thus fairly comparable when it comes to 
financial performance. Diana Shipping has a relative low gearing ratio of 0.18, 
0.36 and 0.32 in 2007-2009 with the corresponding return on capital of 19.3%, 
22.6% and 10.5%. The quick ratio of the Company has increased from 1.0 in 
2007 to 9.2 in 2009, which gives the impression of a company able to handle 
their capital commitments in a timely manner. 
Jinhui Shipping has decreased their gearing ratio during the years 2007 to 2009. 
The gearing ratio was 1.62, 0.97 and 0.84 during this period, and the returns 
were 16.8%, 30.4% and 17.5%. The quick ratio measured 0.72, 1.20 and 1.72, 
which is a significantly improvement during the time of crisis, and shows a sign 
of strength.  
Looking at the stock prices from 2008 through 2009 and comparing Diana, Jinhui 
and Golden Ocean percentage wise, with the start of 2008 being nil, the 
companies has moved very much in synch. The volatility is to a large extent 
driven by the market indicators and affecting the companies in much the same 
way. Diana has had the best performance slightly over Golden Ocean until 
October 2008 where the fall of Jinhui and Golden were steeper and more severe.  
The Diana stock has been somewhat volatile in the period up until 2009. Jinhui 
has tangent their performance, while Golden Ocean is 20 percentage points 
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below them at negative 62% from 2008. “One of the reasons for the relative good 
performance of Diana Shipping is the low equity ratio, which means they can 
double their fleet without having a gearing ratio higher than the industry 
average” (DN.no, 2009f); (Calculations from Appendix 2 & 3 based on Jinhui 
Shipping and Transportation Ltd., 2010); (Calculations from Appendix 2 & 3 
based on Diana Shipping Inc., 2010) & (Yahoo! Finance, 2010b).  
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8.5.8 Share price 
Despite Golden Ocean being a fairly young company, it has already felt the effect 
of a crisis on its share price. From an initiation price of NOK 3.40 on 15th of 
December 2004, the share peaked on 29th of October at a price of NOK 44.20. A 
volatile year and a half saw the share end on NOK 1.58 on 2nd of March 2009, 
falling a staggering 96.4% from peak to trough. Since then, Golden Ocean has 
climbed to NOK 10.57 at the year’s end in 2009 measuring an increase in the 
nine short months of 569.0%. Though, it is still 76% down since the 2007 peak.  
We believe the stock price was adversely affected by the increased utilization of 
the dry bulk fleet, which had a steady build-up in 2006 and lasted throughout 
2007 and 2008. The peak in late 2007 did not prove sustainable and seem to 
have been an artificially high price. The increasing leveraged position of the 
Company, following the incurrence of more debt as well as the sale of ten new-
building contracts, may have given the market a sign of weakness. When the BDI 
fell sharply in the first quarter of 2008 the decline of the share continued 
(Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Graph cited from e24.no, 2010b) 
The Company’s share increased in value during the first months of 2008. This is 
believed to have a correlation with the purchase of 10% the outstanding shares 
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and the consecutive cancellation of these shares, as well as the increase of the 
BDI and the price of steel.  
The second half of 2008 experienced a massive decrease in steel prices, the BDI 
plummeted, the credit market and the world consumption in general dried up. It 
is reasonable to say that these events had a negative effect on Golden Ocean’s 
share price, despite the bulk market showing some signs of improvement 
through increased spot rates. The improvement of the bulk market was mainly 
due to increased demand following the seasonality and the increased activity 
after the 2008 Olympic Games in China, but in spite of this, Golden Ocean 
continued falling. One of the reasons behind the fall of Golden Ocean might be 
that 70% of their fleet covered the voyage market (DN.no, 2008b) & (DN.no, 
2008c).  
Golden Ocean resold a contract with the delivery of six Kamsarmax vessels to 
Britannia Bulk, but since it was deemed unlikely that Britannia Bulk would be 
able to commit to this deal, the Golden Ocean stock fell 8.1% at 29th of October 
2008. Although Britannia had paid installments of $70.6M to Golden Ocean, it 
meant further commitments of $24M per ship when taking delivery from the 
yard. Golden Ocean had expected a net earning of this transaction of $127M, not 
a further commitment of $144M for the new-building program (Bjørndal, 
2008a).  
One of the major reasons for the significantly hard fall of Golden Ocean was the 
fear of a liquidity squeeze, as they were in breach with their loan covenants and 
the debt was due in March 2009. The report for 4Q09 did not state much about 
new-building commitments, nor how the Company should handle their liquidity 
problems. As a result of this the Company’s share plummeted 38.2% in February 
2009 (DN.no, 2009e).  
The liquidity situation was resolved with the buyback of 2/3´s of the convertible 
bonds by Mr. John Fredriksen. Thus, the Company was now able to utilize their 
already established credit facilities, as they were no longer in breach with their 
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covenants. Though, the situation was still rather grim for the Company and a 
foreclosure was on the horizon (Bjørndal, 2009).  
Due to a rather harsh setback in the freight rates, the outlook for revenues did 
not show positive signs as end of March 2009. There was a decline in the demand 
from China and the order-book for vessels in the segment was significantly 
larger than what could be handled by the market. In spite of this, the Company 
took delivery of a new ship. Earnings were up and the future for Golden Ocean 
seemed somewhat brighter now that the covenants were no longer in breach 
(DN.no, 2008b).  
During the year of 2009, the share price increased much due to a stronger 
market. There was increased export of iron ore from China because of the 
decline in steel prices, and the BDI increased significantly in November, which 
meant a strong increase in the Golden Ocean stock price (DN.no, 2009b) & 
(Fadnes & Bjerke, 2009).  
The Company has as of 18th of March 2010 been listed on the Singapore stock 
exchange, which is a sign of the Company being in healthy condition. 
Furthermore, the proximity to the Asian market may prove very important for 
the Company. Also, it may strengthen the market’s belief in the Company, as well 
as it is a place where the Company can obtain capital, if needed (Annual report 
2009 cited in Golden Ocean Group Ltd., 2005-2010, p. 3).   
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9 Conclusion 
We are in this section underlining the major changes brought on by the financial 
crisis and the effect it had on the shipping companies. 
 
9.1 Financial crisis 
The financial crisis started in the US subprime and mortgage market and spread 
to the bank and financial sector. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and 
other financial mammoths, liquidity and solvency difficulties spread to the real 
economy, causing a collapse in the world economy. Effects of the collapse were 
the stock market crash, cutback in consumer spending and the substantial 
decrease world trade in the latter part of 2008 and 2009.  
 
9.2 Shipping industry 
Due to the decline in world consumption, many businesses had too high of 
inventory. Thus, the order of new merchandises was limited, or put on halt, 
causing less demand for shipping services.   
Growing demand for shipping services by sea in the years prior to the financial 
crisis increased the new-building activity of vessels. The world order-book for 
new vessels was for some segments as high as 45-69% of the existing fleet. This 
has caused the supply of tonnage to supersede the demand for tonnage. The 
mismatch does not constitute equilibrium, and ships that are not efficient 
enough to operate have been laid up. There are many ship-owners not able to 
obtain cargo for their ships, forcing the vessels into layups in the hope of an 
increase in demand.  
Because of the prosperous time prior to the crisis, ship-owners ordered ships 
from yards without having the proper financing. Thus, when installments were 
to be paid; the lowly freight rates, lack of shipments and the dismal world 
outlook caused companies without superior bank connections or equity at hand, 
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to forfeit on their commitments. This liquidity squeeze has caused delays in 
delivery, cancellation and strained on the cash holding for some shipping 
companies.  
 
9.3 Market factors affecting the shipping companies 
As we have limited our research to a few segments including crude oil, dry bulk, 
RORO and chemical carriers, we have identified the following market factors to 
have the largest influence on these segments: 
- Demand for oil, iron ore, steel, liquid edible and non edible clean 
products, clean petroleum products and coal 
- Consumer demand for cars and heavy machinery 
- Geopolitical instability 
- Hurricane season in the United States 
- Port congestion 
- Slow steaming 
- Chinese import and export of various products 
These factors have affected the shipping companies before and under the crisis, 
making it difficult to clearly define which of the factors can be contributed to; the 
financial crisis, seasonality and long-term changes.  
The increasing oil prices prior to the crisis hurt the ship-owners hedging their 
bunker cost in the derivatives market, as the price declined both abruptly and by 
67% at the most. World oil demand decreased in 2008 and 2009. In conjunction 
with the high price of crude oil, the world consumption decreased in the second 
half of 2008, and further decreased throughout 2009, as an effect of the decline 
in international spending and consumption of goods.  
For shipping companies with obligations in currencies like the NOK and SGD the 
depreciation of the USD increased cost of payments in addition to the equity 
decrease on the losses of hedging. 
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9.4 Segments 
The crude oil carriers experienced record high freight rates in the beginning of 
2008, only to endure a mammoth decline towards the end of 2008, as the 
financial crisis spilled over to the shipping industry and the demand for oil 
decreased due to falling crude oil prices. Freight increased at the start of 2009, 
although highly volatile throughout the rest of the year. Rates increased during 
2008, due to the demand for vessels for the use of storage as the futures market 
was in contango. 18% of the fleet was single-hulled vessels, which created too 
high supply in proportion to demand during these years, but this situation 
should be somewhat relieved in the aftermath of 2010 as the single-hulled 
vessels are to be phased out due to new regulations.  
The dry bulk segment has mainly been driven by the increased demand of iron 
ore and coal to China, as well as the high utilization rate due to lack of tonnage, 
prior to the financial crisis. Steel demand in China decreased due to spot rates 
was lower than contractual prices and total world demand decreased as a result 
of the decrease in overall consumption, which also included steel. The segment 
was faced with increased freight rates and high utilization of the fleet when 
reaching the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, much due to the higher 
availability of letters of credit and China importing at a high level.  
The chemical tanker segment has experienced less volatility and not as sharp a 
fall in freight rates compared to the other segments in our analysis, with the top-
to-bottom decline of 35% for the Houston-Rotterdam route. Delivery of ships has 
sustained at a high level in both 2008 and 2009 due to the near completion of the 
vessels making it hard to cancel the deliveries. Demolition in the range of 2% for 
2009 was not enough to balance the segments supply and demand. The 
outstanding order-book is 26% of 2009 deep-sea fleet representing a high 
degree of uncertainty for the future, although scrapping is believed to increase.  
The financial crisis put the biodiesel debate on hold, decreasing the demand for 
such products carried by chemical tankers.  
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PCC, PCTC and RORO carriers experienced prosperous times leading up to the 
financial crisis, with undersupply of tonnage. The decreased export from Asia led 
to 50% lower demand for RORO carriers with a utilization rate of 93% in 2008 
the rate fell to 60% in 20009, but the segment was quick to react to the crisis and 
scrapped 14% of their fleet. Increased export from Asia due to incentive 
packages strengthened the market in the second half of 2009. The future outlook 
is mixed, with a high order-book for PCC carriers and Japanese manufacturers 
looking to expand production in the US.  
 
9.5 Companies 
The companies analyzed have all had a decrease in their return on capital 
employed from 2008 to 2009, but the tanker segments have incurred the largest 
decrease. Though, NAT has experienced the least decrease in their share price, 
with a decline from peak to end of 2009 of negative 26.1%, a better performance 
than NYSE, OSEBX and substantially better than the BDTI. With a fleet operating 
mainly in the spot market, and a new-building program financed by the equity 
market, as well as cash holding, the company has managed to pay dividend, 
although less than before the crisis. NAT was well positioned before the crisis 
with the non-cancelable credit facility and the only real worry was to obtain 
freight during the crisis. 
Golden Ocean has shown high return on their capital employed in the amount of 
18.73% in 2009. Although facing a liquidity squeeze in late 2008 and beginning 
of 2009, the company strategically sold vessels to free cash in 2008 when second 
hand prices were high. Through their extensive new-building program, the 
company has substantially increased their fleet, which is largely trading in the 
spot market. The company experienced a serious decline in operating income 
due to the falling freight rates, but the net cash holding increased in 2009 with a 
strong contribution from operating activities as well as the issuance of new debt 
and sale of vessels in a tight market. Although showing signs of increased 
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liquidity and solidity, the Golden Ocean share is the one experiencing the largest 
fall of 76.1% from top to end of 2009.  
Frontline was percentagewise less exposed to the spot market compared to NAT 
and Golden Ocean, but the operating income relies, to a large extent, on the rates 
obtained through voyage charter. With high break-even rates and the falling spot 
price in the second half of 2008, Frontline’s return on capital decreased 
substantially. Facing liquidity problems Frontline cancelled delivery of vessels, 
decreased dividend payments and renegotiated the current portion of long-term 
debt, which has to be repaid in 2011. Capital lease payments were twice those in 
2008, straining on Frontlines cash holdings, although managing to increase the 
holding of restricted cash, to be offset against future debt and lease liabilities. 
Frontlines share price has regained some of its value, but are still down 56.2% 
from the peak. 
Odfjell experienced less demand for services due to the halt in bio-fuel supply 
lead on by the financial crisis. The company used the crisis and the cash 
retrieved from Sevmash to invest in vessels for short-sea carriage in Asia, 
exploiting the decreased vessel price. With the hedges on bunker, the company 
had write-downs of $87M in 2008, but increased the equity to $901M in 2009 
due to the appreciating dollar. The increased oil price and falling oil prices 
accounted for the majority of the reduction in the operating margin. Odfjell has 
experienced some liquidity problems in 2009, but has used the array of long-
term credit facilities and the issue of bonds, to make these payments. The 
terminal segment created far less in operating revenues compared to the 
shipping segment, but provided a higher net cash-flow in 2009. As freight rates 
decreased and the operating cost sustained, cash flow from the shipping segment 
was more than halved. Odfjell’s stock has decreased by 66% from top to end of 
2009.   
The Wilh. Wilhelmsen group were adversely affected by the crisis. 17 vessels 
were laid up for the year 2009 and there was redelivery of chartered vessels to 
third party. Also, the company scrapped 15 vessels, due to an oversupply of 
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vessels in the segments, and only three out of six new-buildings were reported to 
have proper financing, due to difficulties of attaining debt. Although earnings 
decreased in the shipping segment, the joint ventures posted higher net results, 
the Wilhelmsen Ship management saw new market opportunities yielding 
positive results and terminal activity yielded a higher profit than the year of 
2008. Despite some positive results; the stock price of Wilh. Wilhelmsen is down 
53.1% from top to end 2009.    
  
9.6 Thoughts 
Stock markets of the world, such as NYSE, NASDAQ and OSEBX as well as 
shipping indices like the BDI, BDTI and BCTI were adversely affected by the 
financial crisis. The indices fell with less than equal effect. The fall from top to 
bottom was higher for the OSEBX, which is highly correlated to oil and shipping, 
and the shipping indices. While the stock indices are down in the range of 
negative 20-30% from top to end 2009 the shipping companies analyzed have 
not regained their value at the same pace. All companies with the exception of 
NAT are down between 52-76.1% from top to end 2009. NAT has only 
experienced a net decline of 26.1% in this period.  
The companies analyzed are operating in fragmented segments, with different 
debt degree, capital structure, hedging techniques, routes traveled, 
administrative cost, purchase time of vessels and delivery of new-building from 
different yards at various prices. Despite all this, the decline in the stock price of 
the companies was to a large degree in sync both with regard to time and force. 
We cannot state that the financial crisis is the only reason for this decline, but the 
crisis had an effect on market factors affecting the shipping industry and thus the 
shipping companies and their share price.  
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10 Postscript 
When calculating ratios for various companies the information retrieval was 
inhibited by the fact that many companies are not forced to publicize their 
annual reports, thus all the ratios we wanted to calculate for was not possible 
and under some calculations the deduction of some figures was not doable.  
It is important to note that the TCE average prices can vary depending on the 
sources used. We have in this paper used what the company themselves state as 
being TCE for the period. We have used them consistently when analyzing a 
specific firm, but it may create a problem when cross comparing companies. 
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12 Appendix I 
Odfjell 
Profitability       
        
Return on total capital employed      
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
        
EBIT  61000  197,625   203,595   156,167   170,424   114,036  
        
Financial Income 15065  28,501  14354 12682 9675  20,943  
        
Avg. Total capital 2641889  2,481,600   2,283,780   2,072,594   1,913,854   1,774,377  
        
Ratio  2.88% 9.11% 9.54% 8.15% 9.41% 7.61% 
        
        
Capital turnover       
        
Operating income 1264150  1,476,213   1,239,524   1,088,538   1,044,948   943,356  
        
Avg. Tot capital 2641889  2,481,600   2,283,780   2,072,594   1,913,854   1,774,377  
        
Ratio   0.48   0.59   0.54   0.53   0.55   0.53  
        
        
Return on equity before tax      
        
Net result before tax 25999 145,809 142,885 114,885 142,521  105,160  
        
Avg. EQ  813515  696,709   690,130   699,972   667,520   586,770  
        
Ratio  3.20% 20.93% 20.70% 16.41% 21.35% 17.92% 
        
        
Return on equity after tax      
        
Net result  121083 162678 -10109 115941 128269 94577 
        
Avg. EQ  813515 696709 690130 699972 667520 586770 
        
Ratio  14.88% 23.35% -1.46% 16.56% 19.22% 16.12% 
        
        
Solidity        
        
Equity ratio       
        
Equity  906171  720,859   672,558   707,702   692,241   642,798  
        
Equity and liabilities 2698916  2,584,862   2,378,837   2,189,223   1,955,966   1,871,725  
        
Ratio  33.58% 27.89% 28.27% 32.33% 35.39% 34.34% 
        
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Interest repayment capabilities      
        
Net result before tax 25999 145,809 142,885 114,885 142,521  105,160  
        
Financial cost 50464 80317 75064 53964 37578 29819 
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Ratio  1.52 2.82 2.90 3.13 4.79 4.53 
        
        
Finance ratio       
        
Fixed assets  2162666  2,157,370   2,033,491   1,802,555   1,358,503   1,490,562  
        
Non current liabilities 1474576  1,539,962   1,363,312   1,225,050   1,008,338   950,574  
        
Total equity  906171  720,859   672,558   707,702   692,241   642,798  
        
Ratio  90.84% 95.42% 99.88% 93.26% 79.88% 93.55% 
        
        
Debt to equity ratio       
        
Total liabilities 1792746  1,864,004   1,706,279   1,481,522   1,263,725   1,194,207  
        
Total equities 906171  720,859   672,558   707,702   692,241   642,798  
        
Ratio  1.98 2.59 2.54 2.09 1.83 1.86 
        
Current debt ratio       
        
Current liabilities 318169  324,042   342,976   256,472   255,387   243,633  
        
Assets  2698916  2,584,862   2,378,837   2,189,223   1,955,966   1,871,725  
        
Ratio  11.79% 12.54% 14.42% 11.72% 13.06% 13.02% 
        
        
Non current debt 
ratio       
        
Non current liabilities 1474576  1,539,962   1,363,312   1,225,050   1,008,338   950,574  
        
Assets  2698916  2,584,862   2,378,837   2,189,223   1,955,966   1,871,725  
        
Ratio  54.64% 59.58% 57.31% 55.96% 51.55% 50.79% 
        
        
        
Quick Ratio       
        
Cash+ accounts 
receivable+ short term 
investments 329539 358731 303597 357769 283872 248918 
        
Current liabilities 318169 324042 342967 256472 255387 243633 
        
Ratio  1.04 1.11 0.89 1.39 1.11 1.02 
        
        
Operation cash flow ratio      
        
Operating cash flow 117408 355848 186489 273792 259245 202717 
        
Current liabilities 318169 324042 342967 256472 255387 243633 
        
Ratio  0.37 1.10 0.54 1.07 1.02 0.83 
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Golden Ocean 
Profitability       
        
Return on total capital employed      
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
        
EBIT  100150  223,748   167,367   49,822   32,473   1,954  
        
Financial Income 95922  3,939   80,032   12,838   20,109   15  
        
Avg. Total capital 1046697  1,095,239   868,018   472,588   233,696   74,431  
        
Ratio  18.73 20.79% 28.50% 13.26% 22.50% 2.65% 
        
        
Capital turnover       
        
Operating income 349590  947,503   708,035   265,703   95,716   4,853  
        
Avg. Tot capital 1046697  1,095,239   868,018   472,588   233,696   74,431  
        
Ratio   0.33   0.87   0.82   0.56   0.41   0.07  
        
        
Return on equity before tax      
        
Net result before tax 217096 380,202 201,062 35,703 40,945  1,830  
        
Avg. EQ  352569  178,387   159,328   108,430   52,013   24,292  
        
Ratio  61.58% 213.13% 126.19% 32.93% 78.72% 7.53% 
        
        
Return on equity after tax      
        
Net result  217021  380,143   200,970   35,652   40,945   1,830  
        
Avg. EQ  352569  178,387   159,328   108,430   52,013   24,292  
        
Ratio  61.55% 213.10% 126.14% 32.88% 78.72% 7.53% 
        
        
Solidity        
        
Equity ratio       
        
Equity  527468  175,243   181,530   137,126   79,734   24,292  
        
Equity and liabilities 1086737  1,006,658   1,183,820   552,215   392,961   74,431  
        
Ratio  48.54% 17.41% 15.33% 24.83% 20.29% 32.64% 
        
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
        
Interest repayment capabilities      
        
Net result before tax 217096 380,202 201,062 35,703 40,945 1,830 
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Financial cost 15730 20579 46337 26957 11637 139 
        
Ratio  14.80 19.48 5.34 2.32 4.52 14.17 
        
        
Finance ratio       
        
Fixed assets  835883  688,525   523,565   229,029   239,595   48,706  
        
Non current liabilities 473196  167,533   624,071   289,922   237,130   44,750  
        
Total equity  527468  175,243   181,530   137,126   79,734   24,292  
        
Ratio  83.53% 200.87% 64.99% 53.63% 75.61% 70.55% 
        
        
Debt to equity ratio       
        
Total liabilities 559269  831,415   1,002,290   415,089   313,227   50,139  
        
Total equities 527468  175,243   181,530   137,126   79,734   24,292  
        
Ratio  1.06 4.74 5.52 3.03 3.93 2.06 
        
Current debt ratio       
        
Current liabilities 86073  663,882   378,219   125,167   76,097   5,389  
        
Assets  1086737  1,006,658   1,183,820   552,215   392,961   74,431  
        
Ratio  7.92% 65.95% 31.95% 22.67% 19.37% 7.24% 
        
        
Non current debt 
ratio       
        
Non current liabilities 473196  167,533   624,071   289,922   237,130   44,750  
        
Assets  1086737  1,006,658   1,183,820   552,215   392,961   74,431  
        
Ratio  43.54% 16.64% 52.72% 52.50% 60.34% 60.12% 
        
        
Liquidity        
Quick Ratio       
        
Cash+ accounts 
receivable+ short term 
investments 125453 142298 378768 69702 27351 21957 
        
Current liabilities 86073  663,882   378,219   125,167   76,097   5,389  
        
Ratio  1.46 0.21 1.00 0.56 0.36 4.07 
        
        
Operation cash flow ratio      
        
Operating cash flow 117113 235124 182743 59916 37495 3111 
        
Current liabilities 86073  663,882   378,219   125,167   76,097   5,389  
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Ratio  1.36 0.35 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.58 
        
        
        
        
        
Frontline 
Profitability       
        
Return on total capital employed      
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
        
EBIT   240,110   850,480   519,191   822,579   863,543   1,125,108  
        
Financial Income 26056  44,321   184,384   25,217   88,430   111,750  
        
Avg. Total capital 3871473  3,894,910   4,176,014   4,522,377   4,453,300   4,401,148  
        
Ratio  6.88 22.97% 16.85% 18.75% 21.38% 28.10% 
        
        
Capital turnover       
        
Operating income 1133286  2,104,018   1,299,927   1,583,863   1,504,516   1,842,923  
        
Avg. Tot capital  3,871,473   3,894,910   4,176,014   4,522,377   4,453,300   4,401,148  
        
Ratio   0.29   0.54   0.31   0.35   0.34   0.42  
        
        
Return on equity before tax      
        
Net result before tax 105833 701,264 503,991 674,844 766,389  970,936  
        
EQ  741340 702,217 445,969 668,560 715,166  917,968  
        
Avg. EQ  721778.5 574093 557264.5 691863 816567 1086692.5 
        
Ratio  14.66% 122.15% 90.44% 97.54% 93.86% 89.35% 
        
        
Return on equity after tax      
        
Net result  102701  698,770   570,418   516,000   606,839   1,023,382  
        
Avg. EQ  721778.5 574093 557264.5 691863 816567 1086692.5 
        
Ratio  14.23% 121.72% 102.36% 74.58% 74.32% 94.17% 
        
        
Solidity        
        
Equity ratio       
        
Equity  741340 702217 445969 668560 715166 917968 
        
Equity and liabilities 3715218  4,027,728   3,762,091   4,589,937   4,454,817   4,338,760  
        
Ratio  19.95% 17.43% 11.85% 14.57% 16.05% 21.16% 
        
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
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Interest repayment capabilities      
        
Net result before tax 105833 701264 503991 674844 766389 970936 
        
Financial cost 161878 227580 204535 211293 162182 215994 
        
Ratio  1.65 4.08 3.46 4.19 5.73 5.50 
        
        
Finance ratio       
        
Fixed assets  1092662  892,388   368,814   2,613,129   2,600,774   2,254,361  
        
Non current liabilites 2359108  2,607,944   2,725,896   2,492,423   2,925,424   2,746,199  
        
Total equity  741340 702217 445969 668560 715166 917968 
        
Ratio  35.24% 26.96% 11.63% 82.67% 71.44% 61.52% 
        
        
Debt to equity ratio       
  0.574571327      
Total liabilities 2964470  3,318,874   3,316,122   3,380,255   3,381,923   3,092,062  
        
Total equities  741,340   702,217   445,969   668,560   715,166   917,968  
        
Ratio  4.00 4.73 7.44 5.06 4.73 3.37 
        
Current debt ratio       
        
Current liabilities 605362  710,930   590,226   443,916   456,499   345,863  
        
Assets  3715218  4,027,728   3,762,091   4,589,937   4,567,839   4,338,760  
        
Ratio  16.29% 17.65% 15.69% 9.67% 9.99% 7.97% 
        
        
Non current debt 
ratio       
        
Non current liabilities 2359108 2607944 2725896 2492423 2925424 2746199 
        
Assets  3715218 4027728 3762091 4589937 4567839 4338760 
        
Ratio  63.50% 64.75% 72.46% 54.30% 64.04% 63.29% 
        
        
Liquidity        
        
Quick Ratio       
        
Cash+ accounts 
receivable+ short term 
investments 701056 649988 938448 989431 999514 963117 
        
Current liabilities 605362 710930 590226 443916 456499 345863 
        
Ratio  1.16 0.91 1.59 2.23 2.19 2.78 
        
        
Operation cash flow ratio      
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Operating cash flow 477062 1073689 738410 1003115 1054828 1315931 
        
Current liabilities  605,362   710,930   590,226   443,916   456,499   345,863  
        
Ratio  0.79 1.51 1.25 2.26 2.31 3.80 
        
        
        
Wilh Wilhelmsen 
Profitability       
        
Return on total capital employed      
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
        
EBIT   240   243   240   294   206   163  
        
Financial income 35  83   35   34   72   19  
        
Total capital  3684  3,250   2,839   2,735   2,263   1,594  
        
Avg. Total capital 3467 3044.5 2787 2499 1928.5 1517 
        
Ratio  0.079319296 0.107078338 0.098672408 0.131252501 0.144153487 0.119973632 
        
        
Capital turnover       
        
Operating income 1050  1,296   983   975   690   445  
        
Avg. Tot capital  3,467   3,045   2,787   2,499   1,929   1,517  
        
Ratio   0.30   0.43   0.35   0.39   0.36   0.29  
        
        
Return on equity before tax      
        
Net result before tax 312 32 228 273 201  164  
        
EQ  1269 914 953 1,037 834  736  
        
Avg. EQ  1091.5 933.5 995 935.5 785 701 
        
Ratio  28.58% 3.43% 22.91% 29.18% 25.61% 23.40% 
        
        
Return on equity after tax      
        
Net result  334  95   7   230   191   171  
        
Avg. EQ  1091.5 933.5 995 935.5 785 701 
        
Ratio  30.60% 10.18% 0.70% 24.59% 24.33% 24.39% 
        
        
Solidity        
        
Equity ratio       
        
Equity  1269 914 953 1037 834 736 
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Equity and liabilities 3684  3,250   2,839   2,735   2,263   1,596  
        
Ratio  34.45% 28.12% 33.57% 37.92% 36.85% 46.12% 
        
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Interest repayment capabilities      
        
Net result before tax 312 32 228 273 201 164 
        
Financial cost 113 60 103 102 36 18 
        
Ratio  3.76 1.53 3.21 3.68 6.58 10.11 
        
        
Finance ratio       
        
Fixed assets  1589  1,477   1,134   1,098   842   701  
        
Non current liabilities 1933  1,743   1,349   1,134   808   554  
        
Total equity  1269 914 953 1037 834 736 
        
Ratio  49.63% 55.59% 49.26% 50.58% 51.28% 54.34% 
        
        
Debt to equity ratio       
        
Total liabilities 2415  2,336   1,886   1,698   1,429   860  
        
Total equities  1,269   914   953   1,037   834   736  
        
Ratio  1.90 2.56 1.98 1.64 1.71 1.17 
        
Current debt ratio       
        
Current liabilities 482  593   537   857   619   357  
        
Assets  3684  3,250   2,839   2,735   2,263   1,596  
        
Ratio  13.08% 18.25% 18.92% 31.33% 27.35% 22.37% 
        
        
Non current debt 
ratio       
        
Non current liabilities 1933 1743 1349 1134 808 554 
        
Assets  3684 3250 2839 2735 2263 1596 
        
Ratio  52.47% 53.63% 47.52% 41.46% 35.70% 34.71% 
        
        
Quick Ratio       
        
Cash+ accounts 
receivable+ short term 
investments 699 454 412 377 349 264 
        
Current liabilities 482 593 537 857 619 357 
        
Ratio  1.45 0.77 0.77 0.44 0.56 0.74 
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
150 
        
        
Operation cash flow ratio      
        
Operating cash flow 321 257 524 305 252 227 
        
Current liabilities  482   593   537   857   619   357  
        
Ratio  0.67 0.43 0.98 0.36 0.41 0.64 
        
        
        
NAT 
Profitability       
        
Return on total capital employed      
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
        
EBIT   2,418   121,288   53,245   72,242   48,887   42,780  
        
Financial income 94  948   904   1,602   884   143  
        
Total capital  880228  813,878   804,628   800,180   505,844   224,203  
        
Avg. Total capital 880228 809253 802404 653012 365023.5 112101.5 
        
Ratio  0.29% 15.10% 6.75% 11.31% 13.64% 38.29% 
        
        
Capital turnover       
        
Operating income 115411  228,000   186,986   175,520   117,110   67,452  
        
Avg. Tot capital  880,228   809,253   802,404   653,012   365,024   112,102  
        
Ratio   0.13   0.28   0.23   0.27   0.32   0.60  
        
        
Return on equity before tax      
        
Net result before tax 1012 118,844 44,206 67,393 46,317  40,816  
        
EQ  934084 788,586 672,105 611,946 370,872  221,868  
        
Avg. EQ  861335 730345.5 642025.5 491409 296370 163788 
        
Ratio  0.12% 16.27% 6.89% 13.71% 15.63% 24.92% 
        
        
Return on equity after tax      
        
Net result  334  95   7   230   191   171  
        
Avg. EQ  861335 730345.5 642025.5 491409 296370 163788 
        
Ratio  0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.05% 0.06% 0.10% 
        
        
Solidity        
        
Equity ratio       
Master thesis                                                                                                           Spring 2010 
 
 
Eirik Landaas Nilsen & Konrad Dønvik (UiA) 
151 
        
Equity  934084 788586 672105 611946 370872 221868 
        
Equity and liabilities   813,878   804,628   800,180   505,844   224,203  
        
Ratio  #DIV/0! 96.89% 83.53% 76.48% 73.32% 98.96% 
        
  2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
Interest repayment capabilities      
        
Net result before tax 1012 118844 44206 67393 46317 40816 
        
Financial cost 2020 3392 9683 6339 3454 2107 
        
Ratio  1.50 36.04 5.57 11.63 14.41 20.37 
        
        
Finance ratio       
        
Fixed assets  825449  707,853   740,631   752,478   463,933   187,301  
        
Non current liabilities 5684  19,078   108,165   173,500   130,000   -  
        
Total equity  934084 788586 672105 611946 370872 221868 
        
Ratio  87.84% 87.64% 94.92% 95.80% 92.63% 84.42% 
        
        
Debt to equity ratio       
        
Total liabilities 12494  25,292   132,523   188,234   134,972   2,335  
        
Total equities  934,084   788,586   672,105   611,946   370,872   221,868  
        
Ratio  0.01 0.03 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.01 
        
Current debt ratio       
        
Current liabilities 6810  6,214   24,358   14,734   4,972   2,335  
        
Assets  946578  813,878   804,628   800,180   505,844   224,203  
        
Ratio  0.72% 0.76% 3.03% 1.84% 0.98% 1.04% 
        
        
Non current debt 
ratio       
        
Non current liabilities 5684 19078 108165 173500 130000 0 
        
Assets  946578 813878 804628 800180 505844 224203 
        
Ratio  0.60% 2.34% 13.44% 21.68% 25.70% 0.00% 
        
Quick Ratio       
        
Cash+ accounts 
receivable+ short term 
investments 53181 71713 27831 25146 33797 35272 
        
Current liabilities 6810 6214 24358 14734 4972 2335 
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Ratio  7.81 11.54 1.14 1.71 6.80 15.11 
        
        
Operation cash flow ratio      
        
Operating cash flow 57453 169572 95608 101496 66416 49698 
        
Current liabilities  6,810   6,214   24,358   14,734   4,972   2,335  
        
Ratio  8.44 27.29 3.93 6.89 20.41 21.28 
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13 Appendix II 
Odfjell  Norway A-share     
  Date     
Value  37 02.01.2004     
   -6.2% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 34.7 18.03.2009     
   -77.3% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 153 06.09.2005     
       
Value  52 30.12.2009 49.9% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -66.0% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
Frontline Norway      
  Date     
Value  163.52 02.01.2004     
   -30.7% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 113.25 18.03.2009     
   -69.4% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 370 23.06.2008     
       
Value  162 30.12.2009 43.0% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -56.2% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
Frontline USA      
  Date     
Value  25.94 02.01.2004     
   -36.8% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 16.4 03.03.2009     
   -77.1% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 71.76 23.06.2008     
       
Value  27.71 30.12.2009 69.0% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -61.4% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
NAT USA      
  Date     
Value  15.2 02.01.2004     
   50.4% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 22.86 03.03.2009     
   -43.8% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 40.69 20.05.2008     
       
Value  30.07 30.12.2009 31.5% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -26.1% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
Wilh 
wilhelmsen Norway      
  Date     
Value  110.5 02.01.2004     
   -41.4% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 64.75 16.03.2009     
   -75.1% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 260 23.04.2007     
       
Value  122 30.12.2009 88.4% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
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   -53.1% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
OSEBX       
  Date     
Value  173.46 02.01.2004     
   8.5% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 188.23 21.11.2008     
   -64.1% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 524.37 19.07.2007     
       
Value  371.56 30.12.2009 97.4% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -29.1% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
Nasdaq composite      
  Date     
Value  2007 02.01.2004     
   -36.8% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 1269 09.03.2009     
   -55.6% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 2859 31.10.2007     
       
Value  2286 24.12.2009 80.1% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -20.0% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
BDI       
  Date     
Value 4761 02.01.2004     
   -86.0% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 666 04.12.2008     
   -94.4% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 11793 20.05.2008     
       
Value 3005 24.12.2009 351.2% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -74.5% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
BDTI       
  Date     
Value 2122 02.01.2004     
   -78.7% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 453 15.04.2009     
   -80.7% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 2347 23.07.2008     
       
Value 814 24.12.2009 79.7% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -65.3% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
BCTI       
  Date     
Value 1018 02.01.2004     
   -66.1% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 345 15.04.2009     
   -72.1% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 1237 25.04.2008     
       
Value 634 24.12.2009 83.8% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -48.7% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
NYSE       
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  Date     
Value 6451.26 02.01.2004     
   -34.5% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 4225.31 09.3.2009     
   -59.0% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 10311.61 31.10.2007     
       
Value 7255 24.12.2009 71.7% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -29.6% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
Eitzen Bulk  Date     
Value  30 13.01.2004     
   -50.7% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 14.8 17.04.2009     
   -85.1% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 99.5 15.10.2007     
       
Value  40 28.12.2009 170.3% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -59.8% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
 USA      
Diana Shipping  Date     
Value  16.4 04.04.2005     
   -50.9% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 8.06 17.11.2008     
   -81.2% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 42.92 29.10.2007     
       
Value  14.48 30.12.2009 79.7% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -66.3% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
 Norway      
Stolt-Nielsen  Date     
Value  83 02.01.2004     
   -49.4% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 42 09.02.2009     
   -80.2% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 212 16.07.2007     
       
Value  80.25 30.12.2009 91.1% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -62.1% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
 USA      
TEN  Date     
Value  10.6 02.01.2004     
   57.7% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 16.72 23.02.2009     
   -57.0% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 38.9 4.12.2007     
       
Value  14.66 30.12.2009 -12.3% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -62.3% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
       
 Frankfurt      
Mitsui O.S.K Lines Date     
Value  3.08 02.01.2004     
   14.9% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 3.54 08.10.2008     
   -70.3% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 11.9 08.10.2008     
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Value  3.6 30.12.2009 1.7% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -69.7% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
       
 Norway      
Jinhui Shipping  Date     
Value  7.85 02.01.2004     
   -1.9% Change from 2004 to minimum  value 
Minimum value 7.7 08.12.2008     
   -90.4% Change from maximum value to minimum value 
Maximum value 80.5 15.10.2007     
       
Value  25.6 30.12.2009 232.5% Change from minimum value to end of 2009 
   -68.2% Change from maximum value to end of 2009 
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14 Appendix III 
Eitzen      
Return on total assets including financial income  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 
      
EBIT  -53 -279.2 55.107 7.29 
      
Financial income   5.204 1.232 
      
Assets  1428.6  1,470  1,707.80 1,619.40 
      
Avg. 
Assets  1428.6 1469.9 1707.8 1619.4 
      
Tot kap i 
%  -3.71% -18.99% 3.53% 0.53% 
      
      
Debt to Equity ratio     
      
Tot. Debt  1109.4  1,165   1,057   994  
      
Sharehold. Eq 319.2  305   651   625  
      
Ratio  3.48 3.81 1.62 1.59 
      
      
Quick Ratio     
      
Current assets - 
Inventory 176.2 119.3 168.81 118.261 
      
Current liabilities 86.3 801.7 157.178 139.585 
      
Ratio  2.04 0.15 1.07 0.85 
      
      
Stolt-Nielsen     
Return on total assets including financial income  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 
      
EBIT  122.416  202   192   166  
      
Financial income 13.236  12  5.93 11.307 
      
Assets  3212.97 3081.588 2475.6  2,514  
      
Avg. 
Assets  3147.279 2778.594 2494.775  
      
Tot kap i 
%  4.31% 7.71% 7.94%  
      
      
Debt to Equity ratio     
      
Tot. Debt  1695.139  1,765   1,121   1,341  
      
Sharehold. Eq 1515.8  1,316  1354.48 1172.554 
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Ratio  1.12 1.34 0.83 1.14 
      
      
Quick Ratio     
      
Current assets - 
Inventory 310.845 371.671 258.927 248.578 
      
Current liabilities 773.034 955.505 619.505 864.288 
      
Ratio  0.40 0.39 0.42 0.29 
      
      
Diana Shipping      
Return on total assets including financial income  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 
      
EBIT  124.336  226   138   64  
      
Financial income  0.95   0.77   2.67   1.03  
      
Assets  1320.425  1,057  944.342 510.675 
      
Avg. 
Assets  1188.8155 1000.774 727.5085  
      
Tot kap i 
%  10.54% 22.64% 19.33%  
      
      
Debt to Equity ratio     
      
Tot. Debt  321.1  282   145   148  
      
Sharehold. Eq 999.325  776   799   363  
      
Ratio  0.32 0.36 0.18 0.41 
      
      
Quick Ratio     
      
Current assets - 
Inventory 297.156 68.554 21.514 19.062 
      
Current liabilities 32.386 20.012 20.96 7.63 
      
Ratio  9.18 3.43 1.03 2.50 
      
      
Jinhui shipping     
Return on total assets including financial income  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 
      
EBIT  161.484  257   104   58  
      
Financial income  1.19   1.85  2.63 1.018 
      
Assets  977.682  881  818.77 452.105 
      
Avg. 
Assets  929.4975 850.0415 635.4375 226.0525 
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Tot kap i 
%  17.50% 30.41% 16.81% 26.04% 
      
      
Debt to Equity ratio     
      
Tot. Debt  562.733  502   506   224,797  
      
Sharehold. Eq 669.483  515   313   227  
      
Ratio  0.84 0.97 1.62 988.95 
      
      
Quick Ratio     
      
Current assets - 
Inventory 254.4 134.3 89.849 73.506 
      
Current liabilities 148.108 113.135 125.601 41.339 
      
Ratio  1.72 1.19 0.72 1.78 
      
      
      
TEN. Takos energy navigation ltd.     
Return on total assets including financial income  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 
      
EBIT  72405  278,838   249,702   205,246  
      
Financial income 3547  8,406  14240 33646 
      
Assets  2549720  2,602,317  2362776 1969875 
      
Avg. 
Assets  2576018.5 2482546.5 2166325.5 984937.5 
      
Tot kap i 
%  2.95% 11.57% 12.18% 24.25% 
      
      
Debt to Equity ratio     
      
Tot. Debt  1635393  1,987,202   1,508,236   1,214,602  
      
Sharehold. Eq 914327  915,115   854,540   755,273  
      
Ratio  1.79 2.17 1.76 1.61 
      
      
Quick Ratio     
      
Current assets - 
Inventory 458633 359862 263987 214062 
      
Current liabilities 264231 189488 159265 101430 
      
Ratio  1.74 1.90 1.66 2.11 
      
      
      
Mitsui osk lines     
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Return on total assets including financial income  
  2009 2008 2007 2006 
      
EBIT  20939  197,211   291,284   168,073  
      
Financial income 19996  31,401  38992 34806 
      
Assets  1807097  1,900,551  1639940 1470824 
      
Avg. 
Assets  1853824 1770245.5 1555382  
      
Tot kap i 
%  2.21% 12.91% 21.23%  
      
      
Debt to Equity ratio     
      
Tot. Debt  1125609  1,112,058   1,148,898   1,018,951  
      
Sharehold. Eq 719532  727,131   641,306   480,091  
      
Ratio  1.56 1.53 1.79 2.12 
      
      
Quick Ratio     
      
Current assets - 
Inventory 352030 428597 506077 405473 
      
Current liabilities 355185 440909 528390 482810 
      
Ratio  0.99 0.97 0.96 0.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
